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I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing controversy over intellectual property protection for
computer programs is the latest battle in the centuries-old war be-
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tween those who favor intellectual property protection and those who
oppose it.1 The conflict over computer programs, however, has an in-
ternecine aspect-if you will, a civil war among protectionists. It is not
so much a question of whether computer programs should be pro-
tected, but rather which form of protection should be the exclusive or
even dominant one. These combatants may be loosely grouped into
various camps: pro-copyright, pro-patent, pro-sui generis (a separate
title of protection), and those favoring or opposing various combina-
tions of the foregoing.2 There are, of course, some anti-protectionists
1. The first patent statute was enacted in Venice in 1474. See Giulio Mandich, Vene-
tian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 166, 176-77 (1948)(translating the
statute). The English Monopolies Act of 1623 permitted the granting of patents
on inventions as an exception to the general exclusion of monopolies. Statute of
Monopolies Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 3, reprinted in 33 HAIsBURY'S STATUTES OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 5-7 (1987). The sense of the times following the American
Revolution is reported in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966):
Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopo-
lies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution, and Jeffer-
son certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the
new government. His abhorrence of monopoly extended initially to pat-
ents as well. From France, he wrote to Madison (July 1788) urging a Bill
of Rights provision restricting monopoly, and as against the argument
that limited monopoly might serve to incite "ingenuity" he argued force-
fully that "the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be
opposed to that of their general suppression," V Writings of Thomas Jef-
ferson, at 47 (Ford ed., 1895).
The first U.S. patent was enacted in 1791. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-
112 (1790). In the latter half of the nineteenth century, significant anti-patent
sentiment developed calling for the abolishment of existing patent systems. See
EDITH PENROSE, THE EcoNoMIcs OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 12-17
(1951); Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nine-
teenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950). The U.S. may currently be said to be
in a pro-patent phase after a half century of anti-patent sentiment. See irnra note
243.
The first English copyright statute was enacted in 1709, Statute of Anne, 1709, 8
Ann., ch. 19 (Eng.). Opposing the extension of the term of copyright, in a speech
before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), Thomas Macaulay argued.
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptional
way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil.
For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought
not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the
good.
Reprinted in PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED
STATE DocTRINEs 3 (3d ed. 1990)[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, CASEBOOK], citing MA-
CAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY 731, 733-37 (G. Young ed., 1967). The first U.S. Copy-
right Act was enacted in 1791. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124-126. U.S.
copyright law may also be said to be in a pro-protectionist phase. See infra note
243. See generally BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAw (1967)(history of U.S. patent and copyright law).
2. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright- A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281 (19 70)(oppos-
ing copyright protection for computer programs on economic grounds); Donald S.
Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 (1986)[hereinaf-
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who would favor little, if any, intellectual protection for computer
ter Chisum, Algorithms](advocating patent protection of algorithms); Anthony L.
Clapes, Patrick Lynch & Mark R. Steinberg, Silicon Epics and Binary Bards:
Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1493 (1987)(advocating copyright protection of computer pro-
grams as literary works); John M Conley & Robert M. Bryan, A Unifying Theory
for the Litigation of Computer Software Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 563 (1985)(advo-
cating modified copyright protection with focus in infringement actions shifted to
defendant's conduct and economic advantage rather than on substantial similar-
ity; Duncan M. Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 1037 (1986)(supporting evolution of copyright law for program protection
rather than sui generis legislation); Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in
Computer Programs, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1119 (1986)(acknowledging the co-exist-
ence of copyright and patent protection with respect to computer programs but
cautioning against extending copyright protection to functional elements); Den-
nis S. Karjala, Copyright Computer Software, and the New Protectionis7, 28
JURMMTRICS J. 33 (1987)(advocating specialized form of copyright protection, dis-
tinguished by emphasis on "piracy" copying combined with a reduction of com-
petitive edge); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer
Software, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1329 (1987)(opposing copyright protection and sug-
gesting hybrid form of patent protection); Raymond Nimmer & Patricia A.
Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology Infringement Defining Third
Party Development Rights, 62 INi. L.J. 13 (1986)(opposing copyright protection
for author only; suggesting apportionment of rights between authors and value-
added users to encourage dissemination, exchange, and use of ideas); Leo J. Ras-
kind, The Uncertain Case for Special Legislation Protecting Computer Software,
47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1131 (1986) (recommending congressional hearings to ascertain
whether incremental changes in copyright law may provide a feasible alternative
to a sui generis system of protection); J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as
Applied Scientfic Know-how: Implications of Copyright Protectionfor Commer-
cialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989)[hereinafter Reichman,
Computer Programs](advocating sui generis protection because patents provide
too much protection to too few programs and copyright provide too little protec-
tion to too many programs); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case
Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Inven-
tions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990)[hereinafter Samuelson, Benson Revis-
ited](opposing patent protection and advocating sui generis protection); Pamela
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Analyzing the Lessons
of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471 (1995)[hereinafter
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property] (advocating sui generis
protection); Pamela Samuelson, CONU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J.
666 [hereinafter Samuelson, CONTU Revisited](opposing copyright protection
and advocating sui generis protection); Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Al-
gorithm War:. Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J.
371 (1991)[hereinafter Stern, Algorithm War](advocating a two-tiered system-
patent and sui generis); John P. Sumner & Steven W. Lundberg, Patentable Com-
puter Program Features as Uncopyrightable Subject Matter, 17 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 237
(1989)(advocating preempting copyright by patent if a "utility patent claim can be
written on a functional, utilitarian feature specified by a computer program").
Apologies are extended to the above authors for the gross over-generalization of
their views but the intent here is only to illustrate the wide diversity of views
held.
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programs.3
Under the current state of the law, it can be said with a reasonable
degree of legal certainty that computer programs 4(including algo-
ritbms)5 qualify as the subject matter of both copyrights 6 and patents, 7
3. See, e.g., Mitchell D. Kapor, co-creator of Lotus 1-2-3, who in testimony before a
congressional subcommittee stated-
Congress could help bath the software industry and its customers if,
when it passes laws, their legislative histories tell the courts that when
they consider a copyright case, they should err on the side of innovation
over protection.
Study: U.S. Software Needs Legal Protection, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 11, 1990,
§ 7, at 7.
4. Computer program will generally be used interchangeably with "software" as
sets of instructions for computers, with the understanding that software may be
more broadly defined as also including databases. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY AssESsMENT, COMPUTER SOFTWARE & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
BACKGROUND PAPER 1 n.1 (March 1990), [hereinafter OTA BACKGROUND PAPER].
A definition of computer program was added by amendment to the Copyright Act
of 1976 (17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)): "A 'computer program' is a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring
about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), as amended by Act of Rec. 12,1980,
Pub. L. 96-517 (1980). No statutory definition of computer program is included in
the Patent Act. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
5. A distinction can be drawn between a computer program and an algorithm in the
sense that an algorithm is expressed at a higher level of abstraction which must
be transformed along with implementing details into a computer program for use
in a computer. See OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 4, at 2. Justice Stevens,
in dissent in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175,219 (1981), unsuccessfully urged the
Court to provide an "unequivocal explanation that the term 'algorithm'... is sy-
nonymous with the term 'computer program.'" See also Allen Newell, Response:
The Models are Broken, the Models are Broken!, 47 PrIT. L. REv. 1023, 1029
(1986)(maintaining that algorithms and programs are indistinguishable). An im-
portant legal distinction made with respect to algorithms is between mathemati-
cal and nonmathematical algorithms. The genesis of this distinction is found in
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972), where the Court defined "[a] proce-
dure for solving a given type of mathematical problem ... as an 'algorithm.'"
The Court then went on to hold that such a "mathematical algorithm" did not
constitute patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Id. at 71-72.
The Court, however, cautioned: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for
any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold." Id. at 71.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and its successor
the Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and finally the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (PTO) have taken the distinction between
mathematical and nonmathematical algorithms seriously. See infra
notes 253-258 and accompanying text. In a recent CAFC case, Judge
Rich summarized as follows:
We note these discussions of the meaning of "algorithm" to take the
mystery out of the term and we point out once again that every step-by-
step process, be it electronic or chemical or mechanical, involves an al-
gorithm in the broad sense of the term. Since § 101 expressly includes
processes as a category of inventions which may be patented and § 100(b)
further defines the word "process" as meaning "process, art or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, com-
position of matter, or material," it follows that it is no ground for holding
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with perhaps a caveat in copyright law to account for the possibility of
a claim is directed to nonstatutory subject matter to say it includes or is
directed to an algorithm. This is why the proscription against patenting
has been limited to mathematical algorithms and abstract mathematical
formulae which, like the laws of nature, are not patentable subject
matter.
In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989). See infra note 262 for a dis-
cussion of this case. See also Newell, supra, at 1024, who from the viewpoint of a
computer scientist, maintains that such a distinction is "doomed." The distinction
will be made herein whenever it is deemed pertinent.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1988) defines copyrightable subject matter as:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
1. literary works;
2. musical works, including any accompanying words;
3. dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
4. pantomimes and choreographic works;
5. pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
6. motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
7. sound recordings; and
8. architectural works.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the statutory subject issue under
§ 102, lower courts have uniformly held that computer programs are copyrightable sub-
ject matter as "literary works" under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)(1988). See, e.g., Williams
Electronics, Inc. v. Artie Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982)(both source and ob-
ject cede statutory subject matter); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)(operating system
programs in source and object code statutory subject matter fixed in a read-only mem-
ory); accord, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.
1984).
Paragraph (b) of 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) defines the subject matter that is excluded
from being copyrightable:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work
It may be interesting to speculate on how the Copyright Act definition of a com-
puter program may be distinguished from a "procedure" or a "process" or a
"method of operation," as excluded by § 102(b).
7. Patentable subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
This is an exclusive listing compared to the nonexcusive listing in § 102(a) of the
Copyright Act. '"The use of the word 'include', as defined in section 101, makes
clear that the listing is 'illustrative and not limitative', and that the seven catego-
ries do not necessarily exhaust the scope of 'original works of authorship' that the
bill is intended to protect." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976).
After a rough start in Benson and then in Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978) (holding that tacking on insignificant post-solution activity to an algorithm
did not qualify as patentable subject matter), the Supreme Court held in Dia-
1993]
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the merger of idea and expressions and a caveat in patent law to ac-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), that a process for curing natural rubber under
the control of an algorithm was patentable subject matter. Both prior to and af-
ter Diehr, the CCPA and the CAFC have taken a narrow view of the exclusion-
ary scope of these cases, in essence limiting them to when a mathematical
algorithm is claimed and the claim preempts the algorithm. The cases are ex-
haustively collected and discussed in Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, and Sam-
uelson, Benson Revisted, supra note 2, although sometimes giving different
interpretations. See also U.S. Patent Office Trademark Office, Patentable Sub-
ject Matter- Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106 OFFICIAL
GAzETTE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 5 (1989), [hereinafter PTO, Mathematical
Algorithms](defining the test to be applied by the PTO for separating patentable
from nonpatentable algorithm claims), and infra text accompanying notes 253-
258. See generally H.W.A.M. HANNEMAN, THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER
SOFrwARE (1985).
8. The doctrine of merger has been described as follows:
We have already seen that copyright protects expression but that
ideas are statutorily free to all. In some circumstances, however, there is
a "merger" of idea and expression, such that a given idea is inseparably
tied to a particular expression. In such instances, rigorously protecting
the expression would confer a monopoly over the idea itself, in contra-
vention of the statutory command. To prevent that consequence, courts
have invoked the merger doctrine. In other words, given the dilemma
either of protecting original expression even when that protection can be
leveraged to grant an effective monopoly over the idea thus expressed, or
of making the idea free to all with the concomitant result that the plain-
tiff loses effective copyright protection even over the precise original ex-
pression used, copyright law chooses the latter course.
3 MELVILLE B. NIMnER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[B][3](1992)(footnotes omitted)[hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT] Nim-
mer concludes, however, that merger is better considered as a defense to infringe-
ment rather than a bar to copyrightability. Id. at 13-66 to 13-67.
An example where this doctrine was applied with respect to computer pro-
grams is Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computer Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978)(organization and configuration of input formats ideas not ex-
pression). Cf. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1239-40 (3d Cir. 1986) cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987)(rejecting reasoning of
Synercom and holding the structure, sequences and organization of a program
expression. See also Plains Cotton Coop. Assn. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv.,
Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987)(rejecting Whe-
Ian approach and indicating that the similarities between the programs were
"dictated by the externalities of the cotton market").
Professor Goldstein analyzes the divergent approaches of Synercom and Whe-
lan as follows:
The Synercom approach starts from the program's literal expression and
characterizes as the program's unprotectible "ideas" all elements whose
monopolization will disable public access to its functions. The Whelan
approach starts at the opposite pole, with the work's most fundamental
idea-in Whelan the idea of "the efficient management of a dental labo-
ratory"--and characterizes all remaining elements as protectible "ex-
pression."
Of the two approaches to the idea-expression distinction in computer
programs, the Synercom approach conforms more closely to the tradi-
tional principles that underlie the distinction. Whelan's error was in
treating the program's animating concept-the idea of an efficiently
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count for ineptness or overzealousness in claiming.9 Starting from the
premise of overlapping protectability, this article will analyze in a
comparative manner the economic case in Part II and the general
(legal and policy) case in Part III for the respective systems -f copy-
right and patent protection for computer programs '(including algo-
rithms). In Part H, a model will be introduced for evaluating the costs
and benefits of the respective systems. This model will consider
whether the current systems of patent or copyright production induce
a high yield of inventions or works of authorship directed to computer
programs that would not otherwise be created but for the respective
protective systems. In addition, the present systems will be evaluated
to determine whether the incentives they provide are excessive, un-
necessary, and costly in view of other, particularly market, incentives
for the creation of computer programs. Next, various models of the
interfaces of the patent and copyright systems as they relate to com-
puter programs will be analyzed, with particular attention paid to the
economic consequences that may result from a particular legal deter-
mination of the interface model.
In Part I, legal and policy considerations will be comparatively
addressed as they relate to the general case for or against patent pro-
tection for computer programs, including-. the anti-patent sentiment;
protection of processes not involving the transformation of matter, in-
cluding methods of doing business, in an evolving service economy; the
specter of patent infringement by thinking;, the constitutionality of
managed dental laboratory---as the work's only idea, and in overlooking
that "idea" in copyright law is only a metaphor for those elements that
copyright principle requires to go unprotected.
1 PAuL GOLDsTEiN, COPYRIGHT § 2.15.2, at 210 (1989)(footnotes omit-
ted)[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT].
9. With the wisdom borne of Diehr and more recent CAFC cases such as In re
Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989), it appears that the claims in Benson and
Fook could be re-drafted by a competent claim drafter to conform to the evolved
standard under § 101. In Diehr, Justice Stevens pointed out that the distinction
between Diehr and Fook was not in the inventions but in how they were claimed.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 211 n.32 (1981). He quotes from an article, in
which the claims in Diehr were converted to the Flook style. See David A. Blu-
menthal & Bruce D. Riter, Statutory or Non-Statutory?: An Analysis of the Pat-
entability of Computer Related Inventions, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 454, 505 (1980).
The converse, from Fook to Diehr style, should present no drafting problem,
with the proviso that a transformation of matter is not required to satisfy the
definition of a process, under § 101. See infra text accompanying notes 263-272.
Overzealousness in claiming may be seen in cases such as In re Grams, 888
F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) and In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982), where no
reference is made in the claims to computer programs or functions. For example,
in Meyer, at oral argument applicants' counsel admitted that "the claims recite a
mathematical algorithm, which represents a mental process that a neurologist
should follow." In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982). See infra text
accompanying notes 273-296 (discussing the mental process doctrine in patent
law).
1993]
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protecting programs by both copyright and patent; assumptions con-
cerning a causal relation between intellectual property and the growth
of the computer industry; and advocacy for and problems associated
with the establishment of a sui generis system of protection for com-
puter programs.
The conclusions drawn, on a relative basis, are that a somewhat
easier (but not an entirely easy) overall case can be made for patent
protection of computer programs than for copyright protection under
the current state of patent and copyright law and that a sui generis
system offers speculative advantages, at best, over the present
systems.
II. THE ECONOMIC CASE
A. Benefits and Costs of Patent and Copyright Systems
Article I, section 8, clause 8 (the patent/copyright clause) of the
Constitution grants Congress the power: "To promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover-
ies. ' 10 The intent of the clause appears to be instrumentalist in philos-
ophy,'1 although there would seem to be an underlying moralistic
10. Both James Madison and Charles Pinckney submitted proposals for this clause.
It was adopted without debate. See Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 112-14 (1929). Written in a
style typical of the late nineteenth century, this clause may be dissected into two
parallel subclauses, with "Science," "Authors," and "Writings" referring to copy-
rights ("Science" at that time meaning "knowledge" in general) and with "Useful
Arts," "Inventors," and "Discoveries" referring to patents. See 1 ERNEST BAIN.
BRIDGE Lipscom III, WALKER ON PATENTS § 2:1 at 73 (3d ed. 1984).
The constitutional language with respect to copyrightable works is "writings."
This is reflected in the Copyright Act of 1909: "The works for which copyright
may be secured under this title shall include all the writings of an author." § 4, 61
Stat. 654, (1947). In the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), copyrightable
subject matter is referred to as "works of authorship." See infra note 333, for
further discussion on the narrower formulation of the 1976 Act.
The word "discovery" is used in the patent/copyright clause with the evident
intent to mean "invention." In the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1988), the term
"invention" is tautologically defined to mean "invention or discovery."
11. Instrumentalist in the sense of its intent to produce a net benefit to society in
exchange for the grant of exclusivity. The underlying theory is that a patent is a
privilege granted in exchange for providing society with an invention. With re-
spect to patents, see STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYS-
TEM, STUDY No. 15 (Comm. Print 1958)(Fritz Machlup auth.)[hereinafter Mach-
lup] and PENROSE, supra note 1, where two economic theses are analyzed. The
first is the "monopoly-profit-incentive" thesis to the effect that a lottery-type of
patent system is needed in order to induce sufficient investment in inventions.
Machlup, supra, at 21, 25; PENROSE, supra, at 26-31. The second is the "exchange-
for-secret" thesis, where the system induces an inventor to disclose the invention
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aspect,' 2 at least for true believers. The legislation implementing this
clause,13 thus, should be designed to promote "science"'14 and the "use-
that would otherwise be kept secret. Machlup, supra, at 24-25; PENROSE, supra
note 1, at 32-34.
With respect to copyright, see Breyer, supra note 2 (questioning copyright pro-
tection on moral and economic rationales). Cf. Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic
Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor
Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971)(challenging Breyer's economic
conclusions).
12. The natural rights or property theory of intellectual property is reflected in the
French Patent Act of 1791, where the right to an invention is one of the "rights of
man" and not dependant on the state granting a privilege. Machlup, supra note
11, at 22. But see, A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in
the Twenty-First Century, 38 AMER. UNIv. L. REv. 1097, 1105 (1989)[hereinafter
Oddi, Invention Protection], (discussing the qualifications on the grant as reflect-
ing less than a pure-right system). See Machlup, supra note 11, at 21, 23, and
PENROSE, supra note 1, at 26-31, for a critical discussion of the natural-law thesis.
Indeed, Thomas Jefferson was critical of this theory, as indicated in Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1966)(quoting a letter from Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson in 1813):
It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive fermentation of an indi-
vidual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in exclusive and stable
property... That ideas should freely spread from one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improve-
ment of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently
designed by nature... and like the air in which we breathe, move, and
have our physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropri-
ation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
A second moralistic theory is that justice requires a reward proportionate to
the invention's usefulness to society. See, eg., PENROSE, supra note 1, at 29-30,
concluding that justice cannot be guaranteed, noting the relative importance of
scientific discoveries to commercially successful inventions. See also Breyer,
supra note 2, at 284-91, who critically discusses the moral justification for copy-
right protection on a property or reward theory. See generally Tom G. Palmer,
Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justized? The Philosophy of Property
Rights and Ideal Obects, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL. 817 (1990); Dale A. Nance,
Foreword- Owning Ideas, 13 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL. 757 (1990).
13. The First Congress enacted both copyright and patent legislation. The Copyright
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, protected charts and books, being pat-
terned after the Statute of Anne, 1709, 8 Ann., ch. 19 (Eng.). The Patent Act of
April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112, protected "any useful art, manufacture, en-
gine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or
used ... " Id. at 110.
14. The late Eighteenth century definition of "science" is broader than its modern
one. It is perhaps better translated today as "knowledge." See supra note 10.
Some authors in the context of computer programs have begun equating "sci-
ence" with "liberal arts." See, eg., Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at
1112, 1129 n.414. Presumably, this usage is to avoid any implication that there
may be some overlap between the subject matter of copyright and patent if the
broader term "knowledge" were used to translate "science." See infra text ac-
companying notes 186-202, for a discussion of the potential overlap. See also, Karl
B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A ClarOifcation of the Patent Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949), (arguing against any overlap on
the rationale that this would have the potential for placing too high a qualitative
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ful arts"' 5 by providing the incentive of time-limited exclusivity for
the creation of writings and inventions. The overall benefit hence to
be obtained by society by virtue of the copyright and patent systems is
that writings and inventions will be made publicly available through
marketing or, at least, by disclosing them, for improving the overall
efficiency of the economy and the general well-being.1 With such in-
centives, works of authorship and inventions that might not otherwise
be made, or that would otherwise be delayed, will be made available to
society and redound to its benefit.17
Whether the patent and copyright statutes have served this instru-
mentalist purpose over the past two hundred plus years would seem to
depend upon the validity of two underlying assumptions.'s The first is
standard for patent protection if both the useful arts and science have to be
promoted).
15. Perhaps a modern day translation of the term "useful arts" would be "industrial
arts" or "technology" or "technological arts." Although the term has never
caught on in the United States, "industrial property" is commonly used through-
out the world. As stated in Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, signed at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, Art. 1(2) - (3)[hereinafter Paris
Convention]:
(2) The protection of industrial property has as its object patents, utility
models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names, in-
dications of source or appellations of origin, and the repression of unfair
competition.
(3) Industrial property shall be understood in the broadest sense and shall
apply not only to industry and commerce proper, but likewise to agri-
cultural and extractive industries and to all manufactured or natural
products, for example, wines, grain, tobacco leaf, fruit, cattle, minerals,
mineral waters, beer, flowers, and flour.
The term "intellectual property" is of more recent vintage and is now used as the ge-
neric term:
"[I]ntellectual property" shall include the rights relating to:
- literary, artistic and scientific works,
- performances of performing artists, phonograms, and broadcasts,
- inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
- scientific discoveries,
- trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations,
- protection against unfair competition, and all other rights resulting from intel-
lectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields. Conven-
tion Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, signed at
Stockholm, July 14, 1967, Art. 2 (viii).
Technology or technological arts, on the other hand, may have a broader connotation
than "industrial arts," if there is any implication that the word "industrial" is limited to
the production of goods and does not extend to the provision of services. The Copyright
Act of 1790 included "useful arts" as one of the statutory classes. See supra note 13. In
this context "art" may be better translated today as "process or method." In the current
patent act the term "process" is defined to mean "process, art or method.. ." 35 U.S.C.
§ 100.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 58-69 (analyzing the relative benefits occur-
ring from the copyright and patent systems).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
18. Professor Turner succinctly expresses these as follows:
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that society needs more inventions and works of authorship than
would otherwise be provided in the absence of external incentives.
The second is that the exclusivity provided by patents and copyrights
is the needed incentive for the production of an adequate (efficient)
number of inventions and works of authorship.
Assuming these assumptions to be warranted,19 there are still sig-
nificant costs associated with a system of exclusivity, albeit a time-lim-
ited one. Various authorities have discussed the economic costs (as
well as the benefits) associated with having patent and copyright sys-
tems, although more emphasis has been placed on the former.20 To
the extent that "functional" features of computer programs are pro-
The basic rational of the patent system can be simply put. The economic
case rests upon two propositions: first, that we should have more inven-
tion and innovation than our economic system would provide in the ab-
sence of special inducement; and second, that the granting of a statutory
monopoly to inventors for a period of years is the best method of provid-
ing such special inducement.
Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
450, 450-451 (1969).
19. Professor Turner concludes that "[n]one of these propositions is entirely free
from doubt." Id at 451.
20. With respect to patents, see generally the classic studies by Machlup, supra note
11, and PENROSE, supra note 1; more recent studies include Turner, supra note 18;
F. M. SCHERER, INDuSrIAL MALRKE' STRucTURE ANID ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
442-54 (2d ed. 1980)[hereinafter SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL]; Robert F. Dale & James
K. Huntoon, A Cost-Benefit Study of the Domestic and International Patent Sys-
tems, .1 IDEA 351 (1967); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966); Alden F.
Abbott, Developing a Framework for Intellectual Property Protection to Advance
Innovation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND
ECONOMC PERFORMANCE 311-36 (Francis W. Rushing & Carole G. Brown eds.,
1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1017 (1989). For the purposes of
the present analysis, the topology of the costs outlined by Professor Turner will
be generally used.
With respect to copyright, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989), (footnotes
omitted), who indicate:
Intellectual property is a natural field for economic analysis of law,
and copyright is an important form of intellectual property. Yet while
there are good introductions to the economics of copyright law, and a
number of excellent articles on the economics of copying (as distinct
from copyright law), no article examines the field of copyright as a
whole, discussing the evolution and major doctrines in the law from an
economic standpoint. This article, which is in the spirit of our recent
articles on the economics of trademark law, tries to fill this gap-
although the field is so vast that our analysis cannot be exhaustive. As in
most of our work, we are particularly interested in positive analysis, and
specifically in the question to what extent copyright law can be ex-
plained as a means for promoting efficient allocation of resources.
Leading articles on these issues are cited by Landes & Posner. Id at 325 n. 2.
Included on this listing are the classic studies by Arnold Plant: ARNOLD PLANT,
THE NEw COmiERCE IN IDEAS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1953); and Arnold
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:351
tected by both copyright and patent, the costs attributable to the pat-
ent system may be reasonably extrapolated to the copyright system. 21
Within the assumed extrapolation, the relative costs of protecting
computer programs by patent or copyright can be compared.
One cost element is that of administering the respective systems. 22
For the grant of patents, an examination system is employed for ascer-
taining whether the patent application meets the formal requirements
of the statute and Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) regulations,23
and whether the claimed invention meets the qualitative standards of
the statute.2 4 This process entails the cost of separating patentable
from nonpatentable inventions-both by the applicant prior to filing
and by the PTO in the examination process. 25 The difficulty of search-
ing applications for computer-related inventions by the PTO has long
been urged as one of the cost elements of using the patent system for
their protection.26 The costs of preparing and prosecuting patent ap-
plications must also be considered.27 Relatively high filing, issuance,
and maintenance fees are also imposed with respect to patents.28 In
addition, the administrative costs include evaluations of whether there
is infringement by third parties or infringement with respect to pat-
ents of others29 and the costs of enforcing and defending patent in-
Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 (1934). See
also Breyer, supra note 2.
21. For further discussion of the functionality of computer programs, see infra text
accompanying notes 195-210.
22. Turner, supra note 18, at 454.
23. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.809 (1991); with respect to
the contents of an application (§ 1.51); language, paper, writing, margins (§ 1.52),
and drawings (§§ 1.81, 1.83, 1.84).
24. The qualitative standards are: novelty (objective)(35 U.S.C. § 102); non-obvi-
ousness (35 U.S.C. § 103) and utility (35 U.S.C. § 101). Originality (subjective) is
also required (35 U.S.C. § 102(f)).
25. Usually a pre-examination search of the prior act is undertaken at the expense of
the applicant or assignee.
26. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE
THE PROGRESS OF ... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY
(1966)[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
27. See infra note 137 and accompanying text for an estimate of these costs.
28. "Revenues from fees shall be available to the Commissioner to carry out, to the
extent provided in appropriation Acts, the activities of the Patent and Trademark
Office." 35 U.S.C. § 42(c)(1988). The overall budget for the PTO in fiscal year
1992 is $426 million, being made up largely from user fees. See New PTO Fees
Took Effect Dec. 16, 43 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 132-33 (1992).
See infra note 138 (summarizing PTO fees and increases taking effect on Decem-
ber 16, 1991).
29. Policing the market place to determine if there are any infringing products may
be expensive. There is always the difficulty of determining if someone is using an
infringing process in secrecy; this would apply particularly to the use of computer
programs. Introducing a new product may entail considerable expense for patent
clearance to determine if any patents may be infringed.
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fringement claims.3 0
In contrast, the copyright system is one merely of registration, with
very low filing fees and no maintenance fees.31 Thus, the procure-
ment cost of copyright for computer programs is quite low. On the
other hand, significant costs may be imposed because of the uncer-
tainty of the scope of copyright protection granted to computer pro-
grams. If infringement cannot be determined with a reasonable
degree of legal certainty, costly litigation and underutilization may
occur.
3 2
Another cost element is the use of research expenditures to avoid
the intellectual property rights of others.33 In the patent sense this is
generally termed "inventing around," which tends to be wasteful
when an efficient solution to the problem has already been devised.
30. Litigation costs in patent infringement cases can be considerable depending upon
the complexity of the case. A sampling of recent patent infringement cases
shows: Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies and Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649 (Fed.
Cir. 1985)($79,000); Mirafi Inc. v. Murphy, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1337 (W.D.N.C.
1989)($175,000); Padco, Inc. v. Newell co., 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1607 (E.D. Wis.
1988)($231,000 for 2071.4 hours of work); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.,
658 F. Supp. 980 (N.D. IM. 1987)($150,000); Advance Transformer Co. v. Levinson,
No. 79 C 557 (N.D. Ill. 1986)($612,700), 1986 WL 15127. See also 1 L.J. KUTrEN,
COMPUTER SOFIwARE § 3.05 [1][d](sem. ed. rev. vol., 1993)("Patent litigation in-
curs substantially higher attorney fees than other types of litigation .... As a re-
sult, even a small case can generate more than $200,000 in attorney fees."). It
may be noted in passing that in Padco, attorney fees were reduced by $21,200 for
duplication and inefficient work, and in Water Technologies, fees were reduced
from $245,000 to $150,000 because of duplication.
31. Most Copyright Office fees were doubled by the Copyright Fees and Technical
Amendments Act of 1989, 104 Stat. 287 (1990). The registration fee increased
from $10.00 to $20.00. 17 U.S.C. § 708(a)(1)(1988). The budget of the copyright
office in fiscal year 1991 was $22.9 million and estimated to increase to $26 million
in 1992 and $27.4 million in 1993. See BUDGET OF THE UNrrED STATES FISCAL
YEAR 1993, Appendix One-172.
32. Copyright litigation can be expensive even in preliminary stages. See, e.g., Hays v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988)(motion for dismissal - $47,000);
Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. corp., No. 89 Civ. 5094 (MBM), 1991 WL 50278
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991)(motion for dismissal - $130,000); Burger-Moss v. Stein-
man, 127 F.R.D. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(motion for summary judgement - $17,200);
Hulex Music v. Santy, 698 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.H. 1988)(motion for summary
judgement - $10,600); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters.
Inc., 121 F.R.D. 402 (N.D. Cal. 1988)(motion for dismissal - $13,900); Merill v.
County Stores, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1164 (D.N.H. 1987)(motion for summary judge-
ment - $4,600 for 37.9 hours of work). If the case goes to trial, the costs quickly
multiply. See, e.g. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452 (2d
Cir. 1988)(copyright infringement, six weeks - $900,000 +); Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(copyright infringement-
$166,000). The costs of litigation in copyright cases alleging infringement by non-
literal computer programs may approach or even exceed that of comparable pat-
ent litigation. See infra note 373 (discussing such an instance). Expert testimony
becomes increasingly necessary when nonliteral copying of a program is alleged.
33. Turner, supra note 18, at 455.
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This cost would appear to be equally applicable to copyright, where
competitors will have to invest resources in providing alternate com-
puter programs to those already marketed (e.g., by "clean room" tech-
niques) to avoid claims of infringement by "reverse engineering."3 4
With respect to those programs that have become industry standards,
this may prove particularly difficult and costly.35
Another cost element involves the practice of procuring patents
only to block competitors from using the protected invention.3 6 These
so-called "blocking" patents bar competitors from using competing so-
lutions to that used by the blocking patent owner. An alternate solu-
tion may be even more efficient than that used by the patent owner.37
34. The clean room approach to reverse engineering typically involves three groups
of engineers and legal specialists. The first group, referred to as the specification
team, or as the "dirty room" team, (Duncan M. Davidson, Reverse-Engineering of
Software, COMPUTER SOFTwARE 1989: PROTEcnrON MARKETwING, 95-114 (1989)) re-
verse-engineer the competitor's program. Then, the team writes a specification, a
"blackbox" description of the competitor's product, (Norm Alster, New Profits
from Patents, FORTUNE, April 25, 1988, at 185, 190) that is passed on to the clean
room design team, or the "virgins" (Steven Burke, Court Support of "Clean
Room" Cloning May Legalize Intel '386 Chip Work-Alikes, P.C. WK., February 27,
1989 at 63) through the coordination team. Douglas K. Derwin, Licensing
Software Created Under "Clean Room" Conditions, in COMPUTER SoFrwARE
1989: PROTECTION AND MARKErING 439, 448-49 (1989). The coordination team,
usually composed of an engineer and a lawyer, checks the specification to ensure
that none of the knowledge of the trade secrets or copyrightable material which
was obtained through the reverse-engineering is passed on to the design team.
Derwin, supra, at 448-49. The clean room design team must be ignorant of the
competitor's product and is only allowed to view the specification, prepared by
the "dirty" team and approved by the coordinators, and public domain documen-
tation, also cleared by the coordination team. Derwin, supra, at 449, 451.
The purpose of the three-system approach is to have a strong case that any
similarities which might arise in the two products, the copyrighted product and
the accused product, arise only because of the inherent nature of the technology
used and not because of the access to the competitor's product. See NEC Corp. v.
Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1989)(describing the clean room
procedure as compelling evidence that the similarities arise because of the tech-
nology as access to competitor's product is lacking).
Employing the clean room technique adds significantly to the cost of reverse
engineering. For example, with respect to Phoenix Technologies' clone of IBM's
BIOS (Basic Input/Output Software), it has been claimed that Phoenix spent
"nearly twice as much on cloning... as it would have had a clean room not been
necessary." Burke, supra, at 63-64. In fact, the company " 'spent more on legal
fees than to pay [their] technical employees.'" Alster, supra, at 190. The entire
process to "reverse-engineer" the IBM BIOS took 12 months of legal work, 6
months of technical work, and generated an audit paper trail of five volumes at
1000 pages each. Burke, supra, at 64.
Competitors may also incur costs by avoiding reverse- engineering and deny-
ing themselves access to unprotected ideas in a copyrighted program. See infra
note 68.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 119-121.
36. Turner, supra note 18, at 455.
37. For example, a manufacturer may elect to maintain an old design rather than
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As there is no "working" requirement in U.S. patent law,38 a patent
owner may carve out a significantly greater area of technological ex-
clusivity than that actually being used commercially. This cost would
seem to have less applicability to copyright law because of the require-
ment of copying for infringement and hence the need for access to the
program itself.3 9 Nonetheless, it may be expected that, because of the
ease and nominal cost of copyright procurement, substantially all pro-
grams and modifications, including minor ones, will be protected.40
Still another cost introduced by protecting computer programs by
patent or copyright is that investment in developing computer pro-
grams in a specific field or for a particular application may be inhib-
ited.41 If a competitor has already heavily blanketed a particular area
with patents or copyrights or both, the cost of entering the market
may be increased and the overall cost may be increased by lessened
competition. 42 This, again, would be especially true with respect to
computer programs that are recognized in the market as industry
standards.
Another cost element, which historically has been primarily associ-
ated with patents and more recently with copyrights, is that of poten-
tial competitive abuses, including antitrust violations and misuse.43
Some examples of anti-competitive practices that could seriously re-
strain free and fair competition, resulting in underutilization costs, in-
invest in the production of a less costly alternative, which is also protected by a
patent.
38. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (Paper Bag case), 210
U.S. 405 (1908)(holding that since a patent is property, its owner is under no obli-
gation to actually make, use or sell the invention). Compare the United States
with the rest of the world, where the vast majority impose working requirements.
See, 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS §§ 245-
249 (1975). For a comparison of compulsory licensing systems in several different
countries and the categories under which each recognizes compulsory licenses,
see UN=TED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, MANUAL ON LICENSING
PROCEDURES IN MEMBER COUNTRiEs OF THE UNITED NATIONs ECONOMIC CoMMIs-
SION FOR EUROPE, § 5.5.1 (rev. ed. 1991)(section for each country). The Paris Con-
vention, supra note 15, Art. 5A(4), bars contracting states from issuing
compulsory licenses under a patent for "failure to work or insufficient working"
before the longer of four years from the filing date or three years from the grant
of the patent.
39. This is the theory behind "dean room" techniques. However, there are signifi-
cant costs associated with such techniques and the underutilization of reverse en-
gineering. See supra note 34.
40. The costs associated with the overinclusiveness in protecting all computer pro-
grams will be considered, See infra text accompanying notes 140-143.
41. See Turner, supra note 18, at 455.
42. There may be little incentive to invest in developing a new spreadsheet program
due to the multiplicity of programs already on the market. Moreover, the mar-
keting costs to break into the established and heavily protected market may fore-
close investment.
43. Turner, supra note 18, at 455.
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clude price-restrictive licensing, tie-in sales, exclusive grant-backs and
pooling arrangements.44
Costs may also be incurred if there is misallocation of resources in
favor of creating patentable or copyrightable computer programs and
hence away from more fundamental research, which may offer higher
long-term societal benefit.45 It may be expected that investments in
developments that are risky because of the uncertainty of obtaining
protection against competition will be avoided.46 There also may be a
costly misallocation between the development of computer programs
more ideally protected (i.e., at greater benefit or lower cost) by either
copyright or patent.47
Another cost particularly related to the patent system is that a pat-
ent on a particular invention is granted only to the "first inventor,"
and is afforded in rem property status.48 Hence, the investment by the
44. Other abuses include attempting to extend the patent monopoly by dilatory pros-
ecution of patent applications, filing closely related "improvement" patents, and
extending royalty payments beyond the term of the patent. For a discussion of
these forms of patent abuse, as well as those mentioned in the text, see generally
WARD S. BOWMAN JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW, 53-63 (1973); 5 DONALD S.
CHISUM, PATENTS § 19.04 (perm. ed. rev. vol., 1991); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, AN-
TITRUST §§ 116-191 (1977). For a recent case on copyright misuse, see Lasercomb
Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), (holding misuse to be a defense
against copyright infringement without an antitrust violation). In Lasercomb de-
fendant refused a contract restricting the marketing of competitive programs for
the life of the license plus 99 years. Id. at 973. The majority view is to require an
antitrust violation for misuse defenses. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note
8, at 13-144. See also Note, Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of
Antitrust Standards and First Amendment Values, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1289
(1991).
45. See Turner, supra note 18, at 455.
46. Because the fruits of pure research tend to be fundamental truths ("laws of na-
ture") and copyright and patent tend not to protect ideas at such a fundamental
level, investment may be diverted to development of existing technology.
47. For example, if the title of protection of choice for computer programs is copy-
right because of its nominal procurement cost and patent-like protection, costs
may accrue if patent protection affords relatively more benefit.
48. According to the U.S. system, the patent on a given invention can be granted only
to the inventor who qualifies under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(1988) as the first inventor.
The United States and the Philippines are the only remaining countries that
grant patents to the first inventor rather than the first to file. 2 J.W. BAXTER &
JOHN P. SINNOTT, WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 4-6 (perm. ed. rev. vol.
1992). Even if the U.S. enacts a first-to-file system, the problem of independent
development remains. Applicants who lose the race to the PTO may lose their
investment.
In rem property status means that the patent right can be enforced against
anyone, including an independent but second or slower inventor. As defined by
Professor Hohfeld:
A paucital right, or claim (right in personam), is either a unique right
residing in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a single
person (or single group of persons); or else it is one of a few fundamen-
tally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a few defi-
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second, albeit independent, inventor of the same invention may be
lost. Also, competitors may run into a late issuing patent after invest-
ment has been made in the development or even production of a par-
ticular invention.49With respect to copyright, this problem is
minimized because of the need to prove copying and, accordingly, ac-
cess to the particular computer program. However, counterbalanced
against this requirement are the costs of "reinventing the wheel" and
independently developing state-of-the-art programs to avoid a claim of
copying marketed programs.50
The nature of the patent and copyright systems to grant exclusive
rights for a particular invention or work of authorship introduces
costs due to "rent seeking."5 ' Judge Posner defines this term as "the
incentive to overproduce goods that promise a return greater than the
cost of production (that is, an economic 'rent'), and to the resulting
waste when rents are transformed, through competition to obtain
them, into costs." 5 2 Posner analogizes the competition costs to obtain
"rents" from a patented invention to the search for sunken treasure.5 3
If the cost of searching for the treasure or the invention is less than
the value of the treasure or the patent, an incentive is provided for an
accelerated search. However, this incentive may induce multiple com-
petitors for the single prize and thus result in costs exceeding the ben-
efit to society.5 4 These same "rent-seeking" costs would also apply to
nite persons. A multital right, or claim (right in rem), is always one of a
large class offundamentally similar yet separate rights, actual and po-
tential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but avail-
ing res-pectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite
class of people.
WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAIrENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTION 72 (Walter Cook ed.,
1923)(footnotes omitted).
49. Patent applications must be kept in confidence by the PTO. 35 U.S.C. § 122
(1988). As it may take several years for a patent to issue and hence be an enforce-
able right, unsuspecting competitors may thus find themselves infringers upon
the grant of the patent.
50. If competitors, fearing copyright infringement action, refuse to avail themselves
of their "right to copy" ideas within computer programs, which presumably are in
the public domain unless protected by patent, one of the most efficient means of
competing has been foregone. As stated in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989):
From their inception, the federal patent laws have embodied a careful
balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition
that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to
invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.
51. See generally TowARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M.
Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison and Gordon Tullock, eds., 1980)(considering the-
ory, measurement and applications of rent seeking).
52. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAw AND LITERATURE 342 (1988)[hereinafter POSNER,
LITERATURE].
53. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONotiic ANALYSIS OF LAW 35-36 (3d ed. 1986)[hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
54. Posner gives the example where the cost of developing an invention is $250,000
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:351
copyrights,55 and would be particularly costly with respect to com-
puter programs when coupled with the incentive to be first on the
market and the negative incentive of avoiding a charge of copying
someone else's program.
A final cost element, which is of particular relevance to the present
analysis, is that of the denial of access to, and hence the underutiliza-
tion of, inventions or works of authorship protected by patents and
copyrights that would have been created irrespective of any system of
protection, ie., their creation was induced by other than the respective
intellectual property systems.5 6 If there were no patent or copyright
system covering computer programs, those computer programs that
would have come into existence anyway would have been freely acces-
sible by competitors. Underutilization will be costly even if the owner
of the right is willing to license it for a "reasonable" royalty.57
In view of the foregoing costs, whether or not a net benefit accrues
from protecting computer programs by patents or copyright may de-
pend on the magnitude of benefit attributable to such inventions and
and the value of the patent on the invention is $1 million. I& at 36-37. The costs
are multiplied by the number of searchers and the costs of discovery may accord-
ingly be multiplied. However, the multiplied costs may be somewhat less because
the competition is likely to provide the invention sooner. As Posner points out-
'This competition will cause [the widget] to be invented sooner. But suppose it is
invented only one day sooner, the value of having the widget a day earlier will be
less than the cost of duplicating the entire investment in invention." Id- at 36. If
the "widget" is a computer program, the analogy should run to both the costs of
developing inventions and works of authorship.
55. POSNER, LrTERATURE, supra note 52, at 342, where he states:
Still another cost of a broad copyright law stems from what economists
call "rent seeking." This term refers to the incentive to overproduce
goods that promise a return greater than the cost of production (that is,
an economic "rent"), and to the resulting waste when rents are trans-
formed, through competition to obtain them, into costs. suppose that the
cost of creating a new genre, meter, style, plot, or character type were
very low yet whoever was first to create it would, by virtue of copyright
law, have a monopoly of exploiting it. There would be a tremendous
race to be first, and the costs consumed in the race might exceed the
social benefits of accelerated production.
56. See Machlup, supra note 11, at 44; ScHERER, INDuSTRIAL, supra note 20, at 443-44.
The Supreme Court recognized this cost in the context of the qualitative standard
("invention," "nonobviousness") for the granting of a patent in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966).
The difficulty of formulating conditions for patentability was height-
ened by the generality of the constitutional grant and the statutes imple-
menting it, together with the underlying policy of the patent system that
"the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an ex-
clusive patent," as Jefferson put it, must outweigh the restrictive effect
of the limited patent monopoly. The inherent problem was to develop
some means of weeding out those inventions which would not be dis-
closed or devised but for the inducement of a patent.
57. The cost of the royalty plus the transaction costs must be accounted for in the
cost of the product or service. See also Machlup, supra note 11, at 51.
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works of authorship. Benefits cannot be measured solely in terms of
products or services made available for public consumption; benefits
should also include information associated with such products and
services.58 In the case of patents, the Supreme Court has stated the
underlying quid pro quo for the exclusive grant:
When the patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to
the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to
the general store of knowledge are of such importance to the public wealth
that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17 years exclu-
sive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas
and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.5 9
In this regard, there may be a significant difference in the degree of
access afforded to information provided with respect to patented and
copyrighted computer programs. For the grant of a patent, the
claimed invention must be disclosed in the patent application in suffi-
cient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice it.60 Thus, to
obtain a patent on an invention relating to a computer program, the
program must be disclosed in a form enabling a person skilled in the
art to replicate the claimed invention.61 By means of the patent docu-
58. As stated by Professor Parker.
A further strand in the economic logic of patents relates to the diffu-
sion of knowledge. The granting of a patent involves disclosure of the
principles of an invention. In jargon terms, modification of competition
internalises [sic] the benefits of invention, raises the incentive to invent
and accelerates the diffusion of knowledge. Patents are a piece of social
engineering which deliberately support monopoly at the expense of com-
petition on the grounds that the benefits to the community of improving
the potential flow of new knowledge, outweigh the misallocation effects
associated with deliberately creating market imperfections.
J.E.S. PARKER, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION 302 (2d ed. 1978).
See also Jessica IAtman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 185 (1992)(arguing that too much shortsighted emphasis on reduc-
ing the trade deficit through strong protectionism of computer software will
eventually damage the free flow of knowledge and society's access to information
in the future).
59. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988):
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the in-
ventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) requires: "The applicant shall furnish a drawing where
necessary for the understanding of the subject matter sought to be patented." 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1988) provides: "A copy of the specification and drawings shall be
annexed to the patent and be a part thereof."
61. There is no specific statutory requirement for how a computer program is to be
disclosed. The general requirement for all disclosure is 35 U.S.C. § 112, supra
note 60. 37 C.F.R. § 1.96 (1991) further provides:
Descriptions of the operation and general content of computer pro-
gram listings should appear in the description portion of the specifica-
19931
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ment, the public is provided with enabling information concerning the
invention protected by the patent and also to any other information
contained in the document that is not expressly claimed and hence is
in the public domain.6 2 Moreover, once the patented invention is
made publicly available, it is fair game for competitors to ascertain by
reverse engineering any trade secrets the invention might reveal.63
In contrast, copyright protection of a computer program subsists
from its fixation in a tangible medium of expression. There is no re-
quirement for the publication of an enabling disclosure. Indeed, regis-
tration may be effected with the deposit of a limited quantity of source
code with any trade secrets blocked-out.6 4 Copyrighted computer pro-
tion.... The program listing may be either in machine or machine-
independent (object or source) language which will cause a computer to
perform a desired procedure or task such as solve a problem, regulate
the flow of work in a computer, or control or monitor events ....
If the computer program listing is contained on 10 printout pages or
less, it must be submitted either as drawings or as part of the
specification.
The rule then details how program listings may be submitted in the application.
62. 35 U.S.C. § 112:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the appli-
cant regards as his invention.
The underlying policy of specific claiming is set out in General Electric Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)(footnotes omitted):
The limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee,
the encouragement of the inventive genius of others, and the assurance
that the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.
The statute seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the paten-
tee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their
rights. The inventor must "inform the public during the life of the pat-
ent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known
which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license
and which may not." The claims "measure the invention."
Compare the effects of the "doctrine of equivalents", infra note 150.
63. Moreover, if a patent application is filed within one year from the public use, sale
or description in a printed publication of the invention, the invention may still be
protected. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). This "grace period" thus minimizes the need to
rely upon trade secret protection for the invention and induces earlier public ac-
cess to the invention.
64. Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(A)(2)(1991). As
summarized in Copyright Office, Circular 61: Copyright Registration for Com-
puter Programs (June 1991), the following should be filed for new programs:
[Tihe page containing the copyright notice, if any, plus one of the following.
- first and last 25 pages of source code with portions containing trade
secrets blocked out; or
- first and last 10 pages of source code alone, with no block-out por-
tions; or
- first and last 25 pages of object code plus any 10 or more consecutive
pages of source code, with no blocked-out portions; or
- for programs 50 pages or less in length, entire source code with trade
secret portions blocked out.
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grams may be made publicly available only in object (machine reada-
ble) code, typically on floppy disks.65 This access to object code
enables anyone, including those totally unskilled in the art, to copy
easily the object code; however, it provides limited information con-
cerning the underlying program ideas even to those skilled in the
art.6 Indeed, it may require considerable time, effort and expense to
decompile object code to source code by reverse engineering,6 7 and
then at the risk of a claim of copyright infringement.68 In short,
although not intending to over-emphasize the usefulness or timeliness
of the disclosure of a program in a patent,6 9 in all likelihood that infor-
mation content exceeds any contained in the copyrighted work, partic-
ularly when expressed in object code.
65. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN
SOFTWARE, 75-76, (1991)[hereinafter NRC, SOFTWARE IssuEs](indicating that the
decision by IBM to distribute software in object code resulted in the loss of cus-
tomer improvements).
66. Id. at 76-77.
67. See supra note 34. Even using an automatic disassembler, further "time-consum-
ing steps" are required to perfect the decompiled source code, because the assem-
bly listing produced by the disassembler "may not be 100% accurate." Robert S.
Swanke, The Art of Reverse Engineering, COMPUTER LANGUAGE, June 1991, at 57,
58. "As a matter of fact, probably the toughest job in reverse engineering is turn-
ing an executable program into a fully commented source listing. It's usually
quicker to write the program from scratch.. ."
68. Indeed Daniel Bricklin, co-creator of VisiCalc, is reported as saying, "I am not
looking at certain products because I don't want to be accused later of having
copied them." Jane M. Simon, Software Owner Wins "Look and Feel" Victory,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1989, at 43.
69. See, eg., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966), where the Court stated:
However, in light of the highly developed art of drafting patent
claims so that they disclose as little useful information as possible - -
while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible-the argu-
ment based upon the virtue of disclosure must be warily evaluated.
See also, Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 1029 n.52. On the other hand, Daniel Brick-
]in, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Administration of Justice stated: "Nobody reads patents to learn
anything." Intellectual Property, House Panel Holds Second Oversight Hearing
on Software Protection, BNA, DAILY REP. EXEC., Mar. 9, 1990, at A-7. It is per-
haps unfortunate that he had not read Patent No. 3,610,902, filed Oct. 7, 1968,
issued Oct. 5, 1971, to Robert A. Rahencamp and William R. Stewart, Jr. and as-
signed to IBM. The first sentence of the Abstract of this now expired patent
states:
ABSTRACT: An electronic display typing system for use by profes-
sional accountants and statisticians. A cathode-ray display is alternately
utilized to display the contents of a worksheet storage containing all of
the entries and identifications normally placed by an accountant on his
worksheet and to display a scratch pad storage which is utilized by the
accountant for routine, off-the-worksheet calculations.
Figure 1 of the patent shows the now-familiar inverted-L of an electronic spread-
sheet. The first 12 claims of the patent are directed to an "electronic display cal-
culator" note, however, the last claim 13, is for a "method of performing
repetitive arithmetic operations by a calculator ...." Samuelson notes that "IBM
1993]
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Although the respective costs of the patent and copyright systems
are not quantifiable, some insight may be gained from the foregoing
analysis concerning the comparable costs of each system. On a rela-
tive basis, one could rationally conclude that the cost of patent protec-
tion of computer programs is likely to exceed or be as great as that of
copyright protection on all cost elements except the underutilization
cost, which will be further explained below.70 On balance, however,
underutilization by overinclusive protection by copyright may offset
the copyright advantage, particularly when coupled with a diminished
benefit because of a lower knowledge content.
The question of whether patent and copyright systems, together or
separately, which protect all qualifying inventions and works of au-
thorship, produce a net benefit to society over the costs of the systems
has long been the subject of debate and cannot be answered defini-
tively.71 If, however, patent protection could be limited to protecting
only those inventions that were, in fact, induced by the availability of
lawyers claim [this patent] was for a spreadsheet program (claimed in apparatus
form)." Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1039 n.43.
It is interesting to note that Bricklin did not conceive the VisiCalc spreadsheet
program until 1978-a decade after the filing date of the Rahencamp and Stewart
application and 7 years after the patent issued and was available to the public. It
is reported that Bricklin and his partners were advised at the time that the
spreadsheet program was not patentable. See Andrew Pollack, The New High-
Tech Battleground, NEW YORK TIMES, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1, 8. It is not apparent
whether this advice was based on statutory subject matter or on prior art.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 158-172.
71. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers about Intellectual Prop-
erty, in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGiT 19,21 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe Jr. eds., 1986)("[]n the cur-
rent state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the effect on so-
cial welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property.").
See also ScHERER, INDusTRIAL, supra note 20, at 444; Machlup, supra note 11, at
80; David Silverstein, Sharing United States Energy Technology with Less-Devel-
oped Countries: A Model for International Technology Transfer, 12 J. INTL L. &
ECON. 363, 369 (1978).
With respect to copyright, Posner concludes:
One is not even sure that any copyright protection is necessary to
generate the socially optimal amount of book production, given the ad-
vantages that accrue to the first publisher (it takes a while to copy) and
the fact that royalties are usually only a small fraction of the overall cost
of producing and selling a book.
POSNER, LrrERATURE, supra note 52, at 343 (footnote omitted, citing Breyer,
supra note 2, and Tyerman, supra note 11). There would appear to be even less
evidence that broad copyright protection should be extended to computer pro-
grams. See POsNER, LITERATURE, supra note 52, 343-48, on the costs of expanding
copyright protection:
Thus, although an expansion of copyright protection might-as in the
example of copyrighting an entire genre, such as epic-be devastating for
literary creativity, even the existing scope of copyright protection may be
damaging to it .... The more extensive copyright protection is, the more
inhibited is the literary imagination. This is not a good reason for abol-
[Vol. 72:351
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that system, it is generally accepted that a net benefit would be
achieved, as concluded by Professor Scherer:
[E]xcept when innovators' profits come largely from cannibalization of the
profits that would otherwise be enjoyed by the producers of substitute prod-
ucts, it is likely that society as a whole (Le., including both consumers and
producers) gains from inventions and innovations induced or hastened by the
grant of patent rights.7 2
If this generalization can be extended to copyright protection, which
seems justified, at least with respect to those computer programs pro-
viding utility from their use,73 then the present inquiry may focus on
whether the patent and copyright systems are indeed inducing com-
puter programs at an efficient rate compared to nonpatent/
noncopyright-induced programs (ie., induced by the market or other
incentives such as, personal curiosity, desire for fame, promotion, ten-
ure, etc.)7 4
The fundamental problem, of course, is that neither the patent nor
the copyright systems differentiate in their protection of computer
programs, whether they be patent induced, copyright-induced, or mar-
ket-induced. However induced, computer programs are protectible,
provided the formal and qualitative requirements are met. Accord-
ingly, it would follow that the cost to society of protecting computer
programs by patent or copyright increases directly as the ratio of
noninduced to inducedinventions/works of authorship increases. Con-
versely, the cost would decrease where there is higher yield of patent
induced or copyright-induced computer programs.75 A comparative
ishing copyright altogether, as we shall see; but it is a reason possibly for
narrowing it, and more clearly not broadening it.
72. SCHERER, INDusTRIAL, supra note 20, at 443; Douglas F. Greer, The Case Against
Patent Systems in Less-Developed Countries, 8 J. INT'L L. & ECoN. 223,224 (1973).
("Nevertheless, it can be formally demonstrated that the economic benefits of
such inventions (in the form of production cost savings or new product consump-
tion utilities) always exceed those social costs to yield a net social benefit."); see
also Alfred E. Kahn, The Role of Patents, in COMPETION CARTELS AND THER
REGULATION 308, 311 (John P. Miller ed., 1962)("So long as the innovation would
not have been forthcoming without the patent, this social cost must always be less
than the benefit; but of course the converse is equally true.").
73. It should be borne in mind that the premise here is a narrowly focused one, viz.,
where a given computer program is posited to satisfy the subject matter defini-
tions of both copyright and patent.
74. PARKER, supra note 58, at 39:
There are a great number of influences that may induce invention.
These may include personal gain, curiosity, the outpourings of genius,
the pressure of necessity, the type of competition, random and chance
events, and economic forces in general. However, there is a growing con-
sensus that economic forces are predominant.
See also Newell, supra note 5, at 1034.
75. The underlying assumption is, of course, that those computer programs not in-
duced by either the patent or copyright system would be freely available for use
by competitors and consumers. Trade secret protection may impede the free ac-
cess to certain computer programs, but this protection would apply whether or
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analysis of induced versus noninduced inventions/works of authorship
will be undertaken in Section B.
Costs would also increase when computer programs could have
been induced with lower incentives than those provided under the pat-
ent or copyright system. In other words, the inventions/works of au-
thorship could have been created at a lower cost than that afforded by
the exclusivity and scope of protection afforded by patents or copy-
rights.76 A comparable analysis of incentives will be undertaken in
Section C.
B. Induced and Noninduced Inventions/Works of Authorship
The ability of the patent or copyright system, or indeed both, to
induce inventions or writings may be seen as comprising a "bundle" of
inducements that may be involved in any stage of the creative pro-
cess-from conception of the underlying idea, through the various
stages of development, to commercialization and, perhaps beyond, to
improvements and derivatives.77 For the purpose of this analysis, in-
not the program was induced or noninduced. It should also be made clear that,
while it would be economically desirable for courts to uphold inventions and
works of authorship that are induced by the respective systems compared to
noninduced ones, factual differences and doctrinal concerns make this determi-
nation difficult in actual cases. In Oddi, Invention Protection, supra note 12, a
proposal is made for a "revolutionary patent," which would require a factual in-
quiry into how the invention came about and also doctrinal modifications of the
present patent system to attempt to separate out revolutionary inventions. In a
recent article by Grady and Alexander, they state: "The strong version of reward
theory, as advanced in the works of Frederic Scherer and more recently by A.
Samuel Oddi, posits that rewards should explain actual patent decisions." Mark
F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV.
305, 312-13 (1992). They then proceed to attempt to show that their theory of
"rent dissipation" is a better predictor than the "reward" theory or the "prospect
theory" of Professor Kitch. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of
the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). The attempt by Grady & Alexan-
der to show that "the courts appear to have adopted rules of decision that mini-
mize rent dissipation in the pioneer development stage (by limiting the size of the
monopoly reward) as well as in the improvement stage (by enforcing patents
against signaled improvements)" (Id, at 309), is not entirely successful, at least
with regard to the "reward" theory. See Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated
Rewards from Innovation Through Patents: Or Less is More, 78 VA. L. REv. 351
(1992) and Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District" Observations
on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359 (1992). See supra text accom-
panying notes 51-55 (discussing the costs of "rent seeking").
76. The incentive would be deemed excessive if it was greater than the "persuasion"
cost needed for the creation of the program. If someone can be persuaded to
create a program because of the availability of lesser incentives, e.g., trade secret
protection, prizes, tax breaks, fame or curiosity, then exclusivity becomes costly.
77. Economists often distinguish "invention" from "innovation," as summarized by
Scherer:
The terms "invention" and "innovation" suggest the conceptual for-
mulations of Abbott Payson Usher and Joseph A. Schumpeter. Crucial
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ducement will be used in that broad context.
The validity of the first assumption underlying the patent/copy-
right clause, that a sufficient number of inventions and works of au-
thorship would not be induced without patent and copyright systems,
is not an easily verifiable one. The systems do not, and inherently can-
not, separate the induced from the noninduced. Nonetheless, for pur-
poses of analysis, two categories of inventions have been suggested by
Professor Scherer to be patent-induced, i.e., relying on the patent sys-
tem for their creation. The first category is low benefit/cost inven-
tions.78 These tend to be narrow-improvement inventions within
highly developed technological fields. Hence, there is a great deal of
competition, and product substitution is readily available. Inducing in-
vestment where only small technological advances may be anticipated
can be seen as relying upon the availability of patent protection, so
that at least a small scope of exclusivity may be carved out. Scherer
concludes that this category of patent-induced inventions, however,
provides little societal benefit.79
The second and important category of patent-induced inventions
identified by Scherer are those that provide "spectacular technical
contributions." 0 Such inventions effect "a genuine revolution in pro-
duction or consumption patterns" by their creation.8 ' This class of in-
to Usher's conception of invention is an "act of insight" going beyond the
exercise of normal technical skill, even though additional activities (per-
ception of a problem, setting the stage, and critical revision) are also rec-
ognized. Schumpeter, on the other hand, defined innovation as "the
carrying out of new combinations." For the case of new technology this
can be identified with reducing an invention to practice and exploiting it
commercially.
F. M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 8 (1984)(footnotes omitted) [hereinaf-
ter SCHE ER, INNOVATION].
Scherer gives the example of Watt's "invention" of a steam engine employing
a separate condenser as not being dependent on the patent system. The concep-
tion of the separate condenser required little time and expense and was "sus-
tained as a result of scientific curiosity." In contrast, the availability of a patent is
likely to have induced Roebuck to go into partnership with Watt and invest
money in the development of the steam engine, i.e. the "innovation." I&i at 22-25.
See also, Eisenberg, supra note 20, who discusses three incentives offered by
the patent system: (1) the "incentive to invent," i.e, to invest in research to make
new inventions (id at 1024-28); (2) the "incentive to disclose" the invention (id- at
1028-30); and (3) the "incentive to innovate" according to Schumpeterian theory
(id at 1036-40).
78. SCHERER, INDuSTRIAT, supra note 20, at 448.
79. Id Compare Kitch, supra note 75 at 266, who argues that the patent system by
protecting such inventions performs a useful social function if the prospect func-
tion of patents is taken into account. Kitch defines this function as an opportu-
nity to develop a known technological possibility. Id He analogizes the patent
system to a mineral claims system. Id. at 271-75. But see Grady & Alexander,
supra note 75, at 313-16 (critiquing the prospect function).
80. SCHERER, INDuSTRIAi, supra note 20, at 448.
81. IaL
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ventions, which may be termed "revolutionary," are the important
ones in terms of societal benefit, because, as indicated by Scherer, only
"a few can make a big difference in the efficiency of production or the
quality of life."82 The principal reason that such inventions require
the inducement of the patent system for their creation is that they
generally have an uncertain benefit/cost analysis. The benefit is un-
certain because of the risk of failure (ie., in not producing a commer-
cial invention) and the general unavailability of a production or
marketing infrastructure for such an invention.8 3 Moreover, the cost
of development, including capital investment and time, may be unas-
certainable and entail considerable financial risk. Scherer indicates
that black and white television and the early development of xerogra-
phy may be examples of patent-induced revolutionary inventions.84
These inventions changed consumption and production patterns and,
in the absence of the availability of patent protection, the investment
in such developments may not have been made or might have been
substantially reduced or delayed.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that many inventions are
created irrespective of the patent system, i.e., there is no causal con-
nection between the creation of the invention and the availability of
the patent system. These are nonpatent-induced inventions, where
the inducement may range from personal motivation, necessity,
chance, and technological development to economic forces in general,
including competition.8 5 A primary incentive outside the patent sys-
tem is that of anticipating the market for a particular innovation and
being the first, and hence exclusive, supplier. This "lead time" or
"head start" may be adequate for the innovator to make adequate
profits over the development costs of the invention.8 6 An appreciable
lead time may be available with respect to an innovation that is diffi-
cult to copy or to distribute or that requires significant capital invest-
ments.87 Moreover, trade secrets may often assist in maintaining the
82. Id at 454.
83. Id at 448. The success rate for creating such inventions may be considerably
lower than the industry average for all inventions, which in one study was found
to be about 70%. See PARKER, supra note 58, at 58.
84. ScHERER, INDusTRIAL, supra note 20, at 448; see also SHERMAN GEE, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, INNOVATION, AND INTERNATIONAL COMPErPMvENESS 161 (1981)(con-
cluding that "[m]ajor American innovations-such as xerography, instant photog-
raphy, transistors, lasers, synthetic textile fibers, and the airplane-have had a
revolutionary impact on today's modern society").
85. See supra note 74.
86. See SCHERER, INDusTRIAL, supra note 20, at 444-47; PARKER, supra note 58, at 301-
02, 315.
87. PARKER, supra note 58, at 301-02, 315, who notes that in the absence of these
nonpatent barriers to competition, a patent becomes an important incentive.
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head start advantage. 88 In addition, the innovator may be the predom-
inant force in the market or may be able to establish itself as the rec-
ognized source of the innovation, and the innovation may become the
industry standard or consumer choice.89 Product differentiation itself
may be adequate to avoid direct price competition.9 0
Scherer would identify inventions as nonpatent-induced when they
are likely to be of high benefit compared to the cost of producing
them.91 In other words, these inventions would provide significant
economic benefit to the developer at a relatively low cost of develop-
ment. This category of inventions proves the aphorism "necessity is
the mother of invention."92 Such inventions tend to be market driven,
in the sense that there is a ready demand for them. Moreover, certain
inventions that have a high benefit but relatively low cost result from
"serendipity," solution to another problem that is, while searching for
a solution to a particular problem, accidentally found.93 Serendipitous
inventions would include such famous examples as: x-rays, vulcaniza-
tion of rubber, Teflon, and penicillin.94 Such fortuitously discovered
inventions undoubtedly greatly benefitted society, but that benefit can
88. SCHERER, INUSTRIA, supra note 20, at 444-45; PARKER, supra note 58, at 301-02,
315.
89. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 20, at 445.
90. Id. at 445-46; PARKER, supra note 58, at 314. See the classic study- Ralph S.
Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest. Legal Protection of Trade Sym-
bols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1181 (1948)("The economist, whose dour lexicon defines
as irrational any market behavior not dictated by a logical pecuniary calculus,
may think it irrational to buy illusions; but there is a degree of that kind of irra-
tionality even in economic man; and consuming man is full of it."). See generally
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990)(al-
lowing protection of trademarks with no market significance, when some marks
are more desirable than others, raises substantial obstacles for market entry by
competitors); Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of
the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984)(arguing
that economic factors provide practical limitations on the impact of recognizing
an exclusive right to the merchandising value of a trade symbol).
91. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL, supra note 20, at 447, who indicates that nonpatent incen-
tives may be sufficient "if the invention is economically important-that is, if it
has the potential of yielding marketwide cost savings or premium profits large in
relation to the innovator's development costs."
92. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 151 (14th ed. 1968).
93. Horace Walpole coined the term in reference to a fairy tale '"The Three Princes of
Serendip," where the princes were "always making discoveries, by accident and
sagacity, of things they were not in quest of." Serendip was also an ancient name
for Sri Lanka (Ceylon). GILBERT SHAPIRO, A SKELETON IN THE DARKROOM: STO-
RIES OF SERENDIPITY IN SCIENCE, vii (1986).
94. See Id at 1-23 (discussing the discovery of X-rays); DANIEL S. HALACY, SCIENCE
AND SERENDrIPTy 91-93 (1967)(discussing the vulcanization of rubber); ALFRED B.
GARRETT, THE FLASH OF GENIUS 14-15 (1963)(describing the discovery of Teflon);
W.B. Cannon, The Role of Chance in Discovery, 50 Sci. MONTHLY 204 (1940)(dis-
cussing, among others, Nobel's discovery of dynamite and Richet's discovery of
allergies).
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hardly be directly attributed to the patent system. Nonetheless, the
patent system may have had some role in inducing the development
and commercialization of such inventions.9 5
In terms of the cost/benefit analysis of the overall patent system,
which protects both induced- and noninduced-inventions alike, it then
becomes important to compare the yield of patent-induced inventions,
particularly of the revolutionary-type, to the yield of nonpatent-in-
duced inventions, which would have otherwise been introduced
through market or other incentives, at a lower cost to society. The
anticipated yield of patent-induced compared to copyright-induced
programs will be considered below.96
The same form of analysis may be undertaken with respect to the
copyright system, where works of authorship may be categorized as
induced or noninduced by the copyright system. One approach to this
analysis would be to place the various types of works of authorship in
a hierarchy based on the need for protection by copyright.97 The high-
est need category-the most likely to be copyright-induced-accord-
ingly would be "literary artistic works."9 8  Without copyright
protection, the author of a literary work, e.g., a novel, presumably
would have difficulty in finding a publisher. The publisher would be
faced with competition within a very short time from copyists, who
would not have to bear the cost of acquisition of the work and initial
publication costs, including editing, printing, publicity, etc.99
The second category in the hierarchy of needed protection would
95. See supra text accompanying note 77 and note 75. Some indirect attribution may
be given to the patent system if it is assumed that investment in the experiments
leading to the serendipitous invention was induced because of reliance on the
patent system. The creation of "spin off" inventions has often been urged as one
of the benefits of government-funded research. See George J. Howick, The NASA
Technology Utilization Program, in UTIuZING R & D BY-PRODUCTS 69, 78-82 (Je-
rome W. Blood ed., 1967)(describing NASA program and examples of spin-off in-
ventions, including inorganic paint, walking wheel chair, maintenance-free
lubricated bearings, and sight-controlled switches). Some other examples of com-
mercial products arising out of the space program include, smoke detectors,
graphite, an artificial pancreas, heated ski goggles and hang gliders, but not vel-
cro, teflon or tang. See Paul Hoversten, Space Technology Put to Earthly Use,
USA TODAY, April 6, 1989, at 3A.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 125-143.
97. This is based on the assumption that less than an adequate number of works
would be produced for the various classes of works without the incentive of copy-
right protection.
98. This category would include, e.g., novels and other works of fiction, plays, musical
compositions, motion pictures, paintings, sculptures, and other such works not
having a significant utilitarian or marketing value. Compare, the utilitarian value
of a lamp base with the "Chicago Picasso" sculpture or the marketing value of an
advertising poster with a book of poems.
99. See Breyer, supra note 2, who argues that, at least with respect to textbooks,
copyright may not be needed. Compare POSNER, LITERATURE, supra note 52, at
343 n.30, indicating that plays are more likely to need the protection of copyright
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be "factual" works, which would generally require less creativity than
literary or artistic works but would require considerable "sweat of the
brow" for their production.10o These factual works would include, e.g.,
maps, directories, compilations and business forms.' 0 ' Because of the
time, effort, and investment required in their creation, there would be
a considerable disincentive to their publication if they could be imme-
diately copied. On the other hand, because there is a demand for
works compiling facts in an organized manner, there is at least some
market incentive to produce them outside the copyright system, in-
cluding lead time and industry leader status; 02 also, a relatively low
level of legal protection may be provided against copying in certain
instances. 03
The final category, which would appear to be the least dependent
upon the copyright system, consists of "functional" works-works that
in and of themselves serve a utilitarian function, 0 4 e.g., three dimen-
sional works having separate utility (a lamp base 0 5 or a belt
as the author would otherwise have a powerful incentive not to publish in order
to avoid copying.
100. See generally Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and
Representation of Facts, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1569 (1963)(distinguishing "literary or
artistic works" from "fact works"). See also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Infor-
mation: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149
(1992)(cautioning against providing rewards for expending labor in creating
information).
101. See Gorman, supra note 100 (considering in detail maps, news stories, historical
accounts, directories, advertisements, photographs and legal and business forms).
102. Outside of market incentives there may be a statutory requirement to publish,
such as in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991),
whereunder the telephone company was obligated to publish a directory. This
would be a classic example of a noncopyright-induced work. See infra note 131
(discussing the originality requirement imposed by Feist on compilations). But
see Hutcheson Tele. Co. v. Frontier Directing Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.
1985)(holding that a statutory requirement to publish a directory did not bar
copyright protection, reversing the district court).
103. See, eg., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)(defend-
ant enjoined from copying news gathered by plaintiff until its commercial value
had been lost); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219
(E.D.N.Y. 1963)(defendant enjoined from providing answers to problems in phys-
ics text books).
104. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101, states:
A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is con-
sidered a "useful article."
See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert denied 440 U.S. 908
(1979)(upholding the Copyright Office's refusal to register an outdoor lighting
fixture as a sculptural work because the utilitarian aspects of the fixture could
not be separated from its aesthetic aspects). See also, infra note 335.
105. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954)(holding a lamp base representing a Bali-
nese dancer copyrightable subject matter although its primary commercial use
was in a lamp combination).
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bucklel06). Computer programs would appear to be an even better ex-
ample.107 Programs are created to be used in computers out of neces-
sity. Without programs, no useful function is served by a computer.
With respect to functional works, such as computer programs, the
topology developed by Scherer for inventions would seem to be ex-
trapolatable. Thus, the categories of computer programs that would
depend upon the copyright system would be the same as for inven-
tions: namely, low benefit/cost and revolutionary types of programs.
Programs within the low benefit/cost category, at this time, may in-
clude word processing or spreadsheet programs, where the market is
cluttered with a wide variety of such programs that are essentially in-
terchangeable.108 An example of a low benefit/cost program might be
a word-processing program that adds a feature specifically employed
in a particular field or industry; 0 9 such a program might not be cre-
ated except for the availability of copyright protection. This category,
again, would be relatively unimportant to protect in view of the availa-
bility of alternative programs or easily modifiable ones.110
In contrast, however, revolutionary programs would seem to be
ideal candidates for protection by copyright, if investment is induced
when the benefit and cost of the investment are not assured. Exam-
ples of revolutionary programs for personal computers, when they
were originally created, might include: word processing, spreadsheet,
graphics and video games.1 1 These types of programs would appear
106. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980)(holding a belt-buckle (albeit an expensive one) to be copyrightable). Cf.
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985)(holding
mannequins of partial human forms utilitarian and hence not copyrightable as
separate works of art).
107. This categorization would appear to be particularly applicable to algorithms; how-
ever, computer databases may better fit in the factual category as a compilation.
See supra notes 4 and 5 for definitions of computer program, software and
algorithm.
108. As early as 1983, there were 50 word processing programs competing with the
industry leader Wordstar, and 60 spread-sheet programs competing with the in-
dustry leader VisiCalc. Bro Utall, Famous Victories in Personal Software, FOR-
TUNE, May 2, 1983, at 150.
109. For example, a program designed for use by engineers or scientists requiring vari-
ous mathematical symbols.
110. Note, however, that modification may be impeded if the consumer does not have
access to the program in source code form. See supra text accompanying notes
65-68 for a discussion of marketing in object code.
111. See DOUGLAS G. CARLTON, SOFTWARE PEOPLE: AN INSIDER'S LOOK AT THE COM-
PUTER INDUSTRY 38 (1985): "[S]preadsheets, word processors, and adventure
games ... turned computers into consumer ideas." Carlton identifies three pro-
grams-VisiCalc, Wordstar and Adventureland-as having virtually created the
consumer market. Id Graphics also was considered a revolutionary idea being
incorporated into video games after having been developed by the air force. Id at
96. In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,65 (D. Mass.
1990), Judge Keeton states: "Bricklin's idea for VisiCalc was a revolutionary ad-
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to fit the definition in the sense of revolutionizing production or con-
sumption patterns in their utilization." 2 Once, however, the market
has been established for such programs, other programs of the same
general type would not ordinarily fit within the revolutionary cate-
gory but would constitute merely improvement programs further ad-
vancing the state of the art;" 3 such programs might fall within either
the low or high benefit/cost category, as discussed above." 4
The high benefit/cost category of noncopyright-induced programs
provides a high benefit at a relatively low cost with little risk of non-
success." 5 Again, as with respect to patents in this category, techno-
logical developments as well as market conditions may induce the
creation of such programs independently of any system of copyright
protection. Many application programs would appear to fit into this
category. Once a new computer system is introduced on the market,
there is an immediate demand for application programs making the
particular system more competitive. It is a symbiotic relationship.
The introduction of a new computer system stimulates a demand for
application programs, and the increase in application programs creates
vance in the field of computer programming." (citing an affidavit by Dauphinais).
See also the following paragraph of opinion. Id. at 65-66. But see, supra note 69.
112. Other programs that may qualify as revolutionary may include: data-base,
windowing, utility ("unerase"), desktop manager, and desktop publishing. See
Jon Udell, Beyond DOS: Windows and OS/2: Whither Windows?, BYTE, Feb.
1991, at 95, 95 (the author introduces the article with the following statement
about Windows: "No other software product so radically expands the horizons of
... computing."); see also Jeffery H. Lubeck & Bruce D. Schatzman, Making
Windows Work.- Feeling Left Out By Windows Revolution? Here Are Some Tips
that Can Get You Up and Running, BYTE, Feb. 1991, at 293, 293 (using the
phrase "windows revolution" and stating that the "number of Window applica-
tions that have appeared over the last few months is truly astounding."); Matt
Page & Mary Page, Laying Out the Future: Increased Capabilities and Color
Should Give Desktop Publishing a Rosy Future, BYTE, Fall 1990, at 169 (naming
major software programs for desktop publishing); Daniel Bricklin, Hit or Miss?
Secrets for Creating Top Software, CoMPuTrR WoRLD, Nov. 3, 1986, at 122 (dis-
cussing the productivity improvements achieved by "unerase," desktop manager,
desktop publishing and other programs).
113. These would include updated versions of the same program. See infra note 178.
Also, the original program may not be the one that is the most commercially
successful. For example, although WordStar was the first commercially success-
ful word processing program, it was not the first such program. See, CARLTON,
supra note 111, at 38-39 (identifying Electric Pencil as the first commercial word
processing program). Also, LOTUS 1-2-3 replaced VisiCalc as the leading spread-
sheet program. See infra note 118.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79 and 91-95.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92. Serendipity may also play some part in
the development of new computer programs. A programmer may be seeking to
solve a particular problem, yet by chance find a solution to another problem and
obtain the spin off results of this at low cost. It is not apparent, however, how
often this is as likely to occur compared to inventions. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 93-95.
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a greater demand for the computer system.116 Examples of programs
which would seem not to depend upon the copyright system would be
those developed from the state of the art for a particular narrow appli-
cation, such as an inventory control program for a particular industry,
or, to take an example from a well known case, a program for the
administrative operation of a dental laboratory.117 An example of a
revolutionary program that led to a high benefit/cost program may be
the original spreadsheet program, VisiCalc, from which Lotus 1-2-3
evolved.118
There also appears to be a strong market incentive for early intro-
duction of many programs in order to establish familiarity among
users, in the hopes of becoming the industry standard.119 Thus, menu
formats, screen displays, and symbolic representations become highly
important even in the absence of copyright protection.12 0 Moreover,
the decision to maintain an interface as proprietary or not often will
be market driven.121
The availability of an alternate means of legal protection for com-
puter programs may also decrease reliance on either the copyright or
116. See, e.g., NRC, SOFTWARE ISSUES, supra note 65, at 51:
Thousands of software applications were written by third-party develop-
ers, motivated by the prospect of market success. In turn, those who
succeeded by writing high-quality programs benefitted the hardware
manufacturers by increasing the utility and value of their computers.
117. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
118. VisiCalc was conceived by Daniel Bricklin in 1978 and with the assistance of Rob-
ert Frankston was developed for use on an Apple II computer, while they were
graduate students at the Harvard Business School. See Mark Whitehorn, Buyer's
Guide: Spreadsheets, PC USER, June 6,1990, at 120. Lotus 1-2-3 was developed by
Mitchell Kapor and Jonathan Sachs. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass. 1990). Both were financial successes, but Lotus
1-2-3 (designed for the IBM PC) replaced VisiCalc because of inherent limitations
in VisiCalc. 1d, at 65. Indeed, Judge Keeton in Lotus suggests this categorization
when, after indicating the revolutionary character of VisiCalc, see supra note 111,
states that "[Lotus] 1-2-3 like many other electronic spreadsheet programs since,
could thus be thought of as an evolutionary product that was built on the shoul-
ders of VisiCalc." Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
119. This would appear to be the case with the introduction of WordStar and VisiCalc,
even though later displaced as industry leaders.
120. The downside of this is that when a user interface becomes commercially success-
ful it becomes the obvious target for copiers.
121. NRC, SOFTWARE ISSUES, supra note 65, at 52:
The debate over proprietary interests in program code that expresses
external interfaces is intense and often divides the industry. Those firms
offering integrated systems solutions to computer communications envi-
ronments see component interfaces as crucial elements of proprietary
value added. Those who produce software and hardware components
that must attach to and work with complex information systems see pro-
prietary interfaces as a barrier to market entry. Thus, even if intellec-
tual property law provides reasonable protection for interfaces-the
subject of a wide spectrum of opinion-business strategies dictate
whether a firm will deem an interface as open or proprietary.
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patent systems. In this regard, state trade secret law122 may provide
an adequate system of protection independent of either the copyright
or patent systems. Trade secrets work particularly well where a pro-
gram is not widely distributed but is licensed to a relatively limited
group of users who are contractually obligated to maintain the pro-
gram in confidence- 3 In the case of retail distribution of programs,
especially for personal computer use, limiting their availability in only
object code provides a technological barrier to decompiling any trade
secrets that might be buried in the object code.124 In a recent survey,
about 75% of software developers indicated that they relied on trade
secret law, while 25% relied on copyrights and only 8% on patents.125
This finding seems to indicate that trade secret law provides an in-
dependent and significant incentive for the creation of computer
programs. 126
In comparing the two systems of protection, because computer pro-
grams are protectible by both patents and copyright, a particular pro-
gram may have been induced by (i) the patent system solely, (ii) the
copyright system solely, (iii) both the patent and copyright systems or
(iv) neither the patent nor the copyright system. 127 The system (pat-
ent or copyright) that achieves the higher net benefit over cost to soci-
ety, by producing the greatest yield of induced-computer programs to
noninduced programs, would seem to be the more desirable one.128
Although it is theoretically possible that both systems induced a par-
ticular program, a binary analysis (patent or copyright) is thought to
122. See generally, MELvIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW (perm. ed. rev. vol., 1991);
ROGER M. MGRAm, M1LGRm ON TRADE SEcRETs (perm. ed. rev. vol., 1991).
123. At one time it was standard practice to provide programs along with the sale or
leasing of mainframe computers or to strictly license the use of programs with a
particular system. See NRC, SOFTWARE ISSUES, supra note 65, at 6-9.
124. See supra notes 34 and 67, for a discussion of decompiling. It became industry
practice in the 1980's to market programs only in machine code under restrictive
license terms. The rationale for the decision, according to a spokesman for IBM
(Peter Schneider), was: "The reaction to become more secretive was because of
the uncertainty of the legal system was a prudent business decision," although
admitting that this policy greatly diminished possibilities of customers improving
programs. NRC, SOFTWARE ISSUES, supra note 65, at 75.
125. The survey was undertaken by the Massachusetts Software Council and the
above figures are reported in NRC, SOFTWARE ISSUES, supra note 65, at 62.
(Copyrights may be used in conjunction with trade secret law. Hence, the figures
cited do not add up to exactly 100%).
126. As previously discussed, the protection of trade secrets under the guise of copy-
right may impose additional costs compared to a legal regime where programs
would have to be made available in source code to be protected by copyright or
where reverse engineering could be undertaken without fear of copyright in-
fringement. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
127. One could also speculate that a program could be in luced by the copyright system
coupled with trade secret protection afforded by distribution only in object code.
128. The converse is that the system that produces the lowest yield of induced pro-
grams is the costlier.
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be justifiable because all computer programs are protectible by copy-
right, except in the narrow case where merger of idea and expression
may occur.'9
There are two major differences between the patent and copyright
systems, which lead to the conclusion that the patent system produces
a higher yield of induced-computer programs, particularly those of a
revolutionary quality, than does the copyright system. First, the quali-
tative requirements of the patent system are likely to eliminate a sig-
nificant proportion of computer programs from patent protection that
would not be eliminated by the copyright system. To qualify for pat-
ent protection, a computer program, assuming that it meets the statu-
tory subject matter requirement and is not subject to a statutory
bar,130 must also meet the requirements of novelty, utility and nonob-
viousness. The only requirement for protection by copyright law is
that the program be original, i.e., subjectively original with its crea-
tor.13 1 The program need not be new, useful, or nonobvious. In the-
ory, a program satisfying the originality requirement could replicate a
prior program and still be protectible by copyright.132 Interestingly, a
129. The merger doctrine is discussed supra note 8. Obviously those computer pro-
grams that were created prior to the recognition of copyright or patent protection
should be disregarded. It would be highly speculative to presume that the cre-
ators of computer programs were anticipating or relying upon such future
protection.
130. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(19)("public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year" before application filed); § 102(c)(abandonment); § 102(d)(filing abroad
more than one year prior to U.S. filing date).
131. See generally 1 GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, at §§ 2.2.1-.3, (discussing the
originality requirement). Recently, the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991), addressed the originality issue in
the context of a compilation-the white pages of a telephone book. The Court
reasoned.
Rural's selection of listings could not be more obvious: it publishes the
most basic information-name, town, and telephone number-about
each person who applies to it for telephone service. This is "selection" of
a sort, but it lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform
mere selection into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient
effort to make the white pages directory useful, but insufficient creativ-
ity to make it original.
1d. at 1296. Feist may cast some shadow over the originality of certain databases.
132. It has become de rigueur to quote Judge Learned Hand:
Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself pro
tanto an "author"; but if by some magic a man who had never known it
were to compose a new Keat's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an
"author," and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem,
though they might of course copy Keat's.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936). This is the independent creation theory of developing compatible
programs from the specifications of existing ones by the clean room technique.
See supra note 34. Compare Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J.
965, 1023 (1990), who concludes: "In fact, originality is an apparition; it does not,
and cannot, provide a basis for deciding copyright cases."
COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTIONS
program need not even work, i.e., it need not satisfy a utility require-
ment.133 Extensive debugging may be required to obtain a useful pro-
gram; yet, because it satisfies the statutory subject matter requirement
and because it is original, it is protectible. 3 4
It has been estimated that only a small percentage of all computer
programs would satisfy the requirements for patentability. 3 5 None-
theless, with respect to revolutionary programs, which are the impor-
tant class of patent-induced inventions, most of these programs are
likely to satisfy the patent qualitative standards almost by defini-
tion. 36 It thus seems probable that the patent system is more likely to
induce a higher yield of computer programs of the revolutionary type
compared to the copyright system because of the qualitative sorting
mechanism.
Second, the cost of securing protection and the cost of maintaining
133. With respect to patents, the Supreme Court held in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519 (1966), that a chemical compound whose only utility was as an object for fur-
ther investigation did not satisfy the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
stating.
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the
public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a pro-
cess is refined and developed to this point-where specific benefit exists
in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permit-
ting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field.
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
134. It may be questioned why anyone would want to copy an inoperable program.
Yet debugging may be less costly than independent development. Also, the en-
tire program need not be copied for infringement; there need be only "substan-
tial" copying. See 2 -GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, at 27. Professor
Goldstein cites a number of examples where infringement was found although
the quantity of copied expression was small: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)(300 words out of a 200,000 word manu-
script); Dawn Assocs. v. Links, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831 (N.D. m. 1978)(one sen-
tence from an advertisement); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938)(three sentences out of a scientific treatise).
135. In 1983 one commentator stated. "Only a minute number of programs (perhaps
less than 1 percent) are inventive enough to be patented." Duncan M. Davidson,
Protecting Computer Software A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JuRmmcRIcs J.
339, 357 (1983). The only rationale given is that most software is mundane. Id. A
rationale that would lead to a larger (perhaps substantially) estimate of the po-
tential patentability of computer programs is the relative commercial importance
of particular programs. Commercial importance would be relevant to the deci-
sion whether a program developer will invest in the cost of securing a patent.
Commercial success may bear on the issue of nonobviousness of a program. The
CAFC requires that secondary considerations, such as, commercial success, long
felt but unresolved need, and the failure of others, be taken into account on the
§ 103 issue. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538-40
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
136. On the other hand, programs that may revolutionize production or consumption
may have a more difficult time in being categorized as statutory subject matter.
See Oddi, Invention Protection, supra note 12, at 1127.
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that protection will result in the elimination of certain computer pro-
grams from patent protection, but will not have the same result with
respect to copyright protection. The costs of securing patent protec-
tion for computer programs may be appreciable. The cost for the
preparation and prosecution of an application may be in the order of
$10,000-$50,000.137 In addition to attorney fees, the time expended by
the inventor and other individuals in the preparation and prosecution
of the patent application should be included. Also, there are substan-
tial PTO filing and issuance fees for the patent grant and maintenance
fees to keep the patent in force.s3 8 These procurement costs are not
insignificant, particularly for small software houses or for individual
programmers, and hence may eliminate an appreciable number of
otherwise qualifying computer program inventions. 3 9
In contrast, for copyright protection, there are essentially no for-
malities, the cost of registration is nominal, and registration may even
be delayed.140 In addition, there are no maintenance fees to keep a
copyright in effect during its entire term.141 It is abundantly clear
that the cost of procurement of copyright protection serves as no bar
137. See Rory S. O'Connor, Patent Fever Sweeps Software Developers Trying New Ave-
nues to Protect Programs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, § 4, Mar. 20, 1989, at 8 (reporting
that patents may cost as much as $20,000 to obtain and $50,000 to defend). The
total procurement costs from pre-examination searching through maintenance
fees have been estimated by Kahin to range from $15,000 to over $25,000. See
NCR, SOFTWARE Issu s supra note 65, at 63 (citing Kahin, Software Patents:
Franchising the I7formation Structures, CHANGE, May/June 1989, at 24-25).
These figures may be low. R. Lewis Gable estimates that $10,000 is the probable
minimum with as much as $50,000 for an application requiring extensive prosecu-
tion. Interview with R. Lewis Gable, Chairman of Ad Hoc Computer Software
Committee of American Intellectual Property Law Association (1992).
138. As of December 16,1991, filing fees increased to $690 compared to $630 in Novem-
ber, 1990, and $370 in April, 1989; issuance fees increased to $1,130 compared to
$1,050 in November, 1990 and $620 in April, 1989. Maintenance fees are now $900
payable 3.5 years after the patent grant, $1,810 payable 7.5 years after the grant;
and $2,730 payable 11.5 years after the grant, making a total of $5,440 to maintain
the patent over its entire 17-year term. PTO Final Rule Increasing Patent and
Trademark Fees, 43 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 142, 157-60 (1991).
139. Fees are reduced by 50% for "any small business concern as defined under section
3 of the Small Business Act, and to any independent inventor or nonprofit organi-
zation" as defined in the PTO regulations. 35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1)(1988).
140. The current registration fee is $20.00. 17 U.S.C. § 708(a)(1). Copyright protect
subsists from the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression. 17
U.S.C. § 102(a). Registration, however, is a requirement for maintaining an in-
fringement action, except for foreign works subject to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, signed at Berne, Switzerland, on
September 9, 1886. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988).
141. The term is life plus 50 years for a named sole author, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)(1988);
life plus 50 years for joint authors, measured from the death of the last surviving
author, 17 U.S.C. § 302(b)(1988); and 75 years from the publication date for anon-
ymous and pseudonymous and works for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c)(1988).
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to the protection of any computer program irrespective of quality or
benefit/cost ratio.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the conclusion may reason-
ably be drawn that, because copyright protects substantially all pro-
grams and because the patent system has some inherent means of
sorting out on the basis of the qualitative standards and the relatively
high cost of procurement, the ratio of patent-induced programs to non-
patent-induced programs will be substantially higher than the ratio of
copyright-induced to noncopyright-induced programs. In theory, at
least, the patent system may thus be considered more likely to pro-
duce greater benefits because of its tendency to induce computer pro-
grams, especially revolutionary ones, that would not be created in all
likelihood on its basis of the market or other inducements; it would
also inhibit the patenting of marginal improvement programs.142 The
copyright system, on the other hand, has essentially no barriers to pro-
tection and thus protects all programs; hence it tends to be a relatively
costly system. However, this does not mean that the copyright system
does not produce a net benefit, only that it may be less beneficial be-
cause of over-inclusiveness by protecting a high percentage of pro-
grams that would otherwise be freely available to the public.14 3
C. Excessive Inducement
The second assumption underlying the patent and copyright sys-
tems is that exclusivity is the needed incentive for the appropriate
level of creativity.144 Contrary to this assumption, an appropriate
number of inventions and works of authorship may, in fact, be created
by lesser incentives, (i.e., lower persuasion costs), such as governmen-
tal subsidies, tax policies or prizes.14 5 Any incentive is costly if a lesser
incentive would have induced the invention or work of authorship. A
primary consideration concerning whether an excessive inducement is
being provided by either title of protection would be the scope of pro-
tection afforded.
The scope of protection for a patent is defined by its claims.146 In
order to infringe, the alleged infringer must either make, use or sell
the patented invention as defined in the claims.147 Claims tend to be
142. It would only be in the case of the low benefit/cost type of program that the
owner may risk the investment because of the competitive need for even narrow
protection. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
143. Moreover, it is far from clear whether there would be sufficient incentive in the
absence of copyright to proceed to the commercialization stage, including debug-
ging and documentation.
144. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2, quoted supra note 62.
147. "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authorization
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:351
construed strictly within the confines of the patent disclosure.148 The
usual formula given is that each element of the claim must be "read
on" infringing subject matter, and infringement occurs "if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to ob-
tain the same result."149 The doctrine of equivalents, however, may
somewhat expand the scope of coverage and introduces some degree of
ambiguity into the scope.150
The protection granted under a patent is a powerful one because it
affords in rem property treatment,15 1 with strict liability being the
theory of liability.152 Independent development of the invention with-
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1988).
148. The strict rule of patent infringement in the Supreme Court can be traced from
Prouty v. Draper, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842) through Deepsouth Packing Co. v.
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972), where the Court stated. "When so many
courts have so often held what appears so evident-a combination patent can be
infringed only by combination-we are not prepared to break the mold and begin
anew." The CAFC has recently narrowly construed Deepsouth as applying only
when the infringing combination is assembled outside of the United States. See
Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (finding infringement for testing separate components of the invention prior
to the expiration date of the patent even though the complete combination was
not assembled until after expiration).
149. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929), quoted in Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), the leading
Supreme Court case on the doctrine of equivalents. See infra note 150 for a dis-
cussion of this doctrine.
150. The test for equivalency under Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod., 339
U.S. 605 (1950) is whether the accused device and the claimed invention perform
"substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result." Id. at 607. This test is known as the "function, way, result" test and is
used as an alternative analysis to literal infringement, where "every limitation
set forth in a claim must be found in the accused product or process exactly."
Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Since its creation in 1982, the CAFC has substantially modified the doctrine of
equivalents analysis, adding several limitations. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods
v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(prior art); Pennwalt
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987)(element-by-element
analysis); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1983)(pioneer-non-pioneer status); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(prosecution history [or file wrapper] estoppel). Courts and
commentators have questioned the usefulness of most of these limitations. See,
e.g., Martin J. Adelman and Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673
(1989)(element-by-element analysis); Henrik Parker, Doctrine of Equivalents
Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods: The Hypothetical Claim Hydra, 18
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 262 (1991)(prior art). The usefulness of the doctrine as a whole
was recently questioned in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534
(Fed. Cir. 1991), where one panel of the CAFC went so far as to state that the
application of the doctrine of equivalents is the exception and not the rule.
151. See supra note 48, for the definitions of a right in rem.
152. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro I), 377 U.S. 476, 484
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out intent to infringe or even knowledge of the patent does not consti-
tute a defense.15w For monetary damages to be awarded, however,
actual or constructive notice of the patent is required 5 4
The scope of protection afforded under copyright law is considera-
bly more ambiguous than under patent law. The copyright statute es-
tablished a series of exclusive rights reserved to the copyright
owner. 155 A principal one of these is that of precluding copying of the
copyrighted work.1 56 Copying requires access to the copyrighted work
and "substantial similarity" between the two works.157
A major problem with respect to infringement of copyright has
been the idea/expression dichotomy.158 Expression is protectible by
copyright, but ideas are not. The black letter rule may be simply
stated, but, within whatever category of copyrightable subject matter,
(1964)("Not only does that provision [§ 271(a)] explicitly regard an unauthorized
use of a patented invention as an infringer, but it has often and clearly been held
that unauthorized use, without more, constitutes infringement." (citations
omitted)).
153. Ir. at 490 n.3.
154. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a)(1988)(limiting damage from the period of actual notice un-
less the patentee makes the invention with the word "patent" or "pat." and the
patent number). But see, Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co.,
297 U.S. 387 (1936)(not requiring marking when there was no product to mark,
i£e when a so-called "paper patent" is involved).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title
has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending,
(4) in the case of literacy, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly, and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
156. Id at 1 (1). "Copies" are defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as:
"Copies" are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work
is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which
the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term "copies"
includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the
work is first fixed.
157. See 3 NIutER ON CoPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 13.03, (discussing the qualitative and
quantitative parameters of "substantial similarity").
158. This is reflected in the Copyright Act by the dichotomy created between statu-
tory subject matter of § 102(a) and excluded subject matter of § 102(b). See gener-
ally Edward Samuels, The Idea-E-pression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56
TENN. L. REV. 321 (1989); 1 NualER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 1.10[B][2].
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the problem has proved to be a difficult one.15 9 The problem is espe-
cially difficult with respect to computer programs.
The question of the literal copying of source code or object code
presents the simplest case.160 If all or a substantial part of a work is
copied, whatever expression there is will also be copied. On the other
hand, the idea/expression issue becomes of paramount importance
when there is nonliteral copying. Two cases are illustrative: Whelan
Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory'61 and Lotus Development
Corp. v. Paperback Software International.162 The basic approach of
both of these cases was to resolve the idea/expression dichotomy at a
high level of abstraction of idea. In Whelan the Third Circuit adopted
the following test for separating idea from expression: "[T]he purpose
or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and every-
thing that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
the expression of the idea." 63 The court then defined the purpose or
function of the program under consideration as being the general pur-
pose for which that program was created-in this instance, the effi-
cient operation of a dental laboratory.164 It then follows that
everything beyond the efficient operation of a dental laboratory as the
idea would be expression, including the organization, structure and se-
quence of the program.165
In Lotus the court separated idea from expression based upon
whether the program under consideration included "identifiable ele-
159. See e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), where
Judge Learned Hand, in the context of a movie alleged to infringe the copyright
on a play, developed the "abstractions" test, in which patterns of increasing gen-
erality are imposed on the two works to determine if there is a common "idea"
and then the work is dissected to determine if there has been appropriation of
"expression" at a lower level of abstraction; Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod.,
Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), in the context of a TV
commercial alleged to infringe the copyright on a children's TV program, a bifur-
cated extrinsic/intrinsic test was developed, where first it is determined whether
there is substantial similarity of ideas between the two works. If it is so deter-
mined extrinsically, which may include expert testimony and dissection, then the
intrinsic test is applied to determine if a lay observer would find substantial simi-
larity in the expression of the common idea. See infra text accompanying notes
160-171, for a discussion of the tests used in the context of computer programs.
160. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
161. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
162. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). The case was settled with defendants agreeing to
pay $500,000 for infringement, stop marketing infringing programs, not appeal
the district court decision and drop any court claims against Lotus. See 40 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 545 (1990).
163. Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986).
164. Id. at 1238.
165. Id. at 1239.
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ments of expression not essential to every expression of that idea." 66
In applying that test, the court found that the idea was the "rotated-L"
configuration essential to a spreadsheet program and everything be-
yond that constituted expression. 6 7 The fact that the idea of the "ro-
tated-L" was not original to the owner of the Lotus 1-2-3 program or
its creators did not appear to dissuade the court in making the
dichotomy. 68
By conceptualizing idea at such a high level of abstraction and re-
serving everything at a lower level of abstraction to expression, a
rather expansive scope of protection is being afforded to computer
programs by copyright for nonliteral copying. Such a broad scope of
protection would suggest the expansion of copyright into areas tradi-
tionally protected by patents in the sense of the utility associated with
a particular idea at whatever level of abstraction, but certainly at
lower levels of abstraction than defined in Whelan and Lotus. 6 9
166. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 61 (D. Mass. 1990).
See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass.
1992)(following "identifiable elements of expression not essential to every ex-
pression of that idea" test to find copyrightable expression in a "menu command
hierarchy").
167. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (D. Mass. 1990).
168. Judge Keeton states: '"e idea for an electronic spreadsheet was first rendered
into commercial practice by Daniel Bricklin" and describes the "idea" as a "revo-
lutionary advance" upon which the authors, Michael Kapor and Jonathan Sacks,
of Lotus 1-2-3 "built upon the shoulder of VisiCalc." Id. at 65. See supra note 118,
for a discussion of the development of VisiCalc and Lotus 1-2-3. See also, supra
note 69 (discussing Patent No. 3,610,902, granted Oct. 7, 1968, relating to an elec-
tronic spreadsheet).
169. Recently, the Second Circuit declined to follow Whelan in determining substan-
tial similarity of the non-literal aspects of an alleged infringing job scheduling
computer program by stating that the district court correctly found that "Whe-
Ian's synonymous use of the terms 'structure, sequence, and organization' ...
demonstrated a flawed understanding of a computer program's method of opera-
tion." Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)
(amended after rehearing, Dec. 17, 1992). Instead, the court invoked a three-step
procedure involving abstraction, filtration and comparison based on Judge
Learned Hand's abstractions test in Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp., 45 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1930). First, the abstraction levels of the allegedly infringed pro-
gram's structure are determined from the lowest level of individual instructions
to the highest level of module functions. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). The second step, filtration, which is performed on
a case-specific basis, sorts out noncopyrightable elements dictated by efficiency,
external factors, and those taken from the public domain a core of copyrightable
expression. Id. at 707. The third step, comparison, focuses on whether the ac-
cused program copied any aspect of the protected expression as well as the rela-
tive importance of the copied portion of the original program. I'd. at 710.
Other courts have been quick to adopt this analysis. See Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)(applying the Altai abstrac-
tions approach to determine protectible expression as including programming in-
structions that create an arbitrary data stream that serves as the key to unlocking
the computer program); CMAX/Cleveland, Inc., v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337
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An even broader scope of protection is being sought in the Apple
litigation against Micro-Soft and Hewlett-Packard.170 The theory of
infringement is that of "look and feel," in which it is asserted that the
defendants' "windowing" programs infringe Apple programs because
they replicate the pull-down menu and symbolic "look and feel" of the
Apple format.1 7 1
(M.D. Ga. 1992) (following three-step abstraction analysis of Altai to find that the
nonliteral elements of a rental appliance company's computer program including
file structures, transaction codes, and screens and reports protectible expression
as they are not dictated by efficiency considerations or the nature of the indus-
try); Autoskill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 793 F. Sup. 1557 (D.N.M. 1992)
(rejecting analysis of Whelan and utilizing abstractions approach to determine
protectible elements of expression of software program used in the testing, diag-
nosis and training of reading skills.
See also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
The court approved application to computer programs of the "revised" version of
the "extrinsic/intrinsic" test for substantial similarity developed in Sid & Marty
Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977), as
modified in Shaw v. Lindheim, 908 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990). The "revised" test
permits not only an objective analysis of the similarity of ideas between two pro-
grams, but also an objective analysis of copyrightable expression for which "ana-
lytic dissection" and expert testimony are appropriate. Brown Bag Software v.
Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465,1473-75. The court also approved using "analytical
dissection" for determining whether similarity in programs resulted from "un-
protected expression." Id. at 1475-76.
But cf Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992)
(altering Altai application by first performing substantial similarity analysis on
object and source codes, and arrangement and flow of computer program used in
determining appropriate replacement size of industrial belts, before applying ab-
stractions method to sift protectible expression from nonprotectible expression).
See A. Samuel Oddi, Functionality and Free Market Theory, 17 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J.
173 (1989)[hereinafter Oddi, Functionality], for a discussion of how the doctrine
of "functionality" from trademark and unfair competition law could be used to
analyze the potential functionality of program features at lower levels of abstrac-
tion than Whelan.
170. So far four decisions have been rendered in this case on various motions: (1)
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 709 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Cal.
1989)(Schwarzer, J.) (ruling that Microsoft did not have a complete defense to the
infringement action based upon a 1985 settlement agreement, but that this settle-
ment licensed Microsoft to use certain visual displays); (2) Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989)(Schwarzer, J.)(granting
Microsoft's motion that 1985 settlement operated as a partial affirmative defense
to Apple's copyright infringement action); (3) Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal. 1989)(Walker, J.) (ruling there was insuffi-
cient evidence to establish fraud against the Copyright Office by Apple claim and
sufficient originality in Apple's works to satisfy copyright requirement); (4) Ap-
ple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992)(Walker,
J.)(ruling that the arrangement for a computer screen display comprising a user
interface serves "a purely functional purpose" so as to not be entitled to protec-
tion under a "look and feel" theory of substantial similarity).
171. See generally, on the "look and feel" infringement theory, Alfred C. Yen, A First
Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 38 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989), Samuels, supra note
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The scope of protection afforded computer programs by copyright
may also be seen as, in essence, providing a form of trade secret pro-
tection under the guise of copyright. If competitors must reverse engi-
neer to determine what, if any, trade secrets (i.e., ideas) a program
might contain and if, in engaging in such reverse engineering, they run
the risk of a copyright infringement action, access becomes self-re-
strictive which increases costs to society when compared to other
forms of technology on the market. 72
Another factor that may bear upon the measure of inducement
provided by patent or copyright protection is the risk of invalidity or
unenforceability of the right. Patents are frequently found invalid.
With the institution of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) as the common appellate court for patent appeals, the rate of
invalidity has dropped appreciably; still, a relatively high percentage
of all patents are found invalid.i7 3 In the case of copyright, because of
158; Richard D. Moreno, Note, "Look and Feel" as A Copyrightable Element. The
Legacy of Whelan v. Jaslow? Or, Can Equity in Computer Program Infringe-
ment Cases Be Found Instead By the Proper Allocation of Burden of Persuasion?,
51 LA. L. REV. 177 (1990); Elizabeth G. Lowry, Comment, Copyright Protection
for Computer Languages: Creative Incentive or Technological Threat?, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1293 (1990). Professor Goldstein cautions: 'Though appropriate for fanciful
works of art, the "total concept and feel" test creates the risk of protecting unpro-
tectible as well as protectible elements of functional works." 1 GOLSTam, COPY-
RIGHT, supra note 8, at 136 (footnotes omitted).
172. See supra notes 34, 67, and 68. Two recent copyright cases have recognized lim-
ited exceptions for reverse engineering to qualify under the fair use doctrine. See
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling that
intermediate copying of computer video game program necessary for disassembly
of computer object code constitutes fair use as a matter of law where it was the
only way for Accolade to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embod-
ied in Sega's program and where a legitimate reason existed for seeking such
access); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(ruling that Atari's intermediate copying of Nintendo's computer video game chip
for the purpose of reverse engineering did not constitute fair use because the
defense is only available as long as the copying is not more than necessary to
understand the unprotected elements of the work and does not attempt to com-
mercially exploit the protected expression).
173. History shows that courts have invalidated a relatively high percentage of pat-
ents. In a 53-year study from 1921 through 1973, courts of appeals invalidated
65% of the patents, while district courts invalidated 55%. Lawrence Baum, The
Federal Courts and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT. OFF.
SOc'Y 758, 760-61 (1974). In a 30-year study from 1948 through 1977, limited to the
issue of nonobviousness, 52% of patents were held invalid by district courts and
64% by the courts of appeals. See Myron Cohen, Nonobviousness and the Circuit
Courts of Appeal-Twenty-five Years in Review, in NONOBVIOUsNESS--THE ULTI-
MATE CONDITION OF PATENTABurY 3:1, 3:13 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980). In
the first three years of operation of the CAFC with respect to appeals from dis-
trict courts, the invalidation rate decreased to 46% on the obviousness issue and
50% on § 102 issues. If § 112 issues are included, the overall percentage of invalid-
ity was 44%. Donald R. Dunner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-
Its First Three Years: Introduction, 13 A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 185, 186-89 (1985). In a
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the low qualitative standard of protection of originality, it is relatively
rare that a copyright would be invalid for that reason.174 Also, if his-
tory is any teacher, a higher percentage of patents than copyrights is
likely to be held unenforceable for various abuses, including antitrust
violations, misuse or fraud in the procurement.175
The duration of exclusivity provided under patent and copyright
protection, respectively, would bear significantly on the incentive pro-
vided by that particular title.176 A greater incentive obviously is pro-
vided under copyright law with life plus 50 years or 75 years for
institutional protection compared to 17 years from date of grant of a
later study, it was found that the CAFC affixed a finding of validity in substan-
tially all cases (only 3 out of 28 were reversed), while it was equally likely to
reverse as to affirm if invalidity was found by the trial court. See Ronald B. Cool-
ley, What the Federal Circuit Has Done and How Often" Statistical Study of the
CAFC Patent Decisions-1982 to 1988, 71 J. PAT OFF. Soc'Y 385, 391 (1989). It is
also interesting to note that the CAFC has reversed a holding of validity only 14
times out of 120 opportunities, thus indicating an affirmance rate of approxi-
mately 88%. See ROBERT C. GoRMAN, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 639
(2d ed. 1991). See also, in fra note 244.
In terms of predictability of outcome for infringement litigation, one
would expect more consistency with patent appeals being heard by a sin-
gle court, the CAFC, in comparison to copyright infringement appeals
which are heard within the various circuits. In addition, because of the
relative paucity of cases and the difficulty in applying tests for separating
idea from expression, which were developed in a literary context, a
greater uncertainty might be expected concerning the scope of protec-
tion afforded to computer programs by copyright.
174. The originality standard may be becoming more meaningful, particularly with
respect to nonliterary-factual and functional works. See supra note 131, for a
discussion of the Feist telephone work case, and Reichman, supra note 2 at 683-89.
There are also cases where the merger and idea and expression will preclude
copyright protection. See supra note 8 (discussing Plains Cotton and Synercom).
175. This is not to say that copyright law is not subject to antitrust abuses. See NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHTS, supra note 8, § 13.09. Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)(implying acceptance of antitrust misuse
copyright defense from action of Court in reversing and remanding for further
proceedings antitrust judgment and dependent misuse judgment). There has also
been an increase in the use of the misuse defense in copyright cases. See, e.g.,
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990)(holding not only
antitrust violations, but any violation of the public policy interests embodied in
the grant of the copyright grounds for use of misuse defense). Also, although
fraud in procurement has in the past almost been exclusively limited to patents
because of the examination system, it may also be alleged in copyright cases. See,
e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1455 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (finding "no evidentiary basis for [defendant's] claim that Apple intended to
commit a fraud on the Copyright Office" in failing to make full disclosure to the
copyright).
176. The optimal term for a patent has been studied. See e.g., Machlup, supra note 11,
at 66-73; WILLIAM D. NORDHAuS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE Ch. 5 (1969);
PARKER, supra note 58, at 303-306; SCHERER, INNOVATION, supra note 77, at 130-
41. With respect to copyright duration, see Landers & Posner, supra note 20, at
361-63.
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patent. However, this incentive is to a considerable extent amelio-
rated, especially for copyright, by the functional nature of computer
programs and rapid technological developments in the computer field
rendering many programs obsolete within a few years.177 Nonethe-
less, there are certain basic programs that have become industry stan-
dards or that can be updated, which unquestionably will be protected
by copyright beyond the 17-year patent term.178
A particularly appealing argument can be made that copyrightable
works that may be easily copied should be given a relatively broad
scope of protection because, when copying becomes essentially cost-
free, the market incentives for creation, such as lead-time, are seri-
ously undermined.179 Of the "material objects" in which a work may
be fixed, floppy discs upon which computer programs are recorded,
are among the easiest to copy, along with audio- and video-tape cas-
settes. Landes and Posner have developed an economic model accord-
ing to which the scope of protection under copyright would be
proportional to the cost of copying, i.e., the cheaper a work can be cop-
ied, the greater the scope of protection that should be afforded.180 On
the other hand, Landes and Posner indicate that, the broader the
scope of protection, the more difficult it becomes for others to create
works of authorship because of being denied access to previous au-
thors' works:
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. Some copyright pro-
tection is necessary to generate the incentives to incur the costs of creating
easily copied works, but too much protection can raise the costs of creation for
subsequent authors to the point where those authors cannot cover them even
though they have complete copyright protection for their own originality. 181
177. In general, computer software has a life cycle, or expected obsolescence, of three
to four years. See Arthur Middleton Hughes, How to Build a Successful Market-
ing Database, DM NEws, Mar. 18, 1991, at 27. The duration of the life cycle is
influenced by the speed at which the industry for which the application is written
is changing and the speed at which the hardware on which the application is run-
ning is upgraded. See Bruce Caldwell, Blue Cross, In Intensive Care, Beeps EDS,
INFo. Wm., Jan. 27, 1992, at 10, ("'The health-care business is changing dramati-
cally and rapidly... Major [software] applications that started four years ago
were becoming obsolete before they were complete.' "); Some specific applica-
tions, such as computer games, may have even shorter life cycles (one year) than
the average. Gary Coffey, Timing Appears to be Right for New Learning
Software, NASHVILLE Bus. J., May 14, 1990, § 1, at 25.
178. Since its introduction in the spring of 1984, a new version of Lotus 1-2-3 has been
issued roughly every year. Interview with Customer Service, Lotus Dev. Corp.
Since its introduction in 1982, a new version of Word Perfect has been issued
roughly every two years. Interview with Customer Service, Word Perfect Corp.
Since its introduction in late 1982, AutoCAD has had 10 revisions. Interview with
Customer Service, Autodesk, Inc.
179. See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 331-33, 361.
180. Id. at 331-41.
181. Id. at 335.
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In the case of verbatim copying of either source or object code, and
in particular the latter, the scope of protection would not need to be
any broader than prohibition of that copying to overcome any disad-
vantage arising from ease of copying. However, when one goes beyond
verbatim copy to situations, such as in Whelan and Lotus, where the
copying is not nearly as easy and, indeed, involves a great deal of time
and expense to engage in the necessary rewriting of the program, a
narrower scope of protection would seem economically justified.18 2 To
the contrary, the Lotus and Whelan courts provided an expansive
scope of protection that may inhibit competitors from entering the
market for fear of infringement. 83 Moreover, such decisions have a
prohibitory effect on reverse engineering where the dividing line be-
tween idea and expression is drawn at such a high level of abstraction
that it becomes virtually impossible to avoid expression in copyrighted
computer programs where access can be shown.184 The presumed in-
centive of a broad scope of protection may indeed become excessive
and thereby diminish the quantity of programs generated to an inade-
quate or inefficient rate. 8 5
In summary, except for the in rem property type of protection af-
forded by patents compared to the requirement for copying in the
copyright law, the scope of incentives provided by copyright protection
with respect to computer programs would appear to favor copyrights.
This advantage is particularly evident when the idea of a program is
defined at a high level of abstraction, such as in Whelan and Lotus, so
that many low level of abstraction ideas are protected under the guise
of expression that otherwise would be in the public domain unless pro-
tected by patent. In terms of costs, patents providing in rem protec-
tion for computer programs extract no greater cost than for other
inventions. Extending copyright protection to "functional" works,
182. Id at 329-30 (discussing the lessened need for copyright protection when nonlit-
eral copying is involved). Landes & Posner conclude:
The less extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, com-
poser, or other creator can borrow from previous works without infring-
ing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a new work.
Of course, even if copyright protection effectively prevented all unau-
thorized copying from a copyrighted work, authors would still copy. But
they would copy works whose copyright protection had run out, or they
would disguise their copying, engage in costly searches to avoid copying
protected works, or incur licensing and other transaction costs to obtain
permission to copy such works. The effect would be to raise the cost of
creating new works--the cost of expression, broadly defined--and thus,
paradoxically, perhaps lower the number of works created.
Id. at 322 (footnote omitted).
183. See, e.g., Bricklin quote supra note 68.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 196-210, for a discussion of copyright poten-
tially protecting functional future in the public domain with being denied access
to ideas within computer programs.
185. See Landes & Posner supra note 20, at 332.
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however, would seem to be more costly than would be expected for
"literary" or "factual" works, as will be further explained in the next
section.
D. Patent/Copyright Interface
A basic premise of this article is that computer programs may be
the subject matter of both patent and copyright, ie., a given computer
program may satisfy the subject-matter definition of both patent and
copyright.18 6 This premise will now be examined in more detail, be-
186. There is no general agreement on this premise; in a survey conducted by an ad
hoc subcommittee of the Computer Software Committee of the American Intel-
lectual Property Association, 15 out of 26 respondents thought that there was
some overlap, while the remaining 11 thought that the subject matters to be mu-
tually exclusive. See Pamela Samuelson, Survey on the PatentCopyright Inter-
face for Computer Programs, 17 A.I.P.LA. Q.J. 256, 261 (1989)[hereinafter
Samuelson, Survey]. For the reasons given for the positions taken, see i&. at 261-
264. The position of the PTO is that there is an overlap. In response to the ques-
tion "Should someone who has received a patent on computer software be al-
lowed to receive a patent or vice versa?", submitted to the PTO by Representative
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Prop-
erty and the Administration of Justice, Acting Commissioner Jeffrey M. Samuels
in a letter dated Nov. 1, 1989 responded.
The protective offered by the copyright and patent statutes is not mutu-
ally exclusive. Cf In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, (C.C.P.A. 1974)(there is
an area of overlap between copyright and design patent statutes). As
long as the Constitutionally-mandated objective of promoting the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts is being served, the Administration
sees no problem in issuing a patent to a computer process notwithstand-
ing any overlap in patent and copyright protection. Thus, one can patent
a novel and nonobvious computer process and copyright the software for
implementing that process; one might, in fact, copyright several different
software implementations of the same computer process. There is a dis-
tinction between a patentable computer process, which is a series of
steps performed by a computer, and copyrightable software (i.e, a "com-
puter program" under the copyright Act), which is a list of instructions
fixed in a tangible medium. Although there is a functional relationship
between a computer process and the software for implementing the pro-
cess, patenting of the computer process and providing copyright protec-
tion for one or more software programs encourages innovation and
provides appropriate incentives in this important and developing area of
new technology.
Samuels' letter is reprinted in David Bender, Current Developments in Software
Patents, in COmPUTER SoFTwARE 1990 PROTECTION AND MARKETING 379, 443
(1990).
In another study conducted to elicit the viewpoints of United States computer
software companies regarding their positions on various forms of intellectual
property protection for software, and regulatory developments, demographic data
and responses to twelve statements (scale = strongly disagree-disagree-neutral-
agree-strongly agree) were analyzed from 212 usable questionnaires (40% re-
sponse rate). Linda B. Samuels & Le Thi Cao, Survey of the Opinion of Software
Development Companies Concerning Intellectual Property Protection, 32 IDEA
343 (1992). A comparison of small to large companies (large classified by more
than 50 employees) was also undertaken to determine whether the needs of the
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cause the economic consequences of protecting computer programs by
either or both titles of protection may depend upon the legal interrela-
tionship between them.
In this context, various models may be developed showing the in-
terrelationship of patent and copyright protection when the subject
matter is a computer program.1 8 7 The first and simplest model would
be where the subject matter of patent and copyright operate in in-
dependent spheres. This interface model may be represented by two
circles: one representing patentable subject matter and the other rep-
resenting copyrightable subject matter. The two circles would be in-
dependent of one another and, at their closest, the two circles would
be tangential.88 Thus, this is a trinary model, where the computer
program would be either: (i) patentable subject matter or (ii) copy-
rightable subject matter or (iii) neither. This is in essence a preemp-
small business are adequately addressed. Results from the data indicate that a
majority of the respondents (61.3%) disagree that current law effectively protects
software development and does not need to be changed; a greater majority (78%)
agree that software should have its own unique type of legal protection. The re-
sponses specifically addressing copyright protection indicate that only 9% of the
respondents agreed that courts are properly drawing the line between protectible
expression and unprotectible ideas in deciding cases (45.2% disagreed; 45.8% neu-
tral). The responses specifically addressing patent protection show that 56.1% of
the respondents agreed that patent should be granted for new and innovative
software programs. Yet, 47.8% agreed with the current law that patents should
not be granted on mathematical algorithms, though an otherwise patentable pro-
cess should receive protection if it employs an algorithm (19.1% disagreed; 32.9%
neutral). In comparing small companies to large companies only as to 3 of the 12
statements did the strength of their opinions differ noticeably. Concerning the
statement that copyright law should prohibit copying code, both groups strongly
agreed, but the mean approval rate of small firms was greater. For statements
that copyright should be separately copyrightable, the agreement of large firms
was greater than that for small firms.
187. The models outlined here are developed in more detail in Oddi, Functionality,
supra note 169.
188. The tangential, trinary model may be diagrammatically illustrated as follows:
The circle C, defines the subject matter area of copyright and the circle
P_,t defines the subject matter area of patent. The circles do not overlap;
thus a given subject matter must be exclusively copyrightable or patentable
subject matter or neither.
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tion model, where either one or the other of the titles of protection
prevails or where neither title is available. An example of the latter
would be a mathematical algorithm barred by Benson from being pat-
entable subject matter and by the merger doctrine from being copy-
rightable subject matter. 8 9
Although the preemption model has defenders,190 it does not ap-
pear to be the prevailing subject matter legal interface model: Copy-
rightable subject matter is found expressed in programs at relatively
high levels of abstraction (as in Whelan and Lotus) and patentable
subject matter is found in computer programs, including mathematical
algorithms, if properly claimed as inventions. Thus, at the subject-
matter level, there is an overlapping interface, which may be visual-
ized as two overlapping circles--one representing copyrightable and
the other patentable subject matter.19' This is a quaternary model,
where a given computer program may be protected by either: (i) pat-
ent or (ii) copyright or (iii) neither or (iv) both. The fact that the same
computer program constitutes both patentable and copyrightable sub-
ject matter, however, need not cause adverse legal or economic conse-
quences, provided the respective scopes of protection afforded by the
separate titles are appropriately constrained. Thus, it is necessary to
examine the protection interface with respect to patents and
copyrights.
The protection interface defines the relationship between what is
to be protected by patent and copyright, respectively, even though the
189. An interesting question is whether the mathematical algorithm in Benson, which
was held to be analogous to a law of nature, would qualify as copyrightable sub-
ject matter. Was there any expression in the algorithm beyond its idea? Was its
idea capable of expression in only one or in a very few ways?
190, See Samuelson, Survey, supra note 186 at 261-63.
191. This nay be illustrated diagrammatically by two overlapping circles:
Asmo
Copyrightable and patentable subject matter are represented, respectively,
by the circles Co and P, with the overlapping area Ao representing com-
mon subject matter.
See Oddi, Functionality, supra note 169, at 177 (Fig. 2).
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same subject matter may be covered by either or, indeed, both.192
Again, a nonoverlapping or tangential model may be envisioned for
the patent/copyright protection interface, wherein the scope of protec-
tion afforded by patent to inventions as defined by the claims is in-
dependent and different from the scope of protection provided under
copyright for the expression. 93 This is a trinary model that would
protect a given computer program by either (i) patent or (ii) copyright
or (iii) neither.
Conceptually, this model, as with the trinary model for the subject-
matter interface, has a considerable appeal: Copyrights would solely
promote "science" (read: the liberal arts) by protecting works of au-
thorship, and patents would solely promote the "useful arts" (read:
technological arts) by protecting inventions. However, cases such as
Whelan and Lotus make such a formalistic model extremely suspect.
A more realistic protection-interface model would again be an
overlapping quaternary model, where there is an area protectible by
both patent and copyright, in addition to the separate areas of protec-
tion and the excluded area. 94 This model raises concerns about copy-
right invading the traditional province of patents by protecting ideas
in a patent-like manner, and, patents invading the traditional province
of copyright in protecting expression in an in rem manner without
copying.
The encroachment by copyright into the traditional preserve of
patents seems more economically problematic than the converse. If
the area of overlap between the protection interface is defined as "de
192. Id. at 179-182.
193. This model may be illustrated diagrammatically by two tangential circles:
The circles Cp, and P,,, respectively, represent the protection afforded by
copyrights and patents, which, as shown, are exclusive of one another.
See id. at 181 (Fig. 3).
194. This model may be illustrated diagrammatically to be two overlapping circles:
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jure utility" in the sense that utility may be protected by patent, 9 5
then affording extended protection by copyright to that de jure utility
would appear to raise the cost of protecting that program, which pre-
sumably could have been induced with a lower incentive.1 96
Even more costly would be the situation where the particular com-
puter program falls outside the scope of protection of patent, because
it fails to meet one or more of the qualitative requirements for patent-
ability, or, for that matter, fails to meet a formal requirement or is
statutorily barred, e.g., by failure to file a patent application within
one year from the "on sale" date of the program. 97 Such programs
that fail to satisfy the qualitative or formal requirements for patent
protection may still be protectible by copyright, provided they meet
the qualitative requirement of originality of the copyright statute.1 98
Computer programs that do not satisfy the qualitative or formal re-
quirements of patentability, although not having de jure utility in the
sense of being protectible by patent, however, still would have "de
facto utility" in the sense of satisfying the subject matter test for pat-
ents.199 Such de facto utility not protectible by patent is normally
Ap o
Copyright and patent protection are respectively represented by circles C,
and P,,, with the area A, representing dual protection. See id. at 181 (Fig.
4).
195. The area of A., see diagram supra note 194, qualifies for patent protection and
thus whatever utility is claimed in the patent may thereby be protected in the de
jure sense by the patent; hence the term "de jure utility." See id. at 180-82.
196. A lesser incentive in the sense that either one or the other would have induced
the invention, and hence, there was no need for dual protection.
197. See supra note 130.
198. See supra note 131.
199. The problem associated with protecting de facto utility by copyright may perhaps
be better illustrated by modifying the protection interface for the overlapping
model as shown below-..
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freely available to the public upon entering the public domain.20o
However, whether all de facto utility is going into the public domain is
far from clear under the present state of copyright law, as exemplified
by Whelan and Lotus. If the idea/expression dichotomy is to be made
at a high level of abstraction of idea and if there is any de facto utility
at a lower level of abstraction, copyright then protects that de facto
utility under the guise of expression, even though patent law and pub-
lic policy seemingly would demand dedication to the public and afford
the "right to copy" any de facto utility.2 01
Thus, the greater concern is not whether there is an overlap at the
subject-matter interface of patent and copyright system, but, rather,
whether there is an overlap at the protection interface. If such is the
case, de jure utility may be protected by copyright for the extended
copyright term and, more seriously, de facto utility may be protected
by the overly broad and abstract scope of protection afforded by copy-
S-- --- N Apo
The dashed circle Ud represents de facto utility not protectible by patent, ie.
it is outside of the patent protection circle Pp.. Note, however, the circle U5
overlaps the copyright protection circle C,, and an area Adf possessing de
facto utility may be protectible by copyright.
See, Oddi, Functionality, supra note 169, at 182-83 and Fig. 6.
200. Trade secret status, of course, may keep a particular subject matter out of the
public domain for the period of secrecy.
201. The "right to copy" was recently re-affirmed in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989) (recognizing the competitive importance
of "imitation and refinement.") Although Bonito Boats applies to state sanc-
tioned encroachments on the "right to copy," it appears clear that protecting util-
ity has been preempted by patent law, although nonfunctional features of a
product may be protected by trademark or unfair competition law. See, e.g., A.
Samuel Oddi, Functions of "Functionality"in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L. REV.,
reprinted in 76 TRADEMARK REP. 308 (1985)[hereinafter Oddi, Functions]. Copy-
right is at least said to protect only expression and not utilitarian features. See
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) cert denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1979).
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right with respect to computer programs. As a consequence, underu-
tilization and increased costs may result, as well as decreased
investment in computer programs because of the potential for in-
fringement for copying de jure or even de facto utilitarian features.20 2
An example from the Lotus case may serve to illustrate the protec-
tion of de facto utility by copyright. 203 Defendant copied the menu
command structure of Lotus 1-2-3, comprising a list of full-word-menu
choices that were arranged in predicted frequency of use rather than
alphabetically.204 In contrast, the original VisiCalc spreadsheet menu
structure arranged individual letters representing commands in alpha-
betical order.205 Two features of the Lotus arrangement could be cate-
gorized as having de facto utility in making the program easier to use,
thereby increasing "user efficiency":206 (1) using full words so that
the user did not have to remember the letter code or refer to docu-
mentation as required in VisiCalc207 and (2) arranging the words in
order of predicted frequency of use, which would minimize the time to
select the most frequently used commands. 208 The court held the ar-
rangement to be expression on the ground that there were alternative
202. See supra note 71 (quoting Landes & Posner, supra note 20).
203. The de facto utility that a program may exhibit can be broken down into three
functional components. The first may be termed "utility functionality," which
would apply to those program features that are essential to its practical operation,
eg. providing a user interface-a screen display. Another category would be fea-
tures that provide for "maker efficiency," ie. the programmer minimizes costs of
producing a functional program by the employment or certain design techniques.
The third category, and a highly important one from the standpoint of program
marketability, may be termed "user efficiency;," such features in the program en-
able the user to save time and avoid frustration.
As summarized by Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1053-54 (1989):
The field [of computer-human interaction] has identified five human fac-
tor goals that programmers should strive to achieve in designing applica-
tion programs: (1) minimize learning time, (2) maximize speed of
performance, (3) minimize rate of user errors, (4) maximize user satis-
faction, and (5) maximize user's retention of knowledge over time.
See also Oddi, Functions, supra note 201, (developing of these categories of
functionality for use in the context of trademark and unfair competition law).
204. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass. 1990).
205. Id-
206. See supra note 203, for the definition of "user efficiency."
207. With the VisiCale format, once the letter code was memorized, this format would
not impede user efficiency. However, with respect to infrequent users or those
who used other formats, user efficiency could be impaired by having to refer to
documentation or making errors.
208. For example, if the user has to depress the "right" cursor key to obtain a particu-
lar function more times than the frequency of use of that function would predict,
more than an optional period of time is required by the user. When multiplied
over a long period of use, this may provide a considerable user advantage for the
Lotus 1-2-3 format over the VisiCalc format.
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
menu arrangements that could be used.20 9 If a feature that provided
for increased efficiency of operation can be categorized as expression
rather than idea, the right to copy public domain de facto utility is
converted into a duty not to copy under the guise of copyright.2 10
The economic consequences of an overlapping protection model
must also be examined whereby patent protection would extend to ex-
pression in the copyright sense and hence would deny access to that
expression on an in rem basis, i.e., copying need not be shown. Such a
model would theoretically result in underutilization and increased
costs. Nonetheless, the replication (even the independent replication)
of the expression of the idea does not constitute patent infringement.
The claimed invention (idea) must be either made, used or sold to con-
stitute infringement; even if a patent is protecting expression, it also
must be protecting the idea in the classic patent law sense. Accord-
ingly, a patent acting like a copyright is still affording only the protec-
tion of a patent.2 11 The converse is not true, where a copyright may
protect under the current state of the law low-level ideas having de
jure or de facto utility.
A practical solution to the overly broad scope of protection cur-
rently provided by copyright law for computer programs might be sim-
ilar to that suggested by Professor Gorman some time ago with respect
to factual works.212 Statutory subject matter for copyrightability
would be broadly interpreted, but infringement would be narrowly in-
terpreted, so that it would be easy to obtain a copyright but difficult to
prove infringement.2 13 Under the current state of the law, it is cer-
tainly easy to obtain copyrights on computer programs. The problem
is that, rather than making infringement difficult to prove, the law
has made it easier to prove by defining idea at a high level of abstrac-
tion. The consequence is that at least some de facto utility would be
protected, such as by copying only the "structure, sequence and organ-
ization,"2 1 4 or unessential "elements of expression,"215 or even the
209. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 67 (D. Mass. 1990).
210. To avoid infringement of the Lotus copyright, a competitor may thus be forced to
use a less efficient format, with resulting lack of consumer acceptance, to the
competitive advantage of Lotus and without the benefit of patent.
211. Assume that Lotus had obtained a patent on the idea of arranging the function
words in order of frequency of use but not on the use of complete words rather
that first letters of words, could it be argued that the expression of the idea of
using the whole words should be protected by the patent? This question could be
extended to where the accused patent infringer independently developed (ie., did
not copy) the use of whole words.
212. Gorman, supra note 100.
213. Id. at 1575. Limiting infringement to substantially verbatim copying of object
code would implement this approach.
214. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
215. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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"look and feel"216 of a program.
E. Summary
The benefit/cost ratio for the current regime of copyright protec-
tion afforded computer programs tends to be affected by the following
factors: (1) substantially all programs are protected, which results in a
low yield of copyright- to noncopyright-induced programs; (2) at least
some de facto utility is being protected against copying by defining
idea at a high level of abstraction; and (3) relatively little knowledge
concerning the ideas underlying the program is generally made avail-
able by expression in low level codes.
Comparatively, the benefit/cost ratio for the current system of pat-
ent protection tends to be affected by the following factors: (1) only
programs meeting high qualitative standards and warranting the pro-
curement costs are protected, which results in a relatively higher yield
of patent- to nonpatent-induced programs; (2) only the claimed idea is
protected, albeit on an in rem basis; and (3) sufficient information
must be disclosed to enable a person skilled in the act to replicate the
invention, with all other disclosed knowledge going into the public
domain.
Assuming that the analysis of this Part has some validity, it can
reasonably be argued that the economic case for protection of com-
puter programs by patent is stronger than that for protection by copy-
right. Yet, there has been a strong sentiment against patent
protection for computer programs since the earliest days of computer
development, which persists today with significant vigor. The next
Part will address the general case (legal, policy, and otherwise) that
has been made against patent protection for computer programs, with
special attention to mathematical algorithms.
III. THE GENERAL CASE
A. Anti-Patent Sentiment
The anti-patent sentiment was reflected early in a President's
Commission Report in 1966, which recommended that computer pro-
grams be specifically excluded from patent protection.217 The legal
position of the report was that computer programs were not the sub-
ject matter that Congress had intended to protect by patent.218 A pol-
icy reason offered was that the computer industry had prospered
without patent protection so far and hence did not need it, particularly
216. See supra notes 170-171.
217. PREsmENs'S CoMiMssIoN REPORT, supra note 26, at 13. See Samuelson, Benson
Revisited, supra note 2, at 1038-39 nn.39-40 (discussing the Commission's estab-
lishment and its membership).
218. PRESIDENTS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 13.
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in view of the potential for other forms of legal protection.219 Finally,
a pragmatic rationale was put forth that the PTO was ill-equipped to
process patent applications dealing with computer programs. 220
Even though Congress did not enact the recommendation of the
President's Commission, the PTO implemented this recommendation
by rejecting computer program processes on the ground of their not
being proper subject matter for patents under § 101.221 However, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)(the predecessor court
to the CAFC) disagreed, which resulted in a relatively long-lived ten-
sion between the PTO and the court.222
In 1972, the Supreme Court reversed the CCPA in Gottschalk v.
Benson, holding an algorithm, which it defined as "[a] procedure for
solving a given type of mathematical problem," not to be patentable
subject matter.22 3 The Court concluded: "Phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work."224 Presumably, the Court was analogizing the al-
gorithm, as claimed in the Benson application, to one of the categories
indicated.2 25
In a devastating analysis of the Benson decision, Professor Chisum
asserts, "The reasoning in Benson is monstrously bad"226 and charges
the court with an "anti-patent judicial bias."22 7 Professor Samuelson,
while seeming to admit that Benson is not a masterpiece of judicial
reasoning, agrees with the result.2 28 The Court, perhaps implicitly un-
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. In 1966, PTO proposed a set of guidelines, 829 OFFICIAL GAZETTE U.S. PAT. OFF.,
865 (1966), which were adopted in 1968. 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609, 15,610 (1968)(stating
that program processes that produced "no more than a numerical, statistical or
other informational result" was not considered patentable subject matter). Sam-
uelson speculates that the PTO guidelines may have been the reason Congress
did not act on the Commission's recommendation. Samuelson, Benson Revisited,
supra note 2, at 1039 n.45. It would seem equally as plausible that Congress did
not agree with the recommendation or had more important matters on its agenda.
Samuelson also suggests that the "1968 guideline position is as far as the Supreme
Court [in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)] has been willing to go toward
endorsing computer program patents." Id. at 1040. However, only the dissent in
Diehr refered to the PTO guidelines. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197-98, 197
n.11 (1981). For that matter, nor did the CCPA refer to the guidelines in more
than 30 computer program related cases, as indicated by Samuelson. Samuelson,
Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1039 n.40.
222. Samuelson exhaustively traces the case history before the CCPA. See Samuel-
son, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1041-48.
223. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
224. Id. at 67.
225. See Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, at 971.
226. Id. at 977-78.
227. Id. at 961.
228. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1059-62.
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sure of its reasoning, left an escape valve concerning the possibility of
future protection of certain types of computer programs in stating- "It
is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer. We do not so hold."229
The anti-patent sentiment continued when the Supreme Court,
five years after Benson, held in Parker v. Flook 230 that an algorithm
for computing an updated alarm limit did not become patentable sub-
ject matter by tacking on to an algorithm insignificant "post-solution
activity."231 Again, however, the Court left open the possibility of
some patent protection of computer program-related inventions in
stating- "[A] process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a
law of nature or a mathematical algorithm."23 2
In the early 1980's the Court's bias against patents in general,
which had persisted over the prior half century, began to erode.233
The shift may be seen as perhaps commencing in 1980 with Diamond
v. Chakrabarty234 and Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.235
and continuing with Diamond v. Diehr in 1981.236 In Diehr the Court
229. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71.
230. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
231. Id. at 590.
232. Id
233. See, GOLDSTEIN, CAsEBOOK, supra note 1, at 372, where it is indicated in the late
1930's 35% to 40% of litigated patents were held valid, which dropped to 10% in
1942 after the "flash of creative genius test" for "invention" was announced in
Cuno Corp. v. Automatic devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). Thereafter, the valid-
ity rate increased to almost 30% and fell to 3% following A. & P. Tea Co. v. Super-
market Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). With reference to Benson, Chisum concludes:
"Perhaps the best way to view Benson is as a vestige of another era in terms of
the attitude of the United States Supreme Court toword the patent system."
Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, at 991. The anti-patent bias of "another era" is
well put by Justice Jackson: "[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this
Court has not been able to get its hands on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co.,
335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
234. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Court held that living matter-a microorganism-was
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The four-justice dissent argued
that the Court should not extend patent protection in the absence of a clear and
certain signal from Congress. Id. at 322. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), the Court had stated: "We would require a clear
and certain signal Congress before approving the position of a litigant who ...
argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use nar-
rower, than courts had previously thought." The "clear and certain signal" test
was reinforced in both Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) and Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1984).
235. 448 U.S. 176 (1980)(holding that it was not patent misuse for a patent owner to
maintain an action for contributory infringement and to refuse to license the use
of its process consisting of the new use of a nonstaple article of commerce). For
an analysis of the Dawson case and the decision as indicative of an evolving pro-
patent bias in the Court, see A. Samuel Odd, Contributory Infringement/Patent
Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Prim. L. REv. 73, 80-81 (1982).
236. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). See also In Re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd by
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held that a process for curing synthetic rubber which includes in sev-
eral of its steps the use of a mathematical formula and a programmed
digital computer is patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.M
The Court tried to clarify why an algorithm was unpatentable subject
matter by stating, that in Benson, "we concluded that such an al-
gorithm, or mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which can-
not be the subject of a patent."238  The Court relied upon the
definition of a process found in Cochrane v. Deener,239 decided more
than a century earlier. This definition had been repeated in Benson,
where the Court stated: "Transformation and reduction of an article
'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process
claim that does not include particular machines."240 Because the
claimed process in the Diehr application involved the transformation
of an article-starting with raw, uncured synthetic rubber that was
transformed into cured molded rubber products-it was held to be a
process within § 101.2 4 1
More than a decade has passed since Diehr was decided, and the
Supreme Court has not been provided with an opportunity-presum-
ing it had an inclination-to revisit the § 101 issue with respect to com-
puter program inventions.242 Moreover, in view of other patent cases
an equaly divided Court, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981)(per
curiam)(upholding the patentability of an invention consisting of "a combination
of tangible hardware elements a machine including some hardware elements
which contain microprogrammed information termed 'firmware' ").
237. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
238. 1d. at 186.
239. That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular form of
the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If one of the steps of a
process be that a certain substance is to be reduced to powder, it may not
be at all material what instrument or machinery is used to effect that
object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be
pointed out; but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or
machine, the use of the others would be an infringement, the general
process being the same. A process is a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an ac4 or a series of acts, per-
formed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a dif-
ferent state or thing.
94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)(emphasis added).
240. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).
241. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981).
242. No petition for certiorari from the CCPA or the CAFC has been filed since Diehr
by the PTO or an applicant in a case raising the statutory subject matter issue of
computer programs. With respect to the subject matter issue generally, see Alco
Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987)(holding process for turbine rotor inspection pat-
entable subject matter as a process capable of being performed by a machine even
though also capable of being performed by a person); Howes v. Great Lakes Press
Corp., 679 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982)(holding heat-
transfer fabric printing process patentable subject matter as new use of old mate-
rial); Hirschfeld v. Banner, 462 F. Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mem., 615 F.2d
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decided after Diehr and the present composition of the court,
whatever anti-patent bias or sentiment may have been attributed to
the Supreme Court prior to the Reagan-era seems long gone,243 and,
1368 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981)(Markey, J.)(holding digi-
tally controlled camera system patentable subject matter as claims failed to di-
rectly or indirectly recite a mathematical algorithm); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d
809 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981)(holding computer program
which produced cross-sectional map from seismic reflection data patentable sub-
ject matter as program converted one physical thing (seismic time section) into
another physical thing (subterranean cross-sectional map)); Arshal v. United
States, 621 F.2d 421 (Ct. Cl. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981)(per cu-
rium)(holding computer program for aircraft flight control unpatentable subject
matter according to Benson and its progeny as the claims preempted mathemati-
cal formulae).
With respect to copyright cases, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in
cases that could possibly have been raised the statutory subject matter issue with
respect to computer programs. See Plains Cotton Coop. Assoc. v. Goodpasture
Computer Serv. Co., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987);
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). With respect to the subject matter
issue generally, see Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d
1458 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct. 374 (1990)(holding map with proposed gas
pipeline added not copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Worth
v. Selchow & Righter Co. of Colo., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 977 (1988)(holding trivia book not copyrightable subject matter under 17
U.S.C. § 102(b)); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc. 808 F.2d 204
(2d Cir. 1986), cert denied 484 U.S. 820 (1987)(holding daily publication listing
municipal bond redemptions not copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C.
§ 101); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986)(holding plat maps copyrightable
subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) as compilation); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)(holding video
game displays copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) as audiovi-
sual work); Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918
(11th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983)(holding wire-spoked automobile
wheel covers not copyrightable subject matter under 17 U.S.C. § 101 as "useful
article").
243. Supreme Court cases decided since Fook relating to patents, trademarks and
copyrights may be seen as generally favoring intellectual property:
Patents: Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141
(1989)(federal patent law preempts state reverse-engineering statute);
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983)(allowing pre-
judgment interest award under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1988)); Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)(process patent claiming use of mathematical
formula and programmed digital computer in rubber-curing process pat-
entable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 101).
Copyrights: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc.,
471 U.S. 539 (1985)(magazine's use of excerpts from novel not "fair use"
under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988)) Compare Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)(manufacturer of video tape record-
ers not contributory infringer, as off-the-air recording of copyrighter
programs fair use on the basis of time-shifting.
Trademarks: Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
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indeed, the CAFC may be perceived as having a pro-patent bias.244
B. Laws of Nature and Definition of Process
1. Basic Issues
Two basic issues may be distilled from Benson, Flook and Diehr
and from the body of law that has been evolving in the CAFC. First,
whether a particular algorithm may be properly analogized to a "law
of nature." Second, whether the transformation of matter from one
form to another is the sine qua non of a process as statutory subject
matter.245
189 (1985)(trademark owner may rely on incontestability under 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(1988) to enjoin infringement).
Testing the generalization in addition to Sony may be: Feist Publica-
tions, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991)(telephone book
not sufficiently original to sustain copyright protection and rejecting
"sweat of the brow" theory for protection) and Inwood Labs. v. Ives
Labs., 456 U.S. 844 (1982)(no contributory trademark infringement or
Lanham Act § 43(a) violation for making capsules of the same color).
Compare Bonito Boats, which reinforced Sears and Compco in re-
straining states from providing patent-like protection against copying
products in the public domain. Bonito Boats, may thus be viewed as pro-
viding an additional incentive for seeking federal intellectual property
protection, such as a design patent. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1988).
244. Chief Judge (now Dean) Markey admonished the patent bar in a speech delivered
to the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law at the annual meeting of
the American Bar Association in Honolulu, Hawaii, August 8, 1989, to refute the
"big lie" that statistics, without reference to the merit of individual cases, show
the CAFC to be biased in favor of patents. The speech is reprinted 8 PTC News-
letter, Summer/Fall 1989, at 3. Their comments were evidently in response to
published statistical analysis of CAFC validity and infringement decisions, see
supra note 173.
245. Claims drawn in "apparatus" format using "means plus function" elements (see
35 U.S.C. § 112, % 6) instead of process steps are treated in the same manner by
the CAFC and the PTO. As stated in In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 n.3 (C.C.P.A.
1982):
Appellants' apparatus claims differ from the method claims by reciting
"means for" performing the steps set forth in the method claims, and "means for
displaying" the results. However, for purposes of section 101, such claims are not
treated differently from method claims. Such apparatus claims were termed to
be in "illusory apparatus format" in In re Walter, 618 F. 2d 758, 769 (C.C.P.A.
1980). Accordingly, when "process" or "method" is used herein, it should be un-
derstood as also referring to claims in "illusory apparatus format."
The fact that transformation of matter occurs does not, of course, insure pat-
entability. The claimed invention must also be new, useful and nonobvious. In
Diehr, the end product (a molded rubber product) of the claimed process had
utility. Compare, however, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), where the
end-product of a process having utility only as an object of further research was
found to lack utility in the patent sense. An argument could be made that a pro-
cess lacks utility unless an end-product is produced that has utility. In Benson,
the claimed process converted binary coded decimal signals into pure binary
form. Did the pure binary signals have utility? In Flook, the method claimed was
for the updating the alarm limit "in a process comprising the catalytic chemical
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With respect to the first issue, it is generally agreed that phenom-
ena found in nature or laws of nature are not patentable subject mat-
ter. As stated in Chakrabarty: "[A] new mineral discovered in the
earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject mat-
ter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc ; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity."2 46 This
rather clear statement of accepted law, however, does little to help
resolve whether a particular algorithm, mathematical or otherwise,
can be properly considered a law of nature. Chisum makes the valid
point that, if a particular algorithm is devised that represents a law of
nature, it would not be patentable, in any event, because it would not
be new.247 This point would be consistent with the reasoning in Diehr,
conversion of hydrocarbons." Was there utility in updating the alarm limit?
Would there be utility if the process directly claimed was the catalytic conversion,
with the output product of the process being the converted (transformed) hydro-
carbons? In any event, opponents of patent protection for nontransformational
processes have generally relied upon the definition of a process rather than out-
come of the process lacking utility in the Manson sense.
The recent controversy over the patentability of human genes, whose utility
has yet to be discovered, may provoke a more vigorous inquiry into the utility
requirement in patent law. In June 1991, the National Institute of Health (NIH)
filed an application to patent 337 gene sequences, in addition to filing for a patent
on a gene finding method which rapidly isolates short segments of genes from
human cells. Critics have three primary concerns about a patent issuing on these
gene sequences. First, a concern exists that potentially conflicting patent claims
and strategies will chill the ongoing international human genome project. This
project is an effort to find and decipher all of the 50,000 to 100,000 genes that
make up a human blueprint. Already, Britain's Medical Research Council has
announced plans to keep secret the gene sequences it has discovered and to sell
access to those companies developing commercial products. Second, critics are
concerned about a race to gain property rights before any real function of the
gene sequences is known. NIH asserts that the discovered gene sequences do
have utility because they provide a new starting point for finding genes that cause
hereditary diseases and they offer clues about the functionality of a gene. Fi-
nally, critics assert that companies and academic researchers will be reluctant to
invest time and money in developing gene-based products for fear of an infringe-
ment suit by the patent holder of a gene sequence. This may prompt Congress to
clarify when researchers can use patented inventions without paying licensing
fees to a patent owner through a "research exemption." See David L. Wheeler,
Britain and Congress Respond to Controversy Sparked by NIH Plan to Patent
Genes, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 27,1991, at A29; David L. Wheeler, Using
Powerful Machines, an NIH Researcher Leads Efforts to Identify Human Genes,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUc., Feb. 26, 1992, at A6. NIH followed its initial applica-
tion with additional filings in January 1991 on more than 2,000 genetic material
fragments. The fragments identified represent part of the genetic blueprint for
the human brain. Again the international biotechnology community is in an up-
roar about the ethicity of patenting any human product. NIH Seeks Second Con-
troversial Gene Patent, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 1992.
246. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
247. Chisum makes the point that "a mathematical or other algorithm is neither a
phenomenon of nature nor an abstract concept." Chisum, Algorithms, supra note
2, at 980. He concludes that if natural phenomena are not patentable, "it may
19931
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separating the § 101 statutory subject matter issue from the § 102 nov-
elty and § 103 obviousness issues.24 8
The issue could perhaps be more traditionally resolved by the di-
chotomy drawn between "discovering" a particular natural phenome-
non or law as compared to "making" a "process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter."2 4 9 According to Chakrabarty,
a very broad definition of statutory subject matter was intended by
Congress to encompass "anything under the sun that is made by
man."
2 5 0 However, this leads to the question of whether a particular
algorithm is discovered or is human made. This rather difficult philo-
sophical inquiry is reminiscent of whether judges make or discover
law in the absence of controlling constitutional, statutory or decisional
law. Long ago, Zechariah Chaffee posed the issue thusly:
Where do the judges get this newly proclaimed law? Do they make it them-
selves in somewhat the way legislators undoubtedly make statutory rule? Or
do they discover it... in a body of principles of justice? If so, the judicial
process resembles the way Pythagoras discovered the rule that the square of
the hypotenuse equals the sum of the square of the other two sides.2 5 1
This is not the place to examine whether algorithms, or rules of law
for that matter, are floating around in another dimension waiting to
be discovered or whether these are really made by humans. 5 2 The
basic question seems, rather, to be whether there is a practical way of
simply be because they are not 'new'" as required by 35 U.S.C. § 101. 1& at 983.
Chisum also argues that the question of overly broad claiming can be resolved
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 to see that an excessively broad scope of protection is not
granted with respect to a particular algorithm. Id. at 984-87.
248. 450 U.S. at 191. Cf. this result however, with the dissent: "[Today's holding is a
misunderstanding of the applicants' claimed invention and a failure to recognize
the critical difference between the 'discovery' requirement in § 101 and the 'nov-
elty' requirement in § 102." Id. at 211 (Stevens J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
249. 35 U.S.C. § 101 is prefaced by: "Whoever invents or discovers ...." § 100 equates
an "invention" with an "invention or discovery." § 103 (first sentence, second
paragraph) admonishes: "Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in
which the invention was made." This sentence was added in the 1952 Act in order
to preclude the application of the "flash of creative genius" test of invention in
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). See Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 15 n.7 (1966).
250. 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d sess. 6 (1952).
251. Zechariah Chaffee, Do Judges Make or Discover Law?, 91 PROC. AM. PHILOS.
Soc'Y 405 (1947).
252. See, however, LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD'S INTRO-
DUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 1129 (5th ed. 1985)(footnotes omitted):
Although the views of Dworkin and Sartorius must be treated with
respect the general consensus of opinion at the present day is that,
within certain narrow and clearly defined limits, new law is created by
the judiciary. Attention centres primarily not so much on the fact of
judicial legislation but rather on the ways in which this occurs, and the
motives.
For a realist view, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND Ch. IV
(1930).
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separating algorithms that may be properly analogized to laws of na-
ture, which are said to be discovered, from those algorithms that are
indeed made by humans.
In Benson, the Supreme Court concluded in its "nutshell" that the
claims directed to an algorithm were not patentable subject matter
because they "would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and
in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself."253 Based
upon this conclusion, the CCPA and now the CAFC have made/dis-
covered/refined a rule for separating algorithms properly analogized
to laws of nature from those that are made.254 The rule consists of a
two-part test to be applied to claimed subject matter involving algo-
rithms. The first part of the test is to determine whether or not a
mathematical algorithm is claimed (either directly or indirectly); if
not, it is statutory subject matter, and the § 101 issue is resolved.25 5 If
it is determined that a mathematical algorithm is being claimed, the
claim may still pass § 101 muster according to the second part of the
test. This part of the test has evolved from a determination of
whether the algorithm as claimed would "preempt" the use of that
particular mathematical algorithm2 to a more refined test of
whether the mathematical algorithm is "applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps.. ."257 The PTO has indicated that
it will make the determination of the second step by a guideline,
whereby the algorithm would be read out of the claim, and then de-
cide whether what is left would otherwise constitute statutory subject
matter.258
Whether the test, as it has evolved, is consistent with Benson is
253. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
254. See PTO, Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 7, 6-7, for the history of the
evolution of the current rule.
255. See In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245 (C.C.P.A. 1978):
Determination of whether a claim preempts nonstatutory subject matter
as a whole, in the light of Benson, requires a two-step analysis. First, it
must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly recites an
"algorithm" in the Benson sense of that term, for a claim which fails
even to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt an algorithm.
Second, the claim must be further analyzed to ascertain whether in its
entirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.
256. Id.
257. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 906-07 (C.C.P.A. 1982), modifying the second part of
the test of In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 767 (C.C.P.-A 1980), which had modified the
preemption test of Freeman, which was presumably based on Benson. See Ar-
rhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir.
1992), for a discussion of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test and the reiteration that
this is not the sole test for statutory subject matter.
258. See PTO, Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 7, at 7-8. See also R. Lewis Gable
& J. Bradford Leaheey, The Strength of Patent Protection for Computer Prod-
uct&- The Federal Circuit and the Patent Office Refine the Test for Determining
Which Computer-Related Inventions Constitute Patentable Subject Matter, 17
RuTGERs Comm. & TECH. L.J. 87 (1991)(elaborating on the PTO test).
1993]
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arguable.259 Chisum would read Benson narrowly and indeed has
urged that it be overruled.260 Samuelson has argued strongly for an
expansive reading of Benson to exclude all algorithms, because, she
argues, all algorithms are deemed to be mathematical in the sense
used by computer scientists. 26 1 In any event, the practical outcome in
the PTO is that, if the claims satisfy the first part of the test, or if
necessary, the second, they are examined on the merits and the patent
may issue if the qualitative standards of patentability are met.26 2
However the first issue may be resolved between mathematical
and nonmathematical algorithms, as far as it can be resolved, the sec-
ond issue remains of whether in order to qualify as a process under
§ 101 there must be a transformation of matter. The PTO and CAFC
seemingly have resolved this issue as not requiring a transformation,
provided the invention is claimed in a formally correct manner.263
259. It is far from clear that the Court deciding Benson in 1972 had in mind such a
narrow definition for algorithms and what constituted preemption.
260. Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, at 1020. See also Stern, Algorithm War, supra
note 2, at 376, "Iwahashi [888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989)], for all practical purpose
goes back to the CCPA's immediately pre-Benson standard.... After Iwahashi,
virtually any algorithm can be patented if the claims draftsman will use the
proper format."
261. See Newell, supra note 5, at 1024-33.
262. An interesting example of the interplay and continued tension between the PTO
and the CAFC is In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989), where the PTO's
rejection of the claims as being merely a mathematical algorithm was reversed by
the court, holding that the recitation of a "read only memory" saved the claim
from the perdury of nonstatutory subject matter while presumably a "means plus
function" recitation would have condemned it there. See PTO, Notice Interpret-
ing Iwahashi (Fed. Cir. 1989), 112 OFFIcIAL GAzETTE U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. 16 (1990)[hereinafter PTO, Notice], where the PTO attempts to limit
Iwahashi to claim recitations that do not "encompass any and every means for
performing" the recited function and placing the burden on the applicant to show
a narrower scope. But see Stern, Algorithm War supra note 2, at 384-87 (critiqu-
ing the PTO interpretation). See also, Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where the CAFC based on
claiming an algorithm reversed a summary judgement by the district court in an
infringement action, finding statutory subject matter in method and "illusory ap-
paratus" (all means plus function elements) formats for "analyzing electrocardio-
graph signals in order to determine a specified heart activity."
263. Chisum, Algorithm, supra note 2, at 970, cites Musgrave as setting, prior to Ben-
son, "the high water mark of rationality," quoting from Musgrave:
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the tech-
nological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose
to promote the progress of "useful arts."
431 F.2d at 893. In contrast, Samuelson cites a competing line of cases. She agrees
that cases like Musgrave; In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978); and Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), support a nontransformation view of process,
while, on the other hand, cases like In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) and
In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) are in her view more consistent with the
[Vol. 72:351
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Such an interpretation, of course, expands the definition of statutory
subject matter well beyond that recognized in Diehr, which relies
upon the hoary Cochrane v. Deener transformation definition. In
Diehr, however, the Supreme Court was faced only with the issue of
whether the particular claims before it constituted a process within
§ 101, and, as this transformational process fit rather nicely into the
Cochrane definition, there was no need to go any further.26 4 The issue
remains unresolved by the Supreme Court whether transformation is
the sine qua non of a process or whether there need be only a "transla-
tion" of information, e.g., in the form of processing or other
manipulation.265
One argument advanced against a translation definition would
seem to focus upon the breadth of such processes as preempting too
great a scope of protection.266 However, if this were the case, presum-
ably with respect to a mathematical algorithm, the second step in the
PTO guideline should foreclose patentability.67 With respect to a
nonmathematical algorithm, it would then appear that § 112 would
preclude overly broad claiming and hence would prevent excessive
preemption. Certainly, once having met the test of not being properly
analogized to a discovered law of nature and hence being made, it
would seem consistent with Czalcrabarty, as reiterated in Diehr, that a
broad definition of statutory subject matter consistent with "anything
under the sun that is made by man" should reflect public policy.
Samuelson argues that the "anything under the sun" definition of
philosophy underlying Benson and correctly interpreting Diehr as implicating a
narrow definition of process. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1113-
33.
264. As summarized by the Court: '"Te claimed invention is a process for molding
raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products." Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981).
265. The PTO Report, Mathematical Algorithms, supra note 7, at 9 deals with this
issue rather cryptically, under the heading "Transformation of something physi-
cal," stating.
In determining whether the claim recites a statutory process or a non-
statutory mathematical algorithm, it is useful to analyze whether there
is a transformation of something physical into a different form. One dis-
tinction is made between transformation of a physical "signals" from one
physical state to a different physical state, a statutory process in the elec-
trical arts, and mere mathematical manipulation of "data" which, by it-
self, if not a statutory process.
Evidently, the conclusion is drawn that analog electrical signals are "trans-
formed," while digital ones, perhaps representing the same information, are
"manipulated."
266. See e.g., Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1127, who is concerned
about the possibility of infringement of an algorithm claim by thinking, citing In
re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978). See infra text accompanying notes 272-295
for a detailed consideration of the infringement by thinking issue.
267. See supra, text accompanying notes 256-258 for a discussion of the second part of
the PTO test.
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Chakrabarty is "dicta at most."268 Moreover, she asserts that the deci-
sion in Diehr "provides a fragile base for supporting the patentability"
of translation-type algorithms, particularly since the composition of
the Court has changed.269 Perhaps, in a strict legal sense, the
Chakrabarty/Diehr formulation is dicta;270 nonetheless, at least it does
give some indication that the Court would tend to construe § 101
broadly rather than narrowly and would support it by the legislative
history of the Patent Act. Moreover, even though Diehr was a five-to-
four decision, one does not have to be an ardent Court-watcher to pre-
dict with some degree of confidence that the current composition of
the Supreme Court is more likely to be favorable to protection of in-
tellectual property than any Court over the past half-century.2 7 '
2. Infringement by Thinking: "Mechanomorphic" View of the
Brain
Another argument raised by Samuelson is that, if patents are
granted on algorithms involving no transformation of matter, this
would raise the specter of infringement by thinking.272 Samuelson's
position on this issue appears largely based on the views of Professor
Allen Newell.273 Giving a computer scientist's perspective on the is-
268. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1131.
269. Id. at 1102. Judge Rader concurring in Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1992) found the base of Diehr
much more sturdy, concluding: "Thus, Diehr limited Benson and its progeny to
three classes of unpatentable subject matter-laws of nature, natural phenom-
ena, and abstract ideas."
270. The Court in Chakrabarty, of course, need not have adopted such a broad defini-
tion of statutory subject matter to decide that a microorganism was either a man-
ufacture or a composition of matter under § 101. Nonetheless, congressional
intent played a role, indeed, it would appear a significant one, because the major-
ity was faced with a strong dissent arguing that there was no "clear and certain
signal" from Congress to expand protection to living matter. But see supra, note
234.
271. In the first instance, one might notice that Justices Blackman and Stevens, who
dissented in Diehr, voted with the majority in Chakrabarty. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice O'Connor, who were in the majority in Diehr, remain on the
Court. One could speculate that obtaining three votes from a pool consisting of
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg might not be such a
"fragile base" to join with the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor in upholding
property rights (intellectual or otherwise). See supra note 243 (discussing the
pro-intellectual property position of the Court commencing with Chakrabarty).
272. Samuelson, Benson Revisited supra note 2, at 1108-09, 1123-1128.
273. Professor Newell is V.A. and Helen Whitaker University Professor of Computer
Science at Carnegie-Mellon University. He has written extensively in the area of
computer science, artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology. A brief biogra-
phy of Professor Newell is found accompanying Allen Newell, Fairy Tales, in
THE AGE OF INTELLIGENT MACHINES 420 (Raymond Kurzwell ed., 1990). Among
the recent publications of Professor Newell are: ALLEN NEWELL, UNIFIED THEO-
RIES OF COGNITION (1990); ALLEN NEWELL ET AL., UNIVERSAL SUBGOALING AND
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sue of the patentability of algorithms, Newell asserts: "The models we
have for understanding the entire arena of the patentability of algo-
rithms are inadequate-not just somewhat inadequate, but fundamen-
tally so. They are broken."274 The models, or at least some of them,
may well be broken if forced into the perspective of a computer scien-
tist. One of the broken models, according to Newell, is that it is impos-
sible to separate mathematical from nonmathematical algorithms as is
attempted in patent law.275 The dichotomy between mathematical
and nonmathematical algorithms may indeed be unfortunate; how-
ever, acceptance of this model does not in any way resolve the ques-
tion of whether or not algorithms in general should fall within or
without patentable subject matter.2 7 6
Newell further asserts that a patent system that "tries to distin-
guish algorithms as one sort of thing and mental steps as another, will
ultimately end up in a quagmire."277 This conclusion is reached by
relying on a theoretical model of cognitive psychology that posits that
the internal workings of a thinking human brain involve computation.
Although later admitting that there may be some controversy in psy-
chology over this model, Newell concludes from the model: "We
model what is going on inside the thinking human brain, as the carry-
ing out of computational steps. Therefore, humans think by means of
algorithms. Sequences of mental steps and algorithms are the same
thing."278 Samuelson endorses this model, indeed italicizing the three
CHuNKIN-THE AUTromATIc GENERATION AND LEARNING OF GOAL HIERARCHIES
(1986); ALLEN NEWELL ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUimAN COMPUTER INTERAC-
TION (1983).
274. Newell, supra note 5, at 1024.
275. I& at 1024-25.
276. The premise that all algorithms are mathematical as a matter of scientific defini-
tion does not lead to the conclusion that all algorithms must therefore be denied
patent protection. This is the issue that the second part of the PTO test is sup-
posed to resolve when an admittedly mathematical algorithm is found in a claim.
See supra notes 255-257.
277. Newell, supra note 5, at 1025.
278. Id. Immediately following the sentences quoted in the text Newell states:
Any attempt in the law to make distinctions that depend upon contrast-
ing mental steps versus algorithms is doomed to eventual confusion. It is
not important whether you accept this computational view of human
thinking. There can be controversy about whether such an approach is
the correct one for psychology. What is important is that such a view is a
major one in the study of the human mind-that many psychologists see
the mind this way and that thousands of technical papers are written
from within this view, covering large expanses of psychological
phenomena.
While not depreciating from the conclusion that this computational model is an
important one for psychological study, it would follow that should the law refuse
to take the step of accepting this view and instead takes the very pragmatic step
of simply holding that a patent cannot be infringed by merely mental steps, that
"quagmire" of trying to distinguish algorithms from mental steps is avoided.
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quoted sentences.279 After accepting this model of equating mental
steps with algorithms, the next logical conclusion to be drawn is that
infringement of patents covering algorithms may occur by thinking.28 0
Whatever controversy may be raging in cognitive psychology,
presuming or urging that intellectual property law has or should ac-
cept a "mechanomorphic"281 model of the functioning of the human
brain should not rest on such a fragile base. It may be true that com-
puter programs including algorithms may be devised according to a
model of how the devisor thinks the brain works. 282 However, this
anthropomorphic aspect of program design does not lead to the con-
verse conclusion that the brain actually is working according to that
model.283
For that matter, even if mental steps are equated with algorithms,
279. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1123. The sentence following
these, however, was elided. This sentence is: "There can be controversy about
whether such an approach is the correct one for psychology." See supra note 278
for the complete quotation.
280. Newell, supra note 5, at 1025; Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1124.
281. Postulating human behavior as computational, Newell concludes: "Therefore,
humans think by means of algorithms." Newell, supra note 5, at 1025. The model
posited for the brain evidently is a mechanistic one with the brain undertaking
the same sequential steps that would a computer performing the same functions.
282. See, e.g., Clapes, Lynch & Sternberg, supra note 2, for a detailed description of
the context in which programs are written and process used in writing a program,
identifying the following phases: product definition, generalized design, interme-
diate design, detailed design and coding. The authors draw a musical composition
analogy: "[Tihe programmer's view would be analogous to that of the composer."
Id. at 1511. In the context of the thought process employed by programmers, the
authors state:
High-level languages are based on the notion that the job of translating a
program written the way people think (high-level) into a program writ-
ten the way computers are designed (low-level) could be mechanized if
the high-level language was sufficiently formalized.
Id. at 1522.
283. The views of Frances Crick, who received the Nobel Prize, along with James D.
Watson, and Maurice H.F. Wilkins, in 1962, for decoding the structure of DNA, on
the brain-as-computer model are reported as follows:
[Crick] has warned, for example, of the "pernicious influence" of the
computer as a model of the brain. Computers are designed according to
logical and mathematical precepts, he observes, whereas natural selec-
tion cobbles organisms together with "gimmicks and mechanisms," with
whatever works.
John Horgan, Profile: Francis H.C Crick, The Mephistopheles of Neurobiology,
Sci. AM., Feb. 1992, at 32, 32-33. See also, RICHARD RESTAK, THE BRAIN HAS A
MIND OF ITS OWN 119 (1991):
As a result of their research, many neuroscientists now believe that
the brain is not like a computer or a machine, at least not like any
machine that anyone has ever encountered. It has no definable bounda-
ries (neuroregulatory hormones are dispersed throughout the body). Its
parts can break down through disuse or mishap, and yet its functioning
may not be perceptively altered. For example, we're losing neurons
throughout our lifetime (about fifty thousand cells per day, about ten
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any problems ensuing are hardly cataclysmic.284 Some examples from
cases where patents were denied may illustrate this. With respect to
algorithm claims where computer hardware components are directly
recited, as in Benson, it would take a surprisingly liberal application of
the doctrine of equivalents28 5 to find that the step of "storing the bi-
nary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register"286 occurred
in the brain. In Flook could it seriously be argued that the claimed
step of "adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit
value"28 7 could be read on what is taking place in the brain?
If claims are cast in broad conceptual terms without reference to a
computer or computer components, such as may be the case in "expert
thousand synapses per second), yet our mental capacities improve, or at
least hold steady, until late in our lives.
In addition, the brain's status as a wet organ endows it with the capac-
ity to communicate by releasing chemicals into the environment that act
at sites other than the synapse.
284. Outside of academic circles, at least, one would expect any infringement to occur
with the use of a computer.
285. See supm note 150.
286. Claim 8 of the Benson application reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form
into binary which comprises the steps of
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift
register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there
is a binary '1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary T in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a T to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in prepa-
ration for a succeeding binary T in the second position of said register.
409 U.S. at 73,74 (Appendix).
287. Appearing in the insignificant post solution step in claim 1 of the Flook applica-
tion, which reads:
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at
least one process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic
chemical conversion of hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a cur-
rent value of
Bo+K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm
offset which comprises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present
value being defined as PVL;
(2) Determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation:
B 1=Bo(.0-F)+VL(F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) Determining an updated alarm limit which is defined as BI+K; and
thereafter
(4) Adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
437 U.S. at 596-97 (Appendix).
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systems," 288 then the question must be asked whether the brain is ca-
pable of undertaking steps, such as claimed in In re Grams: "[a] per-
forming said plurality of clinical laboratory tests on the individual to
measure the values of the set of parameters;... [c] comparing the first
quantity to a predetermined value to determine whether the individ-
ual's condition is abnormal...."289 If "subjective judgment" is in-
volved, then, according to In re Musgrave, § 112 would be an
appropriate ground for rejection of the claims, because the invention
was not "distinctly" claimed.290 In Grams the CAFC did not reach
this issue because it held that the algorithm claimed was mathematical
and hence barred by Benson.291
In addition, there is a built-in antidote to any fear that granting
patents on inventions that might be infringed by thinking will retard
the useful arts. Detecting infringement of a process patent is often
difficult, even when a product is produced by the process. This diffi-
culty would be significantly compounded when no product is being
produced and the patent owner must prove what is going on in the
alleged infringer's mind. Hence, it would seem that secrecy, rather
than patent, would be the protection of choice for such processes.
Finally, even if a claim could be read on the functioning of the
human brain without involving "subjective judgment," if such think-
ing only involves experimentation without commercial exploitation,
then the exception to infringement of "experimental use" may be in-
voked.2 92 If the individual is commercially exploiting the claimed in-
288. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1115-17, for a discussion of
expert systems.
289. 888 F.2d 835, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The step of "performing... clinical laboratory
tests," involved at least some physical acts. Id. The step of "comparing" may be
very mechanical; e.g. whether the binary state is a one or a zero, or it may involve
a great deal of substantive knowledge to ascertain "abnormality." The court re-
lied, in part, upon In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 792 (C.C.P.A. 1982), where a "process
for indentifying [sic] locations of probable malfunction in a complex system" evi-
dently was a human being and the process was to be used as a neurological diag-
nostic test. The process included the steps of: "(c) testing the complex system for
a response .... ; (d) determining whether said response of the complex system
was at least partially effective or ineffective .... " Id. at 792.
290. "A step requiring the exercise of subjective judgment without restriction might
be objectionable as rendering a claim indefinite, but this would provide no statu-
tory basis for a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101." In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893
(C.C.P.A. 1970).
291. 888 F.2d 835, 840-41. In In re Meyer, discussed supra note 290, the claims also
were rejected on the basis of Benson as being directed to a mathematical al-
gorithm. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789,795-96 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The question of nov-
elty may also be raised in cases such as Grams and Meyer. As evidenced, for
example, in Meyer. "In fact, the Solicitor indicated that these standard tests have
been employed for many years and that the more experienced the doctor and the
better his memory, the less would be his need (if any) for this invention." In re
Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
292. On the experimental use defense, see in particular, Chisum, Algorithms, supra
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vention by thinking and reaps profits from its use, it is not apparent
why the result should be any different whether a computer or other
machine or the brain is involved.
If there was commercial exploitation and the algorithm was new,
useful and nonobvious, the goal of the patent system may indeed be
achieved by affording the patent owner exclusive use for the advance-
ment of the useful arts.293 It would be difficult to conceive that this
would have more economic or social impact than granting a patent for
curing cancer or AIDS.294 Perhaps the matter of infringement by
note 2, at 1017-19, with respect to computer programs. Recently, there has been
considerable interest in this general topic. See Eisenberg, supra note 20; Ned A.
Israelsen, Making, Using, and Selling Without Infringemnntn An Examination
of 35 U.S.C Section 271(e) and the Experimental Use Exception to Patent In-
fringement, 16 A.LP.L.A. Q.J. 457 (1989); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental
Use as Patent Infringement The Impropriety of a Broad Exception?, 100 YALE
L.J. 2169 (1991). The question of experimental use as a defense to a claim of
patent infringement received international attention at the 35th Congress in To-
kyo (Apr. 5-11, 1992) of the Association Internationale pur la Protection de la
Proprietd Industrielle (A.I.P.P.I.). See Group Report Q105, A.I.P.P.I. Annaire
1991/V. (summarizing the experimental use defense in the various countries and
making proposals).
293. Is it also not apparent why it should make any difference whether or not the
expert system is both claimed in a patent and also described in a book. Samuel-
son raises the hypothetical of an algorithm for analyzing and resolving certain
types of contract disputes that was patented as an expert system and also ex-
pressed in a book. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1126-27. As long
ago as Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the Court made clear that the copyright
on a book including blank forms did not preclude the use of those forms to prac-
tice a particular accounting method expressed in that book. If the accounting
method were patentable and patented, what public policy would be served by ex-
cluding enforcement because a user of the method read it in the book? Samuel-
son then asks whether lawyers who use the algorithm in legal briefs would be
patent infringers. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1127. Presum-
ing the patent is valid, infringed, and there is no exception or defense to the in-
fringement, why should this use be treated any differently than using a process
for curing AIDS or cancer? If the algorithm was also described in a book, copy-
right infringement could also be found, presuming there was access and substan-
tial copying of expression, and no merger of idea and expression. See also
Richard H. Stern, Copyright in Computer Programming Languages, 17 RuTGRs
CoMiP. & TECH. L.J. 321, 347-64 (1991)(discussing the issue of the scope of copy-
right protection for programming language, described in a book or in computer
program for translating the language or a program using the language).
294. The interesting question is whether the owner of such a patent could refuse to
use it and enjoin others from using the cure. See discussion of the Paper Bag case,
supra note 38. 35 U.S.C. § 283 authorizes federal courts to "grant injunctions in
accordance with principles of equity.. ." Courts have occasionally refused to
grant injunctions against infringement on equitable grounds. In Vitamin Tech-
nologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Res. Found., 146 F.2d 941, 946 (9th Cir. 1944),
cert denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945), the court said in dictum:
We know of no case in the Supreme Court since the Paper Bag case [210
U.S. 405 (1908)], which has considered the patentee's refusal to license
the use of its patent to protect the health of great numbers of the public
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thinking could be best resolved according to the admonition of Chief
Justice Brian more than five hundred years ago: "The thought of man
shall not be tried for the devil himself knoweth not the thought of
man."295
3. Perceived Models of the Patent System
Perhaps more troubling are Newell's perceived models of the eco-
nomic foundations of the patent system. An underlying premise of
Newell's argument that the models are broken is that computer sci-
ence is distinct from other forms of science and technology. He as-
serts: "One model underlying the patent system posits the existence
of a gap between general scientific discovery and its application to
matters of social and economic value."296 He then posits that natural
curiosity and a quest for fame may be adequate incentives for scien-
tists to search for laws of nature, but that, because discovery of such
natural laws "does not wear its practical application on its sleeve, so to
speak," it is necessary for the patent system to provide an additional
economic incentive for application inventions to be made. 297 His argu-
ment then runs that, because all computer science is related to use,
there is no gap between pure and applied science for computer science,
and asks the rhetorical question: "Hence where is the rewardable,
risky, inventive effort?" 298
such as are here shown to be suffering with rickets. It is strongly argua-
ble that such a suppression of the patent's use is vastly more against the
public interest than its use for a mere control of prices as in United
States v. Masonite Corp. [316 U.S. 265 (1942)], or the tieing of unpatented
with patented material in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co. [320 U.S.
661 (1944)].
See also, Foster v. American Mach. and Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317,1324 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974); City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69
F.2d 577 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 293 U.S. 576 (1934), where the court refused to
enjoin the city from operating an infringing sewage treatment plant, which, if
closed, would result in raw sewage being dumped into Lake Michigan; money
damages were considered an adequate remedy.
Also, governmental use may not be enjoined and eminent domain may be in-
voked for "taking" a patent or a license thereunder, in the public interest. See,
e.g., Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1976); N. V. Philips'
Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Conm'n, 316 F.2d 401, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1963). See also Evan Ackiron, Note, Patents for Critical Pharmaceuticals: The
AZT Case, 17 AM. J. LAW & MED. 145 (1991)(discussing the issue of injunctions,
compulsory licenses and expropriation with respect to alleged monopoly pricing
of AZT).
295. Y.B. 7 Edw. IV, F.2, pl. 2 (1468), quoted in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, JOHN W. WADE &
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 2 (8th ed. 1988). Perhaps
Matthew 5:28 is also relevant: "That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after
her hath committed adultery already in his heart."





In the first instance, it is not intuitively obvious why computer sci-
ence should be put into the binary category of pure rather than ap-
plied science, if indeed there is no gap. Do all algorithms define
natural laws? Are they only induced by curiosity or fame? Second, it
is not difficult to find examples of discoveries in other fields of the
physical sciences that may indeed carry their application on their
sleeves, so to speak, or at least such applications as may well be obvi-
ous to a person skilled in a particular art once the fundamental truth
is discovered.299 One example that comes to mind is the recent discov-
ery that certain compositions of matter exhibit superconductive be-
havior at temperatures well above absolute zero, indeed approaching
room temperatures.3 00 The obvious applications are legion;3 0 ' how-
299. The invention of the transistor led to its substitution for vacuum tubes as had the
vacuum tube replaced electro-mechanical relays in various applications including
computers. The vacuum tube and transistor have been classified as among the
greatest inventions. See G. HARRY STINR, THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE COMPUTER
REVOLUTION 60,66 (1985). See JOEL SHURKN, ENGINES OF THE MIND: A HISTORY
OF THE COMPUTER 9 (1984), listing the atomic bomb, transistor and computer as
the three most important inventions of the twentieth century, and viewing the
marriage of the computer and transistor as effecting a transformation unmatched
since the Industrial Revolution. Magnetic core memory technology also was con-
sidered key to the development of the modern computer. See SHIRLEY THOMAS,
COMPUTERs: THEIR HISTORY, PRESENT APPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE 68 (1965).
One of the negative tests of "invention" prior to the enactment of the nonobvious
standard in the 1952 Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 103) was the substitution of materi-
als. See, eg., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)(substitution of
a clay or porcelain knob for a wood or metal one not invention) Also see Anthony
W. Deller, The Problem of Invention in the Law ofPatents, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y
797 (1946)(listing 14 negative tests).
300. In 1911, Heike Kamerlingh Onnes discovered superconductivity when he found
that mercury cooled to near absolute zero (0 K; -460F; 1273C) lost almost all elec-
trical resistance. Alan M. Wolsky et al., The New Superconductors: Prospectsfor
Applications, SCi. Am., Feb. 1989, at 60. After this initial discovery, progress in
increasing the critical temperature, the temperature at which superconductivity
could be achieved, was exceedingly slow. The first breakthrough came in 1986,
when two scientists in Switzerland began experimenting with ceramics and re-
ported superconductivity at 35K (-396F; -238C), the first increase in critical tem-
perature in fifteen years. Simon Foner & Terry Orlando, Superconducting: The
Long Road Ahead, TECHNOLOGY REv., Feb./Mar. 1988, at 36, 39 (former high criti-
cal temperature 23K). The next major breakthrough came one year later when
researchers at two American universities discovered a particular ceramic which
exhibited superconductivity above 77K (-321F; -196C). I& This discovery was
particularly important as a superconductor with a critical temperature above 77K
could be cooled using liquid nitrogen instead of the much more expensive liquid
helium which had been used to reach temperatures near absolute zero. Wolsky et
al., supra, at 62. Thus began the age of "high temperature" superconductors.
Foner & Orlando, supra, at 39. Progress since that time has been slow but contin-
uous. By 1990, the highest critical temperature achievable for ceramic materials
appeared to be in the neighborhood of 130 K for materials made from either thal-
lium or vanadium oxides. Michael Cross, Vanadium Takes Superconductors to
New Heights, NEw SCIENTIST, Sept. 29, 1990, at 30 (critical temperature 130K; -
225F; -143C); Japanese Lab Develops Highest-Temperature Superconductor, Ky-
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ever, practical implementation of those applications may be far from
obvious. 302
If there is, in fact, no continuum between pure and applied science,
then patent law surely provides a significant incentive along with that
of natural curiosity and the quest for fame. Even the most pure of
scientists might be tempted by the economic incentive. 303 Even after
odo News Service, June 6, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File
(temperature 127K; -231F; -146C). However, a 1991 report made reference to a
new thallium material with a critical temperature of 187K (-123F; -86C). Hitachi
Develops Thallium-Based Superconductor Materials with High Critical Current
density, COMLINE News Service, July 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File.
301. Applications for superconducting materials have been suggested in many differ-
ent areas: electrical motors and transmission devices (eg., high voltage power
lines) providing and transmitting electric power at improved performance levels
and decreased cost because of decreased losses to electrical resistance in the con-
ducting material; high speed trains using magnetic forces to levitate above the
track; energy storage devices storing large amounts of electrical energy in zero-
loss grids against peak demand periods. See Foner & Orlando, supra note 300, at
40-46; Wolsky et al., supra note 300, at 62-66.
With respect to computer technology, it has been suggested that superconduc-
tor technology be "married" to semiconductor technology to produce extremely
fast and highly accurate computer chips. Gallium Arsenide Chips; Half Way to
Paradise, ECONOMIST, June 15, 1991, at 83. The semiconducting material would
control the logic of the chip while the superconducting material would allow for
lighting-fast connections between areas of semiconducting material. Id.
Another possible computer-related application of superconducting materials
involves the use of "Josephson junctions." Josephson junctions are essentially
layers of superconducting and insulating materials which can be used to switch
voltages very quickly while consuming far less energy than conventional devices.
Wolsky et al., supra note 300, at 65. Use of these junctions in computer hardware
circuitry would allow communication limited only by the speed of light. Id.
Problems with the manufacture of memory cells using Josephson junctions have
caused American concerns to abandon research in this field in favor of semicon-
ductor research. However, the Japanese have continued to experiment in this
area. Id.
302. Significant problems still exist with regard to the commercialization of such su-
perconductor applications, specially with regard to the purity and durability of
the ceramics. See e.g., Half Way to Paradise, supra note 301, at 83. However,
industry is catching up with the state of the art in high-temperature superconduc-
tors. New materials and manufacturing process are being found to improve the
purity and ductility of the high-temperature materials. Superconducting Motors:
Getting Warmer, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1991, at 64 ("melt recrystalization" process);
Edmund L. Andrews, Superconductors Made in Bulk Quantities, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 1991, § 1, at 34 (processing improves purity in ductile 1-2-4 materials).
Other processes are being found to improve the bulk performance of these super-
conductors. Superconductors: A Step Closer to Mass Production?, Bus. WK.,
June 11, 1990, at 75.
303. Disputes over ownership of intellectual property are not uncommon. For exam-
ple, when a physics professor at California Institute of Technology (Caltech) de-
veloped a computer program in the course of his research, a debate arose over
whether Caltech had an ownership interest in the program when the professor
wanted to license it. See Gina Kolata, Caltech Torn by Dispute Over Software, 220
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the discovery has been made in computer science, one would expect
that the protection of both copyright and patent may provide the
needed incentive to perfect the application by revisions, debugging,
etc.304
In a further attempt to distinguish computer science from other
technology, Newell posits the basic model of the patent system to in-
duce inventions that are "consumable" to the net benefit of society.3 05
Newell then offers an alternative model whose thesis would appear to
be that, because some computer scientists in the past have had free
access to the programs of others, they have been able to improve them
and, because the patent system may deny access, further improvement
and development may be inhibited.306
Although Newell states that he does "not seriously defend this al-
SCIENCE 932 (May 27, 1983). Thereafter, Caltech changed its bylaws stating that
when intellectual property was developed in a manner such as in the present
case, then the University would obtain the rights to all royalties, unless other
arrangements had been made in advance. In 1983, Carnegie-Mellon University
was in the process of developing a new policy on ownership of intellectual prop-
erty in response to similar disputes. Id. The policy, implemented in 1985, states
as one of its purposes:
There should be incentives for all parties to pursue financial rewards
together, consistent with the expressed goals of the policy. The distribu-
tion of these rewards should reflect, insofar possible, the creative contri-
butions of the creator, and the resources contributed by and risks
assumed by both the creator and the University in developing intellec-
tual property.
Office of the President, Carnegie-Mellon University Organization Announce-
ment No. 307 Intellectual Property, July 30, 1985 at 1. The new policy provided
that the creator would be entitled to 50% of the net proceeds from the University
resulting from the distribution of the software. Id. at 2. See also GARY W.
MATKIN, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE UNIvERsITY, at 81-99 (1990)(discussing,
inter alia, the strong economic incentives that professors have in developing new
technology.) See also, Reichman, Computer Programs, supra, note 2.
304. Debugging costs are difficult to estimate:
The variability of the human element in software development is proba-
bly the principal cause of the lack of quantification in the claims associ-
ated with structured programming and other related issues.... Even the
same programmer may perform quite differently on different occasions
due to such factors as health, motivation, or familiarity with the
program.
S.D. CONTE, Er AL., SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METrcs AND MODELS § 3.1, at
113 (1986). However, a comparison can be made between the cost of errors found
while designing the software and those errors found during maintenances of the
software. The costs of repairing errors found during maintenance may be 100
times more expensive than if the errors were found during design. I& § 2.8.4, at
105 (citing B.W. BOERm, SOFrWARE ENGINEERING ECONOMICs (1981)). Therefore
because of the cost differential, an incentive exists to eliminate as many bugs as
possible during the design phase. See supra text note 77 (discussing the incentive
needed to complete development).
305. Newell, supra note 5, at 1033.
306. Id. at 1033-34.
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ternative model,"307 it would appear that the alternative model is far
closer to the generally accepted model for the patent system. It is only
the conclusion that is different. Certainly, the patent system envisions
the creation of a product that is consumable, but, in addition, it also
envisions the social contract of the public dissemination of knowledge
with respect to the invention to enable a person skilled in the art to
replicate it.308 The general theory is that, rather than inhibiting im-
provement inventions, the publication of technical knowledge con-
cerning the invention (even though it may never be marketed for
consumption) will spur on others to invent improvements or to trans-
fer the knowledge to other fields of technology. 09 It should be
remembered that many patented inventions are never marketed for
consumption.310 This same fate may also be expected of computer
programs.
The common industry practice of distributing programs only in ob-ject code may be having a far more inhibitory effect on program im-
provement than may be attributed to patents on program inventions.
With respect to such patents, the ideas underlying the program must,
at least, be made available to the public in a commonly-understanda-
ble form in an enabling disclosure.
In sum, the broken models may not be those under which the pat-
ent system has been operating for over five hundred years. However
uneasily some may assert that computer programs fit into the patent
system, the system over time has been able to accommodate all tech-
nologies as they have evolved, even if by stretching uncomfortably at
times to force the seams.3 1 The patent system may not be fully com-
patible with scientists who desire free and immediate access to all
knowledge, but the tension between access and incentive is the
307. Id at 1034. He concludes:
I do not seriously defend this alternative model. My goal is more mod-
est-to point out that the world of algorithms and computers may have a
different character than the standard economic model of incentives that
underlies the patent law. Even this model may be broken.
308. See supra, text accompanying notes 60-63.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 58 and 59.
310. In an industry survey conducted in the early 1950s, it was concluded that: "The
overall utilization rate of patents in current use, used in the past, and reported
about to be used is 57 to 58%." Barkev S. Sanders et al., Patent Acquisition by
Corporations, 3 PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT J. RES. AND EDUC. 217, 239
(1959). The survey consisted of over 1,000 questionnaires returned by companies
concerning their use of patents. The study further concluded that the patent util-
ization rate is significantly higher for smaller companies (over 75%) compared to
larger companies (close to 50%). 1& at 218.
311. A recent example is the patenting of life forms. See generally, 1 CHIsUM, PAT-
ENTS, supra note 44, § 1.027][d] and n.24 (collecting articles); Patenting of Life
Form, BANBiuRRY REPORT 10 (David W. Plant et al. eds., 1982). See also supra
note 245, on the current controversy over the patentability of human genes.
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model.312 This model is, perhaps, strained by computer program in-
ventions, as well as by other evolving technologies, but it is hardly
broken.
4. The Service Economy: Methods of Doing Business
The black-letter rule of nineteenth and early twentieth century
patent law that methods of doing business or business systems are not
patentable subject matter continues to have some vitality.313 The ra-
tionale for such a rule is obscure, as is the definition of what consti-
tutes a method of doing business.314 In terms of benefit to society, any
attempt to distinguish a method for producing a product more effi-
ciently from a method of doing business that enables a product or ser-
312. As stated by Professor Goldstein:
The Constitution's authorization to Congress to grant patent and copy-
right protection represents a judgment that, although short-range com-
petitive interests would benefit from immediate and free public access to
technological and artistic innovation, to permit such access would de-
stroy incentive to innovate; new products and works would not be intro-
duced into the market and consequently the longrange competitive
situation would decline.
Paul Goldstein, The Competition Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59 CAL. L. REv.
873, 878 (1971).
313. See generally, 1 CHIsum, PATENTS, supra note 44 § 1.03 (5). In criticism of Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), which upheld a patent claiming a "system for
processing and supervising a plurality of composite subscriber [cash management]
accounts" against a defense that it was a "business method", Samuelson notes:
"The court did not discuss a single 'business method' case, nor did it inquire about
the reasons that might underlie the rule against patenting business methods."
Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1121 n. 384. See also, In re John-
ston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), holding an automated financial record keeping sys-
tem to be within the technological arts. See also, PTO, MathematicalAlgorithms,
supra note 7, at 11, which appears to agree with Paine, Webber.
314. The leading case on the business method/systems rule appears to be Hotel Secur-
ity Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908), relating to a method for
keeping restaurant records to avoid fraud by waiters and cashiers. Chisum notes
that the court provides "no precise reason for such an exclusion." Chisum, Algo-
rithms, supra note 2, at 964. Rather cryptically in Hotel Security Judge Coxe
states: "A system of transacting business disconnected from the means of carry-
ing out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the term, an
art. Advice is not patentable." Presumably, he would have had no problem if as a
means for carrying out the system were connected and met the qualitative re-
quirements for patentability. Chisum also notes that, "Rejection of business
plans is often grounded alternatively on the 'printed matter' rule." 1 Cisum,
PATENTS, supra note 44, at 1-76. More in line with the transformational view of
processes, is Professor Robinson's rationale for not protecting business methods
given a century ago: 'Every invention, when applied according to the design of its
inventor, must accomplish some change in the character or condition of material
objects. This is as essential in a patentable art as in an instrument." 1 WILUIAM
C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 249 (1890).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
vice to be marketed more efficiently may be as evasive as
distinguishing idea from expression.
From an economic policy standpoint, a strong argument can be
made that it would be in the best interests of the United States to
provide incentives for creating inventions advancing the service area
of the economy, which would include methods and systems of doing
business, particularly those implementable by means of computer
technology. At the present time, over 75 percent of jobs in the United
States are in the service sector and the remainder are in manufactur-
ing and farming.31 5 This situation is the reverse of a century ago,
when 75 percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture.3 16 By
the year 2000, it is predicted that the percentage in the service sector
will increase to 80%, with substantially all new jobs being created in
service industries.S17 In terms of the gross national product of goods
and services, the percentage attributable to services has been steadily
increasing since the end of World War 11.318 If the patent system in-
deed works in providing a net benefit to society, it would seem that the
protection of nontransformational service inventions would serve the
beneficial purpose of inducing investment in one of the few areas
where the United State remains a technological leader.3 19 Moreover,
as there are technological developments in the service sector, it would
315. See Louis RExEYsER's BusINEss ALMANAC 199 (L. Rekeyser & J. Cooney, eds.,
1988)[hereinafter BusINEss ALMANAC]. In 1952, 59% of U.S. workers were em-
ployed in the service sector, increasing to 68% in 1972. Id.
316. Id. at 24-26, 199-200
317. Id. at 24, 199.
318. In 1950, services constituted approximately 33% of the total, compared to 40.5% in
1960, 44% in 1970, 48% in 1980, and 54.2% in 1990. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 431 (No. 698)(111th ed. 1991)[hereinafter STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT] for 1950-1980 figures. See 71 SURVEY OF CURRENT BuSINESS 5 (Table 1.1),
July 1991, for 1990 figures. See also infra note 319 for sources attributing even a
higher percentage to the service sector.
319. In 1988, services accounted for 71% of the United States' output, and the U.S. was
the leader in the international market's service sector. Christopher Chipello, Ab-
stract, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 6. In 1990, the service industry
provided $130.623 billion in export trade for the United States, up from $47.584
billion in 1980. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 318, Table 790. See also, U.S.
Department of Commerce, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK '92 (1992)("The U.S. data
processing and network services industry is the world's largest."); Introducing a
New List- The World's Largest Service Companies, FORTUNE, Aug. 26, 1991, at
166-67 ("Among the 25 countries represented [in the international market service
sector], the U.S. has the most companies, with 150 .... [clearly] the U.S. is the
leader . ).."); James Quinn, Serving the Service Industry, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, Summer 1989, at 74-80:
The service sector has increasingly emerged as the critical force driv-
ing the U.S. economy. Service industries... employ three out of four
Americans and account for 72 percent of the GNP .... International trade
services will play a growing role in the global economy. Services cur-
rently account for at least $700 billion of the world's international trade.
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seem quite logical that intellectual property should be ready to accom-
modate rather than to limit the ability of the system to promote ad-
vances in the most rapidly increasing segment of the economy. To the
extent that computer programs are to be used in industrial processes
for the transformation of matter, such as in Diehr, the old traditional
manufacturing model of processes would certainly continue; however,
now that the translation of information and the manipulation of data
have become of paramount concern to the service economy, it would
seem that intellectual property should accommodate itself accord-
ingly, if its historical purpose is to be implemented. Although a sound
service economy requires a sound industrial base,3 20 it may well be
foolhardy to ignore the reality of a service-dominated economy and to
pigeonhole on the basis of an outdated conception of the patentability
of business methods or systems.321
320. See JOEL KURTzEAN, THE DECLiNE AND CRASH OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY Ch. 2
(1988)(arguing that high-tech society cannot expand without increased produc-
tion in industrial sector); Joan Berger, The False Paradise of a Service Economy,
Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 1986, at 78 (detailing lack of growth under a service economy
absent an expanding industrial base).
321. In criticism of Chisum's advocating the patentability of business systems, evi-
dently ironically, Samuelson states: 'Eiminating these impediments to patenta-
bility would, of course, have far broader consequences than simply opening the
patent system to the protection of all computer program innovations. Michael
Milken could now patent his method for junk bond offerings." Samuelson, Ben-
son Revisited, supra note 2, at 1131 n.423.
It is far from apparent that granting Milken a patent on his method of junk
bond offerings would have had adverse economic consequences, particularly if
the patent system had induced the invention. If one assumes junk bonds are bad
for the economy, underutilization as a result of the patent may have reduced any
harm. Nonetheless, the jury is still out on the value of junk bonds. See eg.,
Fredrik Dahl, Nobel Economics Laureate Praise Junk Bonds, LBOS, REUTERS,
Dec. 11, 1990,:
Co-winner of the 1990 Nobel prize in economics, Merton Miller,
praised the use of junk bonds and leveraged buyouts (BLOs) in corporate
finance and denied they encouraged excessive debt and manipulation.
Miller praised Michael Milken, who has been called the king of junk
bonds, as a financial innovator. 'e saw a gap in the financial structure
and he was able to fill it... And he did it very well. The market per-
formed some useful functions.", said Miller.
See also, Not Such Junk; Economic Viability of Junk Bonds, NAT'L REV., June 24,
1991 at 13: "[Milken's] genius turned [the junk bond market] into a financial
breeding ground for start-up companies. The transformation gave the 95% of
American Corporations that are too small, too new, or too unknown for invest-
ment-grade credit ratings... access to credit markets for the first time in his-
tory." See also Michael D. Floyd, Comment, Junk Bonds: Do They Have a
Value?, 35 EMORY L.J. 921 (1986).
Of course, Milken's crime was not coveting a patent on junk bonds. He was
sentenced to 10 years in prison after pleading guilty to 6 of 98 changes of racke-
teering and securities fraud. See James W. Michaels, My Story-Michael Milken,
FORES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 79. Milken has also settled a multimillion dollar law
suit involving a host of civil suits, with Milken required to pay $900 million of the
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C. Algorithms as Liberal Arts
The question of whether algorithms, mathematical or otherwise,
are the statutory subject matter of patents has generally been consid-
ered a question of statutory construction and, hence, within the pur-
view of the courts to so construe.322 Congress has elected not to
specifically exclude or include algorithms within the definition of pat-
entable statutory subject matter in the Patent Act, while at least a
definition of "computer program" has been added by amendment to
the Copyright Act.323 The argument has been raised in a number of
contexts and a variety of ways, however, that the question of whether
an algorithm constitutes patentable subject matter should be decided
at the constitutional level, hence requiring an interpretation of the
Patent/Copyright Clause.324
$1.3 billion settlement. Milken already has paid $400 million in connection with
another settlement made with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1990.
See Judge Approves $1.3 Billion Settlement Between FDIC, Milken, Drexel Offi-
cials, VNA's BANKING REPORT, March 16, 1992, at 476. The settlement would
reportedly leave Milken with well over $500 million. See Allan Sloan, Crying
Over Spilled Milken, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1992, at 56. The estimate of his net
worth probably does not take into account his prison wages of 30 cents per hour.
322. In Supreme Court cases considering the 35 U.S.C. § 101 issue of patentable sub-
ject matter, the issue has been whether Congress has or intended to extend pat-
ent protection to particular subject matter, not whether such extension was
within the power of Congress. For example, in Benson, the Court states: "It may
be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these programs, a policy mat-
ter to which we are not competent to speak." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
72 (1972). In Chakrabarty, the Court states: "The Constitution grants Congress
broad power to legislate to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts ..... Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980)(emphasis added).
In the next paragraph, the Court goes on: "The question before us is a narrow
one of statutory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 .... Id
(emphasis added). In Diehr, Justice Stevens, in dissent, states: "The broad ques-
tion whether computer programs should be given patent protection involves pol-
icy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address." Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 216-17 (1981).
323. See supra note 4 for the definition.
324. For example, the issue was raised in In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A.
1970):
All that is necessary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational
steps a statutory "process" within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the tech-
nological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose
to promote the progress of "useful arts."
Judge Baldwin concurred in result in Musgrave but was concerned about a rule
that would find "claims drawn entirely to purely mental processes to be statu-
tory..." Id. at 896 (emphasis added). He then hypothesized on the possible diffi-
culties of such a rule:
It should not require much imagination to see the many problems sure to
be involved in trying to decide whether a step requiring certain human
judgment evaluations is definite or not.
As one more example, suppose a claim happens to contain a sequence
of operational steps which can reasonably be read to cover a process per-
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This argument appears to be based on a number of premises. The
major premise is that a strict parallel construction must be given to
the Patent/Copyright Clause. Accordingly, "writings" must exclu-
sively promote "science" (read-liberal arts) in order to qualify for
copyright protection and "inventions" must exclusively promote the
"useful arts" (read-technological arts) in order to qualify for patent
protection.325 The second premise is that "mathematics" falls exclu-
sively within the liberal arts.326 The third premise is that all algo-
rithms are mathematical in nature. 27 If these premises are accepted,
the conclusion may then be drawn that algorithms should not be the
subject matter of patents, because being mathematical they promote
the liberal arts and not the useful arts.
Even if the third premise is accepted-that all algorithms are
mathematical in nature-there is no clear indication that mathematics
in general or algorithms in particular, in the intellectual property
sense, should be exclusively allocated to the liberal arts. Laws of na-
ture expressed by mathematical equations are categorized as unpro-
tectible subject matter because of their preemptive nature, not
because they are or can be expressed mathematically.2 8 Moreover,
formable both within and without the technological arts? This is not too
far fetched. Would such a claim be statutory? Would it comply with sec-
tion 112? We will have to face these problems some day.
Id. Compare In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877-78 (C.C.P.A. 1978), where Judge Bald-
win, writing for the court, stated.
First, we hold that the method for enabling a computer to translate natu-
ral languages is in the technological arts, ie., it is a method of operating a
machine. The "technological" or "useful" arts inquiry must focus on
whether the claimed subject matter (a method of operating a machine to
translate) is statutory, not on whether the product of the claimed subject
matter (a translated text) is statutory, nor on whether the prior art
which the claimed subject matter purports to replace (translation by
human mind) is statutory, and not on whether the claimed subject mat-
ter is presently perceived to be an improvement over the prior art, e.g.,
whether it "enhances" the operation of a machine. This was the law
prior to Benson and was not changed by Benson. (emphasis added)
In Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), the argument was raised in an amicus
brief that since a mathematical algorithm was claimed and mathematics is part of
the "liberal arts" and not the "useful arts", it could not be the subject matter of a
patent. The Court did not take the bait and relied upon the preemption of the
entire mathematical algorithm. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2,
at 1055 n.97 (quoting Amicus Brief Burroughs Corp. at 9-10) and at 1054 n.96 and
1055 (discussing the interpretation of the mathematical issue in the Benson case).
The constitutional issue may also be raised in the context of the patent/copy-
right interface as to whether a computer program may be the subject matter both
patent or copyright or must be restricted to one or the other. See supra text
accompanying notes 186-191.
325. See supra note 10 for the parallel construction of the patent/copyright clause.
326. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1112: "Mathematics has tradition-
ally been considered part of the 'liberal arts"' (footnote omitted).
327. Newell, supra note 5, at 1024-25.
328. As stated in Benson, "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental
19931
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the application of a law of nature, in the form of a mathematical equa-
tion or an algorithm in apparatus or a process, obviously may be statu-
tory subject matter.329 It is separation of the algorithm per se from its
use that creates the problem with which the courts are now struggling.
In essence, the issue again boils down to whether transformation of
matter is necessary to qualify as patentable subject matter. 3 0
Implicit in the first premise is the assumption that the Patent/
Copyright Clause must be given a strict parallel construction so that
there can be no overlap between patentable and copyrightable subject
matter. A given subject matter accordingly must promote either the
liberal or the useful arts, but it cannot promote both. The strict pige-
onholing of the two constitutional titles of protection is reminiscent of
the formalistic jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries.331 Such an approach finds little support in court deci-
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the
basic tools of scientific and technological work." Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 67 (1972). Cf. Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, at 980-84 (criticizing the "ba-
sic tools" argument). In Flook, the Court states:
The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be patented
rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not processes, but
rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not the
kind of "discoveries" that the statute was enacted to protect.
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
329. As stated in Diehr, "It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). The Court then
quotes from Mackay Radio Corp. & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306
U.S. 618, 626 (1939).
330. Samuelson would distinguish Benson and other non-transformational cases from
cases like Mackay Radio, on the basis that primary "instantiation" of the al-
gorithm in Mackay Radio was in the physical parameters of an antenna, while
algorithms in computer program related inventions have their primary "instan-
tiation" in the program implementing them. She then analogizes the "instantia-
tion" of its algorithm to "printed matter" and concludes such has "traditionally
been regarded as outside the bounds of the patent system." Samuelson, Benson
Revisited, supra note 2, at 1112. This analogy, of course, does not explain Diehr,
unless it can be argued that the Arrhenius equation found its summary "instan-
tiation" in the molded rubber products rather than in the control of the rubber
molding process. Note also that in Toma, Judge Baldwin admonished that the
subject matter decision should be based on what is claimed (a machine or
method) and not on the utility served by the invention, whose primary instantia-
tion could be a writing (a translated text). In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 (C.C.PA.
1978). See supra note 324.
331. The period of formalism is generally considered to run roughly from the end of
the Civil War until World War I. See GRANT GiLmoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 11, 60-64 (1977). Gilmore summarizes the judicial approach of that time:
The post-Civil War judicial product seems to start from the assumption
that the law is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law: they
merely declare the law which, in some Platonic sense, already exists.
The judicial function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of
law to changing conditions; it is restricted to the discovery of what the
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sions or legislation.332 In fact, care has been taken in the Copyright
Act to avoid the use of the constitutional language "writings" in speci-
fying copyrightable subject: the Act employs the narrower term
"works of authorship." 3 The Supreme Court also made clear in Ma-
zer v. Stein that, because a lamp base would qualify as the subject mat-
true rules of law are and indeed always have been. Past error can be
exposed and in that way minor corrections can be made, but the truth,
once arrived at, is immutable and eternal. Change can only be legislative
and even legislative change will be treated with a wary and hostile dis-
trust A statute in derogation of the common law-as what statute is
not?-will be strictly construed even if it cannot be set aside on constitu-
tional grounds as beyond the power of the legislature to enact.
Id at 62 (footnote omitted).
332. Samuelson asserts that the legal system ' has generally assumed that an intellec-
tual product is either a writing (and hence copyrightable) or a machine (and
hence patentable), but not both at the same time." Samuelson, Benson Revisited,
supra note 2, at 1129. (Emphasis added, footnote 414 omitted). In her footnote
414, reference is made to the parallel construction of the patent/copyright clause
and the recognition of this parallelism in the OTA BACKGROUND PAPER, supra
note 4, at 34. Also, cited in footnote 414 is an article, Michael J. Kline, Requiring
an Election of Protection for Patentable/Capyrightable Computer Programs, 6
COMPUTER/L.J. 607 (1986), with a specific citation to 647 nn. 185-186 as "citing
authorities on this point" These "authorities" include cases such as Penneck v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829) and Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Suremarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950)(Douglas, J. concurring) where inventions were
constituted to promote both "science and the useful art." Not included in the
"authorities" is Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, (1903),
where in the context of the copyrightability of circus posters, Justice Holmes
states:
We shall do no more than mention the suggestion that painting and
engraving, unless for a mechanical end, are not among the useful arts,
the progress of which Congress is empowered by the Constitution to pro-
mote. The Constitution does not limit the useful to that which satisfies
immediate bodily needs.
Id. at 249. One would surmise that Justice Holmes would support the proposition
that copyrights may promote the useful arts.
333. Copyright Law Revision, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976):
In using the phrase "original works of authorship," rather than "all the
writings of an author" now in section 4 of the statute, the committee's
purpose is to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to
legislate in this field, and to eliminate the uncertainties arising from the
latter phrase. Since the present statutory language is substantially the
same as the empowering language of the Constitution, a recurring ques-
tion has been whether the statutory and the constitutional provisions are
coextensive. If so, the courts would be faced with the alternative of hold-
ing copyrightable something that Congress clearly did not intend to pro-
tect, or of holding constitutionally incapable of copyright something that
Congress might one day want to protect. To avoid these equally undesir-
able results, the courts have indicated that "all the writings of an au-
thor" under the present statute is narrower in scope than the "writings"
of "authors" referred to in the Constitution. The bill avoids this di-
lemma by using a different phrase--"original works of authorship"--in
characterizing the general subject matter of statutory copyright
protection.
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ter of a design patent (an ornamental design presumably promoting
the useful arts), this would not preclude its also qualifying as a subject
matter of copyright (a sculpture promoting the liberal arts).33 4 More-
over, the fact that a lamp base may also serve a utilitarian function
and could thus qualify as a "machine" for patentable subject matter
purposes need not preclude copyright protection of its artistic expres-
sion but only of its utilitarian aspects.3 35
The overlapping model of patent and copyright also has been the
modern approach of the CCPA and now the CAFC.336 These courts
have also consistently held that protection of a three- dimensional
product by patent does not preclude its protection by trademark, as a
separate title of protection advancing over policy goals.33 7
334. 347 U.S. 201 (1954)
335. Excluded from the definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" are
their "mechanical or utilitarian aspects" and "the design of a useful article" can
fall within this definition "only if, and only to the extent that, such design incor-
porates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of this
article." 17 U.S.C. § 101. The definition of a "useful article" is one "having an
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information. An article that is unusually a part of a useful
article is considered a useful article." Id. See supra notes 104-106 for cases relat-
ing to the utilitarian issue.
336. See In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974), where the court held that there
was an overlap in statutory subject matter between copyright and design patents,
citing Mazer v. Stein as so holding. The CCPA decided that the prior grant of a
copyright on a watch face design (a caricature of former Vice President Spiro
Agnew) did not bar the grant of a design patent on the same subject matter and
the applicant did not have to elect one or the other title of protection. Compare
Regulations for Registration of Claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a)(1992),
with respect to pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, that a "copyright claim on
a patented design or in the drawings or photographs in a patent application will
not be registered after the patent has been issued." This would seem to estop a
registration of such a work appearing in either a design or utility patent. The
regulation is, of course, easily circumvented by registering the work prior to issu-
ance of the patent. Nonetheless, it seems rather peculiar that a registration
should be denied an original work when "copyright protection subsists" from the
time it is "fixed in any tangible medium of expression," (17 U.S.C. § 102(a)),
which presumably would include a patent application. See Douglas R. Wolf,
Note, The Doctrine of Elections: Has the Need to Choose Been Lost?, 9 CARDOzO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 439 (1991)(considerating the election doctrine and its applica-
tion by the Copyright Office).
337. In In re Mogan David Wine Corp. (Mogan David I), 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964),
the court held that the ownership of a design patent on the ornamental design of
a decanter did not bar its registration as a trademark, provided the decanter de-
sign functioned "a trademark to indicate origin." Id at 932. The case was re-
manded and the PTO again refused registration on the ground, inter alia, that
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964), precluded registration because the
trademark, if granted, would continue to provide protection of the container after
the design patent had expired. This argument was rejected in In re Mogan David
Wine Corp. (Mogan David II), 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967), on the ground there
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The argument that the domains of patentable and copyright sub-
ject matter should be kept exclusive has some formalistic appeal.
However, as a realistic approach to the resolution of the problem of
algorithms, it offers little advantage. Surely a published article
describing an invention advances the useful/technological arts in de-
tailing how the invention may be implemented and also advances the
liberal arts in its expression of that implementation. Conversely, if
the same description appeared in a patent application, would only the
technological arts and not the liberal arts also be advanced?m3
Samuelson expresses concern that a method for analyzing the
structure of a novel might be considered patentable, particularly if im-
plemented on a computer.33 9 The concern evidently stems from the
presumption that literary works and their structuring are to be solely
allocated to the liberal arts. Without this presumption, provided the
method of analyzing the structure of a novel or other literary work is
new, useful, and nonobvious, society presumably benefits at the mar-
gin, particularly if the patent system induced the method. The more
interesting question is whether the method is performable only by the
mind, which, as previously discussed, need not raise a § 101 statutory
subject matter issue, but rather a § 112 definiteness issue.s 40
Finally, in the context of the respective spheres of technology and
the liberal arts, it must be recognized that, from a technical stand-
point, hardware and software are often interchangeable.3 41 If the use
was no conflict between the policy reflected in the respective federal patent and
trademark statutes. See in particular, the concurring opinion of Judge Smith dis-
cussing the respective policies. Id. at 542-46. The position of the PTO with re-
spect to patents and copyrights on computer programs reflected supr note 186.
338. The patent document itself is presumably a "work of the United States Govern-
ment" under 15 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) and hence not subject to copyright protection.
However, nothing precludes the publication of the patent application (in whole or
in part) in an article, or book or otherwise.
339. Samuelson reasons:
Is an algorithm by its very nature "technological" because it involves a
precise set of steps to achieve a result? If so, a graduate student's
method of analyzing the structure of Balzac's novels would seem to be
patentable, and easily so, if the method can be carried out by computer.
Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1125-26 n. 401.
340. See supra note 290.
341. See, e.g., T. PRATT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 19
(2d ed. 1984):
Given a precise definition of a computer, it is always possible to realize
the computer in hardware-that is, to construct a hardware device
whose machine language is precisely that of the defined computer .... In
suggesting this possibility we are appealing to the important basic princi-
ple behind computer design: Any precisely defined algorithm or data
structure may be realized in hardware. Because a computer is simply a
collection of algorithms and data structures, we may assume that its
hardware realization is a possibility, regardless of the complexity of the
computer or its associate machine language.
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of software or hardware to perform a particular function is one of de-
sign choice, it stretches credibility to argue that the software imple-
mentation of an algorithm promotes only the liberal arts but that,
when the implementation is firmed-up, the technological arts now are
solely promoted.3 42
In sum, it cannot be said with any degree of certitude that § 101 as
presently construed by the CAFC and the PTO is an unreasonable in-
terpretation. Whether Benson is being ignored and the law returned
to a pre-Benson state is debatable.343 However, certainly under the
supervisory authority of the Supreme Court, the CAFC can be
brought back into line or, indeed, Congress can resolve the issue one
way or another by amending the Patent Act or enacting other legisla-
tion. Such being the case, there are still a number of policy reasons
that bear upon whether or not algorithms should be protectible by
patents.
D. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc
One of the major policy arguments that has been raised against
protecting computer programs by patents is that such protection is un-
necessary because the computer software industry has grown signifi-
cantly over the years without patent protection and with other
available protection, especially copyright. This point was raised in the
1966 President's Commission Report,3 " was mentioned in dissent in
Diehr345 and continues to be repeated.346 This type of reasoning is
See also David S. Churbuck, The Sincerest Form of Flattery, FORBES, Feb. 20,
1989, at 116-18. '"There are two ways of emulating. The hardware way is to add a
circuit board containing a co-processor, that is, a processor chip of the sort found
in the second computer.... The other way of emulating... is with software ...
Although embedded on a chip, this system is really nothing but software, that is,
a series of instructions to the machine."
342. Samuelson recognizes the problem that the technical interchangeability of hard-
ware and software may present for a system of sui generous protection for
software but concludes: "Although these problems may be difficult, they do not
seem to be inherently unresolvable." Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note
2, at 768. See infra note 391.
343. See supra notes 260, 262.
344. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 13.
345. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193 (1981).
346. In setting out the position for reliance only on copyright for software protection,
Samuelson states: "The fact that this growth has occurred without the aid of
patent protection is powerful evidence that patent protection is not necessary for
the software industry to thrive." Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at
1136 (emphasis added). Compare Chisum's conclusion based upon detailed hypo-
thetical findings, which he strongly suspects closely track reality, that denying
patent protection to algorithms will adversely affect investment in software de-
velopment. Chisum, Algorithms, supra note 2, at 1014-15. See also NRC,
SOFTwARE ISSuES supra note 65, at 60 (indicating the conclusion of an IBM vice
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still another example of the "hydraheaded heresy" of post hoc ergo
propter hoc reasoning. As stated a half century ago by Justice Griffith:
There is one heresy in the judicial forum which appears to be Hydra-
headed, and although cut off again and again, has the characteristic of an end-
less renewal. That heresy is that proof that a past event possibly happened, or
that a certain result was possibly caused by a past event, is sufficient, in proba-
tive force to take the question to a jury .... 'Post hoc ergo propter hoc' is not
sound as evidence or argument.3 4 7
The fact that copyright protection existed as a "past event" has a
causal connection with a "certain result"-the rapid growth of the
computer software industry-is, in Judge Griffith's words, "not sound
evidence or argument." The mere availability of copyrights for com-
puter programs cannot be given credit for the creation of all computer
programs. All programs induced by other than the Copyright Act
must be excluded.34s Indeed, the fact may be that the growth of the
industry has been or may be inhibited by the scope of copyright pro-
tection afforded under cases like Wzhelan and Lotus. A fortiori, the
absence of patent protection during the critical period hardly provides
a causal link to the growth of the software industry. Samuelson recog-
nizes this but dismisses the contention that there would have been
even greater growth had there been patent protection.3 4 9 The absence
of patent protection is no more proof for the growth of the industry
than is the presence of copyright protection.
president that "the software industry has prospered under the current intellec-
tual property system.").
The use of post hoc reasoning has also been used as a general justification for
the patent system; see, eg., Robert C. Brown, Jr., Whither Goes the United States
Patent System?, 9 IDEA 251, 256 (1965): "Nothing succeeds like success itself, and
the effectiveness of the United States patent system has been strongly evidenced
by the place that the United States holds in scientific and industrial progress."
347. Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625, 627 (1939). Generations
of torts students will remember this case from Dean Prosser's casebook, now in
its eighth edition. WLLIAm L. PRossER Er AT., supra note 295 at 270. In Kramer,
plaintiff received a cut on his forehead from defendants' negligently maintained
transom. Plaintiff developed skin cancer at location of the cut on his forehead.
The issue was whether there was a causal conduct between the past event (the
cut from the glass in the negligently maintained transom) and a certain result
(skin cancer).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 97-129 (discussing noncopyright-induced
programs).
349. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at U42-43:
The most powerful argument against patents for program-related inven-
tions is that the industry has grown from being a nonexistent industry to
a major, flourishing, and highly innovative industry without patent pro-
tection. It is no answer to say, as some patent lawyers might be tempted,
"Just think how innovative it would have been had patents been in
place." The absence of patents allowed the rapid spread of ideas about
programming computers.
This conclusion is contrary to one of the inducements for obtaining patents, viz.,
the incentive to disclose. See supra notes 58, 59 and 77 and accompanying text.
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As the figures in the margin indicate, growth in the computer
software industry has been continuous, but the annual growth rate of
the 1990's is projected to be less than half that of the 1980's.350 Studies
by Kenneth Flamm indicate that the primary driving force for the
growth of computer software industry in the early years was govern-
ment funding of research and development. 351 The market then was
demand driven, with increases in the performance/cost ratio of com-
puters making them desirable to a widening spectrum of consum-
ers.3 52 The performance/cost advancements in the computer field
have been dramatically put: "[I]f the automobile and airplane busi-
nesses had developed like the computer business, a Rolls Royce would
cost $2.75 and run for 3 million miles on one gallon of gas. And a Boe-
ing 767 would cost just $500 and circle the globe in 20 minutes on five
gallons of gas."3 5 3 Daniel Bricklin maintains that new software prod-
ucts will be purchased when "they are perceived to have a very good
350. From 1970 through 1980, expenditures increased from $500 million to $2.85 bil-
lion, an annual compound-rate increase of 19%. From 1980 to 1990, the increase
was $2.85 billion to $42.5 billion, an average annual compound rate increase of
31%. For the period 1990 to 2000, the projected figures are from $42.5 to $174.6
billion, with an average annual compound rate of 15.2%. CBEMA, THE INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DATA BOOK: 1960-2000, Table 4-7 at 100 (1990)(the
figure for 1990 is taken from CBEMA, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY
DATA BOOK: 1960-2001, Table 4-7 (1991)). One could speculate that the decrease
in the rate of growth projected for 1900-2000, may be related to the availability of
patent protection for computer programs. One could also speculate that the de-
crease may be related to the scope of copyright protection afforded under deci-
sions such as Whelan and Lotus. More probably, the decrease is related to the
maturing of the software industry. See SCHERER, INNOVATION, supra note 77, at
265; NRC, SOFTVARE ISSUES supra note 65, at 6.
351. Flamm points out that the market was driven by increased demand that was a
result of lower prices and increased performance, that in turn was driven by
heavy U.S. investment into R & D. Flamm concludes: "The federal government
has enormously influenced the development of computer hardware in the U.S. at
both the micro and macro levels." KENNETH FLAMM, TARGETING THE COMPUTER
123 (1987). Flamm stated that this enormous influence was the result of heavy
public investment in computer research and development, the pace of technologi-
cal progress would not have been as strong.") Flamm also suggested that tax
breaks and incentives by the U.S. government had a direct affect on the computer
industry's growth. Id. at 110.
352. Flamm observes that after heavy investment by the U.S. government fostered the
growth of the U.S. computer industry, other forces began to drive the market.
One such force was technological advance: "As technological advance continu-
ously lowered the costs of information processing, successful entrants to the in-
dustry have pioneered new markets and applications, with new products tailored
to those markets." KENNETH FLAMm, CREATING THE COMPUTER (1988). Flam
also noted the importance that increased computer compatibility had on the mar-
ket. I& at 212-213. Flamm's studies have shown a 25% price/performance im-
provement every year from 1957 to 1978 and suggests higher improvements since
then. See Linda Runyan, 40 Years on the Frontier. History of Computing, 37
DATAMATION 34 (1991).
353. THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION xiii (Tom Forester ed., 1985).
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cost-benefit ratio" and "products take off only when they are so much
better than what went before that buyers are forced to make a
purchase. Success requires a productivity improvement of roughly 100
times or, measured differently, a three-week payback."31m Another
reason that may be advanced for the rapid growth of the industry is
standardization, with customer demand and competition increasing
with the compatibility and interoperability of components and
programs.355
In short, whether the presence of copyright or the absence of pat-
ent protection had any significant impact on the growth of the com-
puter software industry is unknown and probably unknowable.
E. The Industry Position
Another argument raised is that many in the computer software
industry believe that patent protection on computer programs will be
harmful to the industry.356 This assertion may be the modern day ver-
sion of 'That is good for GM is good for the country."3 57 The asser-
tion of industry preference is at best anecdotal and appears to present
the view of a limited segment of the entire industry and, indeed, in-
cludes some individuals who now or previously opposed or advocated a
low level of copyright protection for programs.358
Copyright protection, of course, provides significant advantages to
354. Daniel Bricklin, Hit or Miss? Secrets of Creating Top Software, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Nov. 3, 1986, at 122.
355. See NRC, SoFTwARE IssuEs supra note 65, at 66-72.
356. As stated by Samuelson: "Accepting an expansive realm for software patents re-
quires ignoring that many in the software industry itself are strongly opposed to
patents for software innovations." Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at
1048 (footnote omitted); see also id. 1133-39 and accompanying notes for industry
view.
357. The quote is attributed to Charles Wilson, then President of General Motors, in
testifying at a Senate hearing in 1953 prior to being appointed secretary of De-
fense. GM public relations tried to clarify the "misquote" up until the 1970's. In
response to a question concerning a potential conflict between GM stockholders
and the country Wilson stated. "I cannot conceive of one because for years I
thought that what was good for the country was good for General Motors, and
vice versa. The difference did not exist Our company is too big. It goes with the
welfare of the country. Our contribution to the nation is quite considerable..."
See PR Imbroglios Seem to Haunt General Motors, PR SERVIcES, Oct. 1990, at 16.
358. See ag., Mitchell Kapor, Litigation v. Innovation, BYTE, Sept. 1990, at 520:
"Overprotection of intellectual property is as pernicious as underprotection in its
stifling effects on innovation and the consequent loss to society. Unfortunately,
the computer industry is experiencing an unsteady but stubborn march to extend
the scope of copyright...."; Daniel J. Lyons, IBMand Software Developers Resale
Pros and cons of copyright Protection, PC WEEK, June 5, 1989, at 72(1): "'You
don't have the right to own everything, my view is, let's have as little protection
as possible', said Daniel Bricklin. 'The software industry will do best with some
protection, but not much.'"
19931
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
small software houses because it is inexpensive to acquire, provides an
ambiguous patent-like scope of protection, and does not require appre-
ciable disclosure of the underlying ideas when distributed only in ob-
ject code. The major fears of those opposing patent protection appear
to be that they will be barred from using broad basic ideas, they will be
subject to the "time bomb" of the late-issuing patents, and powerful
companies like IBM will dominate patent ownership.35 9
Another argument advanced is that the rules have been changed,
so that if programs can now be protected by patents, this will have an
ex post facto effect; thus, expectations of free access are defeated.36o
The unfairness in the evolution of rules by the common law method
leads again into the controversy over whether courts make or discover
the law.361 On the other hand, it may be argued that industry expecta-
tions may also have been defeated when copyright protection was
given a broad patent-like scope of protection in cases like Wrhelan and
Lotus. Although some or all of these fears may be justified, the issue
would seem to be better framed in terms of what would be in the best
interests of the country in implementing the patent/copyright clause,
rather than in terms of self-perceived interests.36 2
F. Generic Anti-Patent Arguments
Other arguments illustrating the anti-patent sentiment to patent
protection for computer programs appear to be basically generic anti-
patent arguments. One argument raised is that of late issuing patents
(the "time bomb") resulting in wasted resources from independent de-
velopment.363 This problem, however, is not exclusive to the com-
puter software industry, but is common to all industries. It has long
been recognized as one of the costs of the patent system, which pre-
sumably is counterbalanced by the "lottery" incentive of patent grant-
ing in rem exclusive rights to the first inventor. Indeed, a strong case
can be made that many industries face more significant costs because
of higher capital investment and longer development times compared
to the software industry.36 4
359. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1137-38 n.440, IBM is reported
as acquiring 200 patents per year on "software-related inventions." See, Software
Patents: A Horrible Mistake?, MAssAcHuSrrrs INSTrrUTE OF TECHNOLOGY COM-
MUNICATIONS FORuM, Seminar Notes, Mar. 23, 1989, at 6 (summary of comments
by Stephen Kahn)[hereinafter MIT Notes].
360. See NRC, SOFTWARE IssuEs supra note 65, at 33.
361. See supra text accompanying note 252.
362. It is not surprising that interface designers are opposed to patent or broad "look
and feel" protection or that computer scientists would be opposed to protection of
algorithms.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
364. For example, it has been estimated that the interval between invention (concep-
tion) and innovation (commercialization) was 11 years in the petroleum industry
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Another generic anti-patent argument is that the availability of
patents on various aspects of computer programs would increase the
cost of program development because licenses would be required for
the individual components. 36w However, this again is a problem com-
mon to any industry that is producing systems, machines or processes
involving multiple parts or components, whether they be automobiles,
television sets or mouse traps.w6
A related generic argument, that patents may inhibit entry into the
field, is a particularly weak one with respect to computer programs.3 6 7
for 11 important inventions and 14 years in a variety of other industries for 38
important inventions. See EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL, RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
IN THE MODERN CORPORATION 181 (1971)(citing a study by H. Enos, Invention
and Innovation in the Petroleum Refining Industry, in THE RATE AND DInEC-
TION OF INVENTIVE ACrvrry (1962)). With respect to the pharmaceutical indus-
try the average estimated time was 15 years for 65 products studied. Id., at 183.
One could speculate that the interval was decreased in time due to the develop-
ment of computer technology. Contrast this with the interval from the concep-
tion of VisiCalc and Lotus 1-2-3 to their commercialization.
With respect to costs, in a study of the relative costs incurred during five inno-
vation stages: ((1) applied research, (2) specification, (3) prototype or pilot plant,
(4) tooling and manufacturing facilities, and (5) marketing start-up), for three
different industries (chemical, machinery and electronics), it was found that ap-
proximately two-thirds of the total cost was expended in stages (3) and (4). There
would appear to be little analogous expense to these stages for computer software
development, except perhaps for debugging, which could be the prototype stage.
See supra note 304 (considering debugging costs). It would appear clear, that the
capital and labor investment required for tooling up and construction and equip-
ping a manufacturing facility (41% of the total cost for chemicals, 37% for ma-
chines and 30% for electronics) are not comparable for the computer software
industry. See MANSFIELD, supra, at 118. The relative time spent on each of these
stages has also been studied. Id at 120.
With respect to research and development (R&D) costs per innovation, a
study reports that in the petroleum industry, an average of $15 million in R&D
was expended for each innovation, with a patents to innovation ratio of 43.58. In
comparison, the R&D per innovation ratio for the computer and office equipment
industry was $1.86 million, with a yield of 1.85 patents per innovation. The over-
all average R&D expenditure per innovation was $2.28 million, with a patent to
innovation ratio of 3.9. See Zolton J. Acs & David B. Audretsch, Innovation and
Technological Change: An Overview, in INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1, 7, Table 1.1 (Zolton J. Acs & David
B. Audretsch, eds. 1991).
365. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1137, (citing MIT Notes, supra
note 359, at 15).
366. A producer has the option of purchasing the needed parts or components and
receiving a patent and copyright infringement indemnity from the supplier or
may manufacture the part or component itself and acquire a license, if needed,
from the intellectual property owner. It is an economic decision and transactions
costs will, of course, enter into the decision.
367. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1137 and 1137 n.439 (arguing
that the cost of patent acquisition may inhibit small firms from developing pro-
grams). However, if the program development is important enough and a patent
is obtained, the patent owner has the option of granting licenses or probably mar-
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To the contrary, it can be argued that the availability of patents pro-
tecting components of computer systems would be more likely to pro-
vide entry into the market for small software houses, who may
produce components that provide unique advantages, which a pro-
ducer would be desirous of using in a computer system or broader
computer program. The producer may find it economically desirable
to take licenses rather than to engage in independent development to
invent around. 368
Another argument advanced is that the PTO lacks the technical
expertise to examine effectively applications claiming computer pro-
gram inventions.3 69 This, of course, is not a problem unique to the
computer software industry.S7o Nonetheless, there is no question that
many patents issued in all technical fields are of dubious validity.37 '
Certainly, if there is a question of infringement of a patent, the ac-
cused infringer will have great economic incentive to make further
investigation into the validity of the patent and, presumably, will have
access to the sufficient expertise required to defend an infringement
suit. The economics of this situation are hardly different from those
keting the program itself. Compare the plight of the owner of a patent on a pro-
cess for making steel. If no steel producing company will take a license, does the
patent owner often have a meaningful option of setting up a steel mill to use the
process?
368. The producer may be placed at a competitive disadvantage if it does not provide
the patented invention or a noninfringing substitute. One could argue that small
software houses may be the principal beneficiaries of patent protection in the
sense that a patent would provide them with a much stronger title of protection
to license than a copyright.
369. This is a recurring theme starting with the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 26, at 26, and continuing to Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2,
at 1138-39. Indeed, Samuelson offers a potential solution to the problem of pro-
posing a "scientific advisory board" to assist the PTO so that the software indus-
try "would gain confidence in the Office's decision making." Id. at 1146. It is not
apparent why the industry would need the intervention of a board, when, after
all, the industry is the one who would be acquiring the patents and presumably
would be "skilled in the art."
370. See, e.g., G. S. Churbuck & David C. Churbuck, Whose Invention Is It Anyway,
FORBES, Aug. 19, 1991, at 114, who report that the PTO is understaffed in techno-
logically developing areas of biotechnology, computer software, superconducting
materials, and artificial intelligence, exacerbated by a high turnover rate among
examiners-recently above 50% a year in certain units. See also David L. Wilson,
New Inventions in the United States, NAT'L J., Mar. 2, 1991, at 553, who reports
that the number of bio-tech applications is increasing at twice the average rate
and the disposal of bio-tech applications is 8 months longer than average. The
main reason for the difficulty with bio-tech applications according to a General
Accounting Office study is that the PTO lacks enough skilled examiners to han-
dle the increased load in this evolving area of technology. From October 1988 to
June 1990, the number of bio-tech examiners increased from 91 to 112, but of
those 112 examiners, only 14% have at least six years experience. Id
371. Of the patents important enough to be litigated and appealed to the CAFC almost
one-half are still found invalid. See supra note 173.
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in many other areas of technology.3 7 2
Another argument raised, which reflects an anti-patent sentiment
or, perhaps more accurately, an anti-patent attorney bias, is that pat-
ent attorneys in general (or at least certain patent attorneys) are
strongly advocating the patent protection of computer programs for
their own selfish gain.373 Although it may, at times, be difficult to
separate self-interest from advocated public interest, ad hominem ar-
gumentation has perhaps too glibly married the two. It may be sim-
pler to explain such advocacy as reflecting faith in the patent system
or, even more mundanely, as protecting against a charge of
malpractice.374
It has also been suggested that this controversy may be a turf battle
between patent and copyright attorneys; 75 it is not apparent, how-
372. Indeed, the litigation expenses in copyright infringement cases involving com-
puter programs may be approaching that of patent litigation, when considering
the extent of discovery being undertaken and the use of expert witnesses. For
example, it is reported that defendant Paperback Software spent more than
$600,000 in pre-trial expenses in a losing cause in Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). Lotus is likely to have
expended considerably more. Lotus had sales of over $400 million in 1987 com-
pared to Paperback's sales of $4.7 million that year. See William H. Wright, Com-
ment, Litigation as a Mechanism for Inefficiency in Software Copyright Law, 39
UCLA L. REV. 397, 399400 n.9 (1991). See supra note 32 (considering litigation
expenses).
373. See eg., O'Connor, supra note 137, at 8, who reports: "'Lawyers are running
around our industry asking people if they'd like to patent something,' said Ken
Wasch, executive director of the Software Publishers Association in Washington,
D.C. 'It's gotten worse than ambulance chasing, and we don't think it's a positive
development."' This theme is picked up in Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra
note 2, at 1031-32 n.16: "[I]ntellectual property law is supposed to give incentives
to invest in innovation to those who develop computer software-not to patent
lawyers." (emphasis added). One could ask with some trepidation whether this
would apply to law professors (who might happen to have been patent attorneys
in a prior life) who advocate patent protection for computer programs. One could
ask is there a different incentive motivating others, including law professors, who
attack both patent and copyright protection for computer programs to promote
sui generous protection? Posner notes:
Many writers receive nonmonetary rewards from writing-fame, pres-
tige, the hope of immortality, therapy, inner satisfaction. These rewards
reduce the cost of writing- and some of them, notably fame, can be trans-
lated into money.
POSNER, LrrERATURE, supra note 52, at 339.
374. So far at least, law professors have not had to face malpractice for the negligent
writing of law review articles. The courts have uniformly denied recovery on the
basis of educational malpractice. See generally, J. CoLws, EDUCATIONAL MAL-
PRACTICE (1990); Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action
in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 743 (1981).
375. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1147 n.474. Many patent attor-
neys, of course, hold themselves out as intellectual property law specialists quali-
fied to provide legal services related not only to patents, but also including
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, and sui generis protection. Copyright at-
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ever, how the availability of patents for computer programs would in
any way diminish the availability of copyright protection for the same
programs. It is only in that narrow area.of overlap that dual protec-
tion may be asserted; provided these titles of protection protect, re-
spectively, the claimed invention and the expression of the work, no
significant conflict should exist. For that matter, if sui generis protec-
tion of computer programs is adopted, the turf battle will probably be
expanded to the likely economic gain of patent, copyright and newly
self-proclaimed sui generis attorneys. 76
G. Sui Generis Advocacy
In terms of advocacy, there are those who are opposed not only to
patent protection of computer programs but also to copyright protec-
tion. A principal advocate taking this position is Professor Samuelson,
who has long urged the adoption of a sui generis system of protection
for computer programs.3 77 The basic argument appears to be based
upon the premise that computer programs just do not nicely fit into
either a copyright pigeonhole or a patent pigeonhole; therefore, a third
sui generis pigeonhole is needed to accommodate them. In her recent
Benson Revisited article, Samuelson states: "Programs are, in truth,
too much of a mechanical process to fit comfortably in the copyright
system and too much of a writing to fit comfortably in the patent
system."3 78
The underlying assumption of this advocacy position is that there is
something unique about a computer program not shared by other
technologies. In the first instance, it is not intuitively obvious that
programs are "in truth" too much of a mechanical process to fit com-
torneys find themselves somewhat more restrained unless registered to practice
before the PTO.
376. This may depend on how the interfaces between patent/copyright/sui generis are
defined. For example, with broad preemptive in favor of the sui generis system,
this could adversely affect patent attorneys if most programs are excluded from
patent protection. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that both patent
and copyright attorneys have bemoaned the lack of infringement litigation under
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988). See
Ronald S. Laurie, The First Year's Eaperience Under the Chip Protection Act or
"Where are the Pirates Now That We Need Them?', CoMPUTER LAw, Feb. 1986,
at 13-14, and Jon Baumgarten voicing the same concern two years later. 'There
are the pirates when we need them?", Jon Baumgarten, Chip Protection, 35 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 444 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes
412-414 (discussing this Act as a prototype for sui generis protection and note 385
for its rationale).
377. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1148-53; Samuelson, Creating a
New Kind of Intellectual Property, supra note 2; Samuelson, CONTU Revisited,
supra note 2.
378. Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1128-29. See also id. at 1148 (intro-
ducing the sentence with the phrase "If it is true that", "in truth" is deleted, and
"mechanical process" is replaced with "machine").
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fortably in the copyright system. The expression of a mechanical pro-
cess (or other expression of an invention) certainly is a writing (a
work of authorship), and it quite comfortably fits there, whether in
standard English or source or object code.379 This expression may be
fixed in copies in various tangible media of expression.3 8 0
The converse, that a program is too much a writing to fit into the
patent system, again begs the question of why the expression of an
invention (computer program or otherwise) becomes any less of a
writing when put into a patent specification including the claims.3 81
Rather than being a hybrid, a more plausible analogy might reflect the
dualistic character of a computer program, of being a writing when
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and of being an invention
when appropriately claimed as a process or machine.
Samuelson's view that programs are "a hybrid-both writing and
machine," requiring "hybrid" treatment, is based on the assumption,
which she attributes to the legal system, that something that can fit
the definition of both copyrightable and patentable subject matter
cannot be protectible by both.382 If this assumption is not so easily
made, the hybrid aspect of programs fits much more neatly into either
or both titles of protection. 33
It is also particularly interesting that the argument for sui generis
protection for computer programs is not based on the inability of pro-
grams to meet the qualitative standards for protection by either pat-
ent, copyright or both. This is in contrast to the position taken with
respect to separate protection for industrial designs384 and semicon-
379. In Baker v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the copyrightability of Seldon's book ex-
plaining the system of bookkeeping was not challenged. What was not copyright-
able were the blank forms which would preclude others from practicing the
system.
380. It is irrelevant whether the program is creatively expressed in prose in a book or
in magnetically recorded binary code on a floppy disk.
381. While many may prefer to read a novel by Balzac to a patent specification, espe-
cially the claims, most would find more literary expressiveness there than in a
print-out of object code.
382. Samuelson's expression of this idea is quoted in the text supr note 378.
383. Indeed urging the hybrid nature of a computer program is somewhat inconsistent
with the argument that such programs are exclusively writings for the promotion
of the liberal arts and are therefore excluded from patent protection. See sutra
text accompanying notes 322-343 (discussing the constitutional issue).
384. Because the nonobvious standard applies for design patent protection (see 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 171-73) relatively few individual designs qualify for protection. In
this regard since 1914 more than 70 industrial design protection bills have been
introduced-into Congress. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796,801 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). There currently is a bill before Con-
gress for industrial design protection. H.R. 1790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
Legislation known as the Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991 was in-
troduced on April 15, 1991, to give ten year protection to industrial designs that
are inadequately protected under patent, trademark, or copyright law. The re-
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ductor chips.38 5 There is no question that certain computer programs
can meet the qualitative standards for patent protection and that sub-
stantially all do for copyright protection.38 6 It is only a question of
whether they should be protected even though they are original and
new, useful, and nonobvious. In short, a mechanistic, binary view of
the Patent/Copyright Clause would appear to be a weak base indeed
to support the denial of full intellectual property protection to pro-
grams that completely satisfy the respective formal and qualitative
standards for protection.
Even assuming that preempting computer programs, in whole or in
part, from copyright and patent protection can be justified, there are
still significant problems in devising a sui generis system that will
achieve the presumably desired instrumentalist goal of inducing an
adequate number of computer programs with adequate incentives so
that a net societal benefit can be achieved. Unfortunately, this cannot
be known with any degree of exactitude aside from rational analysis of
drafted legislation includes an original design standard in § 1001 which requires
"a distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining to similar articles which is
more than merely trivial and has not been copied from another source." In addi-
tion, a new provision (§ 1022(b)) was added to permit a seller or distributor to sue
"for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in in-
stances where the injunctive relief was sought in bad faith." Also, § 1002(5) ad-
ded a provision, similar to the public use bar in patent law, which specifies that
protection does not extend to designs "embodied in a useful article that was made
public by the designer or owner in the United States or a foreign country more
that I year before the date of the application for registration under this chapter."
For recent studies of industrial design protection and U.S. practice compared to
other countries, see Reichman, Computer Programs, supra note 2; J.H. Reichman,
Design Protection and the New Technologies: The United States Experience in a
Transnational Prospective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 6 (1989).
385. The underlying rationale of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
[hereinafter SCPA], 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988), has been summarized as follows:
The purpose of the statute is to protect the investment necessary to de-
sign integrated circuits to be embodied in particular semiconductor de-
signs. A firm could spend thousands or even millions of dollars on the
engineering for a chip to perform a particular function-to act as a
processor for a computer, or to control the functions of a microwave
oven or a television set--and a competitor could simply photograph the
chip and use the photograph together with available techniques and ma-
chinery to make an exact copy. Although the engineering of the chip
was expensive, it employed known design methods and hence was proba-
bly unpatentable because "obvious" to one skilled in that art. Since the
"form" of the circuit was dictated not by design considerations, but by
the functional imperatives of the circuit components, it was not copy-
rightable. Congress passed the statute in order to protect the private
incentive to design such chips in spite of the fact that they could be so
easily copied.
EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETI-
TIVE PROCESS 840-41 (4d ed. rev. 1991). See generally, RICHARD H. STERN, SEMI-
CONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION (1988).
386. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 131-136.
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the component parts of any proposed sui generis system, which
should, of course, discount the political compromises attendant to such
legislative proposals.38 7
At a fundamental level, a sui generis system of protection presents
the same basic problems of any system of intellectual property,
namely, the definition of protectible subject matter, the qualitative
standards for protectability, and the scope of protection granted.
The statutory subject matter issue for a sui generis system may
prove even more difficult than that for patents. Are all computer pro-
grams to be preempted for a sui generis system? How will the inter-
faces of the sui generis system with the patent and copyright systems
be defined? For example, at the extreme margins: would the pro-
gram-controlled process found patentable subject matter in Diehr be
forced into the sui generis system, even though there is transforma-
tion of matter?38 8 Would a computer program described in a book in-
cluding flow charts and algorithms be denied copyright protection and
be limited to sui generis protection?3 8 9 In any event, it is far from
clear that a sui generis system would provide bright lines at the inter-
faces of patent and copyright, and this system may indeed complicate
an already unclear situation with respect to the interrelationships of
these titles of protection.
Samuelson's view on the sui generis interface with the copyright
and patent system has evolved over time. In her original article advo-
cating a sui generis system for programs, she would only preempt ob-
ject code for sui generis protection, and leave the rest to copyright.3 90
With respect to the patent/sui generis interface, she would require an
election between one or the other.391
In her latest article, she would expand sui generis subject matter to
387. It may be recalled that it took 20 years for the present Copyright Act of 1976 to be
enacted. See GOLDSTE1N, CASEBOOK, supra note 1, at 528-29, for a brief history of
the enactment of this Act. It took 10 years for the Semiconductor Chip Protec-
tion Act; see Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Comment, Five Years Without Infringement
Litigation Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act. Unmasking the Spec-
tre of Chip Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies,
1990 WIS. L. REv. 241 (1990). We still do not have industrial design protection
even though bills began to be introduced 75 years ago. See supra note 384.
388. Samuelson appears willing to cede "industrial processes and machines" applying
computer programs to patents but is wary of patent attorneys who may not
"claim software-related innovations in a straightforward manner" and of the
PTO's ability to draw lines. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at
1140-42.
389. Presumably documentation and instruction manuals would still be copyrightable
subject matter.
390. See Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 2, at 767-68.
391. Id. at 768. If sul generis protection is not limited to object code, the problem of
the interchangeability of software and hardware would seem somewhat more
"unsolvable" at the copyright/patent interface. See supra notes 341-342 (discuss-
ing the interchangeability of software and hardware).
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include source code previously allocated to copyright,392 and would
limit patent protection to "traditional industrial or physical processes
utilizing computer programs or elements."393 Hence, the sui generis
protection would preempt significant areas presently allocated to
copyright or patent or perhaps both.
Stern has suggested a possible solution to the patent/sui generis
interface problem.394 Under his proposed test for separating patenta-
ble algorithm-related inventions from nonpatentable ones, knowledge
of the algorithm would be assumed and the question would be asked
whether it would be obvious to select and adapt the algorithm for use
in the claimed invention. 95 Adopting the fiction of prescience implic-
itly accepts a discovery theory of algorithms and "remorselessly ap-
plies"396 it against its discoverer. Nonetheless, according to this test,
obvious selections and adaptions of algorithms would still be eligible
for some form of protection.3 97 It is not really apparent why an incen-
tive should be provided for obvious algorithms, except for the protec-
tion of their original expression (if any) under copyright.
A second fundamental issue is the qualitative standard to be ap-
plied in the sui generis system. Would originality be sufficient, such as
in the current copyright protection, or should a higher standard be
imposed, e.g., "hard work" or "brilliant work," as has been sug-
gested?3 98 The "hard work" standard seems to imply a "sweat-of-the-
brow" theory.399 The adoption of a "brilliant work" standard raises
392. See Samuelson, Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1150.
393. Id. at 1094.
394. Stern, Algorithm War, supra note 2, at 384-96. He only addresses the patent/sui
generis interface and evidently presumes the copyright/sui generis interface will
resolve itself under the merger doctrine. But see supra note 8.
395. Stern, Algorithm War, supra note 2 at 395. A test involving assumed knowledge
of an algorithm is found in Fook, where the Court quotes and italicizes the fol-
lowing sentence from O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115 (1854): "We
think the case must be considered as if the principle being well known, the plain-
tiff had first invented a mode of applying it .... The Flook Court added "math-
ematical formulas" to "principle." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
396. This approach is reflective of the formalistic period of the law. See supra note
331. It is also reminiscent of John Chipman Gray's famous rule, in disregard of
reality, that the Rule Against Perpetuities was to be "remorselessly applied."
JOHN CmPAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIEs § 62a (4th ed. 1942).
397. Stern, Algorithm War, supra note 2, at 390-91, suggests amending the Patent Act
or enacting utility model legislation, the essential features being a registration
system, limited term (e.g. 10 years), and a different qualitative standard.
398. Robert Spinrad of Xerox Corp. has suggested two forms of coverage for computer
software one for "hard work" and the other for "brilliant work." See Samuelson,
Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1149. Samuelson favors sui generis protection
"for minimally 'original' program source and object code . . . (Spinrad's 'hard
work' coverage)." Id. at 1150. She also raises the possibility of protecting "bril-
liant work" according to a "modified patent approach" but questions the ability of
the PTO to be up to the task. Id. at 1151.
399. In Feist Publishing Co. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991) the Supreme
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even more interesting question.
Presumably, a "brilliant work" standard would be higher than a
nonobvious standard of patent law for which in rem protection is
granted.40 o If "brilliant" can be equated with "revolutionary," in the
sense as described above of revolutionizing production or consumption
patterns,4 0 ' then it should follow that society would want to provide
relatively great incentives for the creation of such programs. Indeed,
if the patent system is functioning as intended, "brilliant work," such
as Karmarkar's Linear Program, which Stern indicates "is said to be
the veritable E=mc of linear programming,"4 02 would be classified as
revolutionary and theoretically should provide significant societal
benefits in excess of costs. It may be anticipated that Bell Labs would
have a greater incentive to invest in the development of such brilliant
work when in rem protection can be obtained compared to some form
of watered-down sui generis protection.403
A critical issue in any sui generis system would be the scope of
protection/infringement issue. One aspect of this issue is the permissi-
ble scope of reverse engineering, which is presently haunting the
field.404 A related issue is the nature of the remedy to be provided for
infringement. Would the sui generis right be treated as property in
the patent or copyright sense, and would an injunctive remedy be
available? Or would the sui generis right be treated as "quasi prop-
erty"40 5 or be subject to compulsory licenses? 40 6
The in rem property treatment of a patent, in particular, has
proved troubling to many. For example, Stern would find it prefera-
ble for Bell Labs, as the owner of the Karmarkar patent, to license it
(i.e., be compelled to license it) at a reasonable royalty rate rather
than maintaining full exclusivity.407 If Bell Labs were forced to grant
compulsory licenses, this would, of course, diminish the incentive for
Court rejected a "sweat of the brow" test of "originality" with respect to a tele-
phone directory. It would be hoped that any 'ard work" standard for sui generis
protection would at least meet the Feist standard, especially if source code was to
be preempted for the sui generis system.
400. It is not apparent whether the "brilliant work" standard would be higher or
lower than the "flash of creative genius" test for patentability of Cuno Eng'g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
401. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84 (discussing revolutionary inventions).
402. Stern, Algorithm War, supra note 2, at 387.
403. See Oddi, Beyond Obviousness, supra note 12, at 1137-41 (proposing that such rev-
olutionary inventions be granted augmented protection over utility patents).
404. Reverse engineering is a defense under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,
17 U.S.C. § 906 (1988).
405. This term was introduced into the common law branch of intellectual property
when the Supreme Court upheld enjoining the copying of 'hot" uncopyrightable
news until the news has lost its value. International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
406. See supra note 38 and infra note 409.
407. Stern, Algorithm War, supra note 2, at 387-88.
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it to invest in the creation of such inventions, admitted to be of a bril-
liant/revolutionary type. It is far from established that society would
benefit more from a system imposing compulsory licenses at a reason-
able royalty compared to the incentive of exclusivity and the in rem
treatment of the patent system.408
The question of the remedy to be afforded for intellectual property
infringement has been considered by the Supreme Court several times
in the last decade. In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., the
Court observed that compulsory licenses were a rarity in the U.S. pat-
ent system and refused to order one for alleged patent misuse.409 In
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios (the Betamax case), Justice
Blackmun, in dissent, urged that it was not so much a question of right
as one of the remedy, which should at least entitle the copyright
owner to royalties if not an injunction against home copying of off-the-
air television programs.410 There would thus appear to be no indica-
tion that the Supreme Court, at least in the near future, is likely to
relax its property treatment of patents, although Congress has been
more amenable to compulsory licenses with respect to certain activi-
ties under the Copyright Act.411
A word of caution may also be voiced concerning the adoption of
sui generis systems of protection for so-called hybrid technologies, if
anything is to be learned from the less-than-inspiring history of the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.41 2 A great deal of time, effort
and money was expended by interest groups and other advocates to
convince a receptive Congress to solve what proved to be virtually a
nonexistent problem.413 Technological advancements appear to have
408. See BowMAN, supra note 44, at 243-49 (1973)(evaluating the effectiveness of com-
pulsory license as a remedy for antitrust or misuse violations and concluding that
such license might be used as a remedy "as a last resort" in the absence of other
alternatives). For a recent study, see Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory
Patent Licensing in the United States: Good in Theory, But Not Necessary in
Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TEcH. L.J. 41 (1990).
409. 448 U.S. 176, 223 (1980).
410. 464 U.S. 417, 494 (1984)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
411. With respect to compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976, see
17 U.S.C. § 111 (1988)(cable television); § 115 (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. §§ 116 &
116a (1988)(juke boxes); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (1988)(public broadcasting); 17 U.S.C.
§ 119 (1988)(superstations and network stations). See also Paul Goldstein, Pre-
empted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Test-
ing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107 (1977)(critiquing these
compulsory licensing provisions).
412. The history of the SCPA is detailed in Risberg, supra note 387, at 254-260.
413. To date only one case has been decided under the SCPA, Brooktree Corp. v. Ad-
vanced Micro Devices, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1088 (S.D. Cal. 1990) aff'd 977 F.2d 1555
(Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case the district court upheld a jury verdict of over $25
million for mask work infringement under the SCPA and patent infringement of
three of plaintiff's patents. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for
the jury to find that defendant had not proven its reverse engineering defense.
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left whatever copyists there may have been in the lurch, and chip de-
signers presently appear to find patents a congenial title of
protection.4' 4
This is not to say that there is not considerable merit in a finely
tuned sui generis system of protection for computer programs, as
would also be the case for all other fields of technology, e.g., separate
titles for genetics, pharmaceuticals, oil prospecting, pollution control,
etc.4 15 Certainly, a title of protection specifically devised to meet the
needs for inducing developments in the respective technical fields at
exactly the right level of incentive, with the right scope of protection
(including the duration) would be ideal for optimizing benefit.416 Un-
fortunately, devising such systems with any degree of certitude of re-
sult appears beyond the present state of knowledge, even if political
consideration could be disregarded. 1 7 Thus, to attack the refusal to
change the status quo and urge the adoption a sui generis system re-
quires a leap of faith to believe that a substitute sui generis system will
provide greater benefits than costs compared to the title or titles of
protection that it preempts.4' 8
Plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment intevert for patent infringement but not
under the SCPA. 757 F. Supp. at 1099. The district court then conditioned plain-
tiff's recovery of prejudgment interest for patent infringement upon whether "it
can successfully segregate the damage award between the patent and mask work
damages." I&. at 1100. Such an allocation may prove difficult if the mask work
registration provides only redundant coverage to the patents. The Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed both the jury verdict and district court rulings that an extensive
paper trail does not incontrovertibly prove the originality of the end product or
the absence of copying to establish a reverse engineering defense under the
SCPA. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
The following reasons have been offered for the lack of reliance on the SCPA.
current sophisticated chip designs do not lend themselves to direct copying,
greater availability of licenses to competitors; improved climate for patent protec-
tion; and the availability of computer-aided design for chips and reduced incen-
tive to copy because of an increasing market for semicustom chips. See, Risberg,
supra note 387.
414. The number of applications under the SCPA has remained approximately con-
stant at about 1000-1200 per year. U.S. Copyright Office, FEDERAL STATUTORY
PROTEMrION FOR MASK WORKS, Circular 100 (April 1991)(attachment). Chip de-
signers appear to be relying on patents to protect their specialized processes. See
Risberg, supra note 387, at 263-69.
415. The need for such sui generis protection may be based on the degree of unique-
ness or the relative importance of the subject matter or perhaps the clout of a
particular interest group.
416. See Machlup, supra note 11 (citing economic studies on optimal duration).
417. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
418. Compare Samuelson's position:
Apart from the conceptual integrity that a sui generis law would finally
introduce to intellectual property law as applied to computer programs,
a key advantage of sui generis legislation is that it would be accompanied
by an increased certainty in the field about what is and is not protected
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The current agnostic approach may not produce optimal benefits in
the short or even the long run, but it has been evolving in a period of
extraordinary technological growth.419 The common law method
takes a great deal of time to fill in the contours of any field of law,
including statutory interpretation as in copyright and patent law. On
the other hand, if Judge Posner is correct and the common law even-
tually produces efficient results, this method may well be the desira-
ble way of dealing with the problem of defining the parameters of
patent and copyright protection for computer programs.4 20 This is es-
pecially so when there are no clear indications that the present ap-
proach to protecting computer programs is producing the dire
consequences that certain spokespersons for the software industry and
advocates of sui generis protection have asserted.42 1 Presumably, both
the patent and copyright systems have served this nation well for over
two hundred years. It is hardly demonstrable that the development of
computers and computer programs over the last four decades would
and under what conditions protection is available. It is unfortunate that
so many intellectual property lawyers are content to wait decades for the
existing laws to be applied in a case-by-case fashion so that the contours
of the law of software protection will be revealed by the "genius" of the
common law. Firms in the software market today are probably less than
pleased at the prospect of being the guinea pigs in this common law pro-
cess and want to know the answers to protection questions now. Unfor-
tunately, the answer they get now will depend on which lawyer they ask.
Benson Revisited, supra note 2, at 1152-53 (footnote omitted).
419. No cause and effect relationship is claimed between this growth and the "agnostic
approach" for fear of Hydra growing a new head. See supra text accompanying
notes 346-355.
420. As concluded by Posner- "Although the correlation is far from perfect, judge-
made rules tend to be efficiency promoting while those made by legislatures tend
to be efficiency-reducing" (footnotes omitted). POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS,
supra note 53, at 495. Although patents are created by statute, the rule that com-
puter programs or algorithms are patentable subject matter is a judge-made one
in the absence of a specific statutory rule.
Posner makes the argument that inefficient rules are likely to be litigated in
order to reach an efficient result. Insufficient interest and stare decisis may stand
in the way of this. Id. at 522-28. The same can be said for the interpretation of a
statute. A particular interpretation may be challenged until finally decided,
hopefully in an efficient manner. But see id. at 500-07, (concerning statutory in-
terpretation). This would seem to suggest that the interpretation of statutory
subject matter and infringement should be left to the courts in a common law
capacity rather than having the legislation reach a political compromise based
when the relative power of the interest groups.
Posner also indicates that the costs of legislative enactments are high, but sug-
gests that sometimes the benefits may exceed the costs by having narrow rules.
Id. at 512-14. See supra note 387 (indicating the number of years required to enact
intellectual property legislation).
421. See supra note 350 (indicating projected growth of the software industry to the
new century). There are also the qualitative and cost barriers to the acquisition
of patents.
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have been better served by a sui generis system; whether the next gen-
eration would be better served is pure speculation.
IV. CONCLUSION
An attempt has been made in this article to analyze the relative
benefits and costs of the current protection afforded computer pro-
grams by the copyright and patent systems. The conclusion drawn
from this comparative analysis is that the economic case for copyright
protection of computer programs is somewhat uneasier than is that for
patent protection.
The conclusion is also drawn that no easier case can be made for
the preemptive protection of computer programs by copyright or by a
sui generis system on the basis of the legal and policy arguments made
against patent protection. In this context, Professor Machlup's classic
study of the patent system may provide some helpful insight. Mach-
lup concluded that, if a patent system already exists, it would be irre-
sponsible, on the basis of present knowledge of its economic
consequences, to recommend terminating it; on the other hand, if one
did not exist, it would be irresponsible for the same reason to recom-
mend instituting one.4 22 Accordingly, although it may be quite re-
sponsible to advocate that the protection of computer programs (or
other particular forms of technology) be preempted by an existing ti-
tle of protection or that a sui generis system be created for such pro-
tection, far less than a compelling case has been made to date for those
propositions.
422. Machlup, supm note 11, at 80.
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